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Background and Objectives: The overall objective of the current thesis was to 
investigate three forms of prospection in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
namely episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and prospective memory (PM), using 
three empirical studies. While few past studies have found ASD-related impairments in 
episodic future thinking, there is limited understanding of the mechanisms that might 
underpin these impairments in this clinical group. The aim of the first empirical study was 
therefore to investigate whether difficulties in two potential cognitive mechanisms, 
specifically scene construction and self-projection through time, might contribute to 
episodic future thinking deficits in children with ASD. In addition, no studies to date have 
examined the practical application of episodic future thinking, which involves taking steps 
in the present in light of imaginations of the future (referred to as episodic foresight in the 
current thesis), in individuals with ASD. Thus, the second empirical study aimed to 
investigate whether episodic foresight might be compromised in children with ASD, and 
possible cognitive factors that might underpin any identified episodic foresight deficits. 
Furthermore, while time-based PM has consistently been shown to be impaired in ASD, 
findings on event-based PM have been mixed in the literature. The cognitive contributors to 
impairments in PM also remain unclear. Hence, the aim of the third empirical study was to 
investigate event-based and time-based PM, as well as their potential contributing factors, 
in children with ASD. Lastly, given the importance of episodic foresight and PM on daily 
functioning argued in the literature, the current thesis also explored the relationships 
between these forms of prospection and functional capacity in children with ASD. 
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Method and Results: Children with high-functioning ASD (i.e., IQ > 80) aged 8 to 
12 years and age- and IQ-matched healthy controls were recruited for the current research 
project. Study 1 (n = 37 ASD, 60 controls) showed that impairments in episodic future 
thinking were linked to difficulties in scene construction, rather than self-projection through 
time. In addition, Study 2 (n = 40 ASD, 55 controls) provided novel evidence of an intact 
capacity to take appropriate steps in the present in anticipation of potential future problems 
in the ASD group. However, children with the disorder demonstrated an impaired capacity 
to subsequently implement actions at specific future points that allowed successful problem 
resolutions, therefore result in a failure in episodic foresight. The impairments in 
implementing actions at appropriate future points were not attributable to retrospective 
memory or executive functioning deficits. Study 3 (n = 32 ASD, 42 controls) revealed 
pervasive deficits in both event-based and time-based PM in children with ASD, and 
indicated that these deficits were related to difficulties in executive functioning and 
retrospective memory for PM task content. Finally, episodic foresight and PM were not 
found to be associated with functional capacity in the ASD group. 
Conclusions: The current thesis provided novel insights into the unique profile of 
impairments across different forms of prospection in children with ASD. Further 
investigations will be needed to clarify how and why specific impairments in these forms of 
prospection are apparent in children with ASD, specifically whether these impairments may 
be attributable to common underlying deficits. Future research in this area will be beneficial 
in contributing to the development of targeted interventions that aim to improve daily 
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1.1 Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a lifelong pervasive neurodevelopmental 
disorder characterised by impairments in social reciprocity and social communication, as 
well as restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). The disorder has previously encompassed a range of diagnostic labels including 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s syndrome and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise 
specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, 
Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). However, these 
diagnoses have been subsumed under one broad diagnostic category of ASD in the latest 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). As a result, the diagnosis of ASD now includes individuals 
who fall on a wide spectrum of symptom severity and show considerably varied levels of 
language and intellectual abilities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Gonzalez-
Gadea et al., 2014). As such, ASD is considered a highly heterogenous disorder. Regardless 
of the differences in these diagnostic features, all individuals with ASD present with poor 
adaptive functioning and often struggle to acquire independent living skills throughout life 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
There is generally a global rise in the number of people being diagnosed with ASD, 
with population prevalence rates estimated to be 1.5% in developed countries (Lyall et al., 
2017; Özerk, 2016). In Australia, there has been a 42.1% increase in ASD diagnoses from 




Bureau of Statistics, 2015; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017). Statistical 
reports from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015) further revealed that 83.7% of 
individuals with ASD between 5 and 20 years of age experienced significant difficulties 
within the educational domain. For adults with ASD, unemployment rates were reported to 
be as high as 31.6%, which was three times more than the rate for individuals with other 
disabilities and six times more than the rate for those without a disability (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2015). The substantial increase in the number of individuals diagnosed 
with ASD is alarming, considering the challenges for these individuals and the potential 
burden on families and society more broadly as a consequence. In fact, findings in recent 
studies illustrated that ASD is associated with high lifetime costs across multiple domains, 
due to these individuals’ needs for lifelong care and support (Roddy & O’Neill, 2019; 
Rogge & Janssen, 2019). Clearly, the high prevalence of ASD and high degree of 
associated impairment underscores the importance of increasing current understanding 
regarding the possible contributors to the poor functional outcomes in life associated with 
the disorder. 
In the research literature, individuals with ASD have generally been categorised as 
either low-functioning or high-functioning (Jaarsma & Welin, 2012; Pineda, Friedrich, & 
LaMarca, 2014; Thomeer, McDonald, Rodgers, & Lopata, 2019). Individuals with low-
functioning ASD are usually those with a comorbid intellectual disability and language 
delay, whereas those who are high-functioning have an average to above average IQ, as in 
the former diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; 
Zimmerman, Ownsworth, O’Donovan, Roberts, & Gullo, 2018). Due to the normal general 




terms of receiving support in their daily living activities. For instance, one of the common 
issues with children who are identified as high-functioning is that they are often placed in 
mainstream schools where limited support is provided, despite their ongoing behavioural 
and academic difficulties in the classroom (Thomeer et al., 2019). Daily challenges such as 
time management and task organisation are also frequently experienced by children with 
high-functioning ASD, which often in turn impose heightened stress levels for their parents 
(Bonis, 2016; Thomeer et al., 2019). Research on high-functioning children with ASD is 
therefore invaluable as it provides further insights into ASD-related deficits which will 
contribute to understanding of the specific support that these children require to adaptively 
function in different settings. For the current research project, children with high-
functioning ASD were recruited as the population of interest. 
1.2 Introduction to Cognitive Functioning in ASD 
Despite the average to high levels of intellectual functioning in a proportion of 
individuals with ASD, deficits in various areas of cognitive functioning have been shown in 
a wealth of past studies in these individuals. For example, there is well-established 
evidence of impairments in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-
Cohen, O'riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 
1994; Happé, 1994; Kimhi, 2014; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013), episodic 
memory (Boucher, Mayes, & Bigham, 2012; Lind, 2010; Lind & Bowler, 2008; Tanweer, 
Rathbone, & Souchay, 2010), relational memory (Bowler, Gaigg, & Gardiner, 2014; 
Bowler, Gaigg, & Lind, 2011), retrospective memory measured on verbal recall tasks 




Brunsdon et al., 2015; Fitch, Fein, & Eigsti, 2015; Lind, Bowler, & Raber, 2014; Pellicano, 
2011) across all age groups. In addition, attenuated performances across a range of 
executive function tasks have been shown in individuals with high-functioning ASD, 
including tasks measuring cognitive flexibility (Sinzig, Morsch, Bruning, Schmidt, & 
Lehmkuhl, 2008; Van Eylen et al., 2011; Yeung, Han, Sze, & Chan, 2016), inhibition 
(Sanders, Johnson, Garavan, Gill, & Gallagher, 2008; Xiao et al., 2012), working memory 
(Fried et al., 2016; Lai et al., 2017; Landa & Goldberg, 2005), and verbal fluency (Lai et 
al., 2017; Spek, Schatorjé, Scholte, & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2009). Deficits in these areas 
have been found to contribute to the behavioural symptoms of ASD (Berenguer, Miranda, 
Colomer, Baixauli, & Roselló, 2017; Jones et al., 2018; Lind, Williams, Raber, Peel, & 
Bowler, 2013; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Zalla & Korman, 2018), as well as 
functional difficulties in daily life (Bennett et al., 2013; John, Dawson, & Estes, 2018; 
Kenny, Cribb, & Pellicano, 2019). One area of cognition that has largely been neglected in 
the field, however, is the capacity for prospection, which could possibly be an additional 
contributing factor to the reduced adaptive skills in individuals with ASD. 
1.3 Introduction to Prospection 
Prospection is a broad future-oriented cognitive construct that encompasses all 
forms of thinking related to the future, such as planning, spatial navigation, implementation 
intentions and semantic future thinking (Baumeister, Vohs, & Oettingen, 2016; Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2007; Szpunar, 2010; Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). Episodic future 
thinking, episodic foresight and prospective memory (PM) are three forms of prospection 




in the current thesis. Episodic future thinking refers to the capacity to imagine oneself pre-
experiencing events that might happen in a particular future time period (Atance & O'Neill, 
2001; Schacter, Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017). A number of researchers in recent years have 
extended this concept by highlighting the adaptive function of imagining the future, which 
includes the ability to apply imaginations of hypothetical future scenarios to guide actions 
in the present in order to secure future benefits (Baumeister et al., 2016; Suddendorf & 
Moore, 2011). For example, a person who imagines themselves possibly getting wet in the 
rain on the way home from work then chooses to bring an umbrella with them before 
leaving the house in the morning. This practical capacity has been labelled ‘episodic 
foresight’ (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011) and will be a term that is used in the current thesis 
to specifically refer to the adaptive application of imagining the future. To date, most past 
studies have focused on investigating the capacity to mentally simulate future scenarios 
(i.e., episodic future thinking), whereas the adaptive application of such capacity (i.e., 
episodic foresight) has attracted less empirical attention. The third form of prospection 
focused on in the current thesis is PM, which refers to the ability to remember to perform 
intentions associated with the future such as remembering to call a friend at 8 p.m. or 
remembering to turn off the lights before leaving the house (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; 
Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000). Relative to the investigation of episodic future thinking and 
episodic foresight, PM is a topic that has a longer history of research, particularly in 
relation to aging populations (e.g., Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004; Phillips, 
Henry, & Martin, 2008; Rose, Rendell, McDaniel, Aberle, & Kliegel, 2010). By contrast, 
research on PM in children has rapidly increased only in recent years (Kvavilashvili, KyLe, 




2014). The importance of episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and PM for successful 
daily functioning has continually been emphasised throughout the literature (Brunette, 
Calamia, Black, & Tranel, 2018; Henry, Addis, Suddendorf, & Rendell, 2016; Hering, 
Kliegel, Rendell, Craik, & Rose, 2018; Raskin, 2018), with increasing evidence showing 
impairments in these capacities in clinical populations that have well-established 
difficulties with adaptive functioning such as adults with schizophrenia (D'Argembeau, 
Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Henry, Rendell, Kliegel, & Altgassen, 2007), individuals 
with depression (Addis, Hach, & Tippett, 2016; Altgassen, Kliegel, & Martin, 2009) and 
older adults with Parkinson’s disease (de Vito et al., 2012; Foster, Rose, McDaniel, & 
Rendell, 2013). Given that poor adaptive functioning is commonly observed in children 
with ASD, an investigation into episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and PM is 
warranted to gain a better understanding of why functional difficulties may be present in 
this clinical population. 
1.4 Objectives of the Current Project 
The overall objective of the current research project was to investigate prospection 
in children with ASD, with a specific focus on episodic future thinking, episodic foresight 
and PM. Three empirical studies were conducted to address research questions related to 
episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and PM in this clinical group, and these studies 
were written in three separate chapters in the current thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
 Study 1 
Given that there is emerging evidence of an impairment in episodic future thinking 




study was designed to further explore possible mechanisms that might underpin these 
impairments. Two of the mechanisms argued to be important for episodic future thinking 
are self-projection through time and scene construction (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis 
& Maguire, 2007). As such, the aim of the first empirical study was: 
- To investigate whether difficulties in scene construction and/or self-projection 
through time might underpin the impairments in episodic future thinking in 
children with ASD.  
 Study 2 
To date, past studies on children with ASD have predominantly examined the 
experiential component of imagining the future while the adaptive application of this 
capacity remains largely unexplored. As a result, there is currently very limited 
understanding of the capacity to adaptively apply episodic future thinking (i.e., episodic 
foresight) in this clinical group. The second empirical study thus aimed:  
- To extend previous findings of an impairment in the capacity to pre-experience 
future events in imaginations in children with ASD by investigating whether 
episodic foresight might also be impaired in children with the disorder, using a 
novel behavioural measure called Virtual Week-Foresight. 
- To identify the extent to which any deficits in episodic foresight in children with 
ASD might be contributed to by difficulties in retrospective memory and/or 




- To examine whether any deficits in episodic foresight in children with ASD might 
be related to poor adaptive functioning. 
 Study 3 
The third empirical study was conducted to investigate PM abilities in children with 
ASD. Two main types of PM tasks were examined, namely event-based and time-based 
PM. To date, relatively few studies have investigated both event-based and time-based PM 
in the same sample of children with ASD. In addition, Study 3 addressed the potential role 
of retrospective memory and executive functions in any identified PM deficits in this 
clinical group as this remains unclear in the existing literature. The extent to which PM 
might be related to adaptive functioning in this clinical group has also been under-
researched to date and was investigated in this study. Thus, the aims of the third study 
were:  
- To examine patterns of performance on event-based and time-based PM tasks in 
children with ASD using a reliable measure called Virtual Week-Prospective 
Memory. 
- To explore whether any identified PM impairments might be related to difficulties 
in retrospective memory and/or executive functions in children with ASD. 
- To examine whether deficits in PM performance might be associated with poor 





1.5 Thesis Structure 
The current thesis comprises eight chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) provides an 
overview of the area of interest (i.e., prospection in children with ASD), as well as the 
rationale and aims of the research project. Chapters 2 and 3 respectively provide two 
critical reviews on episodic future thinking and episodic foresight, and PM, covering 
definitions, proposed cognitive underpinnings of these cognitive abilities, and assessment 
methods that have been employed thus far in the literature. These two chapters also include 
discussions of the research to date regarding episodic future thinking, episodic foresight 
and PM in individuals with ASD and conclude with summaries of the gaps in the current 
ASD literature. Chapter 4 is a methodology chapter which provides details of the 
recruitment process, sample characteristics and measures used in the three empirical 
studies. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical studies undertaken to address the research 
questions in the current project. These chapters are written as three standalone empirical 
papers and therefore necessarily contain some repetition of information from previous 
chapters. In the write-up of the first empirical study in Chapter 5, mechanisms underlying 
episodic future thinking in children with ASD are addressed. This is followed by Chapter 6 
reporting the second empirical study which investigated the adaptive form of episodic 
future thinking (i.e., episodic foresight) and its contributors in this clinical group. Chapter 7 
then explores PM in children with ASD and discusses the possible contributors of other 
cognitive abilities to PM. Finally, the thesis concludes in Chapter 8 with a general 
discussion of the findings from the three empirical studies and the implications of these 
findings for children with ASD. Strengths and limitations of the current project and future 



























Episodic future thinking and episodic foresight are complex constructs of 
prospection and will be the focus of discussion in this chapter. The chapter will start by 
defining episodic future thinking and episodic foresight, followed by a review of the 
proposed cognitive mechanisms that might underpin these abilities. In addition, various 
methods of assessment that have been used to index episodic future thinking and episodic 
foresight will be reviewed, including a critical discussion of the limitations of existing 
measures. Finally, the chapter will critically analyse studies that have investigated episodic 
future thinking in adults and children with ASD and will identify the current gaps in 





2.1 Mental Time Travel into the Past and Future 
Mental time travel is a unique human cognitive faculty that enables individuals to 
mentally experience personal events in subjective time (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 
2007; Tulving, 2002). One form of mental time travel, labelled episodic memory, is the 
ability to mentally project backwards in time to re-experience past events, and has been the 
focus of research attention for many years (Tulving, 2002, 2005). By contrast, research into 
the ability to mentally travel forwards in time to pre-experience hypothetical future events 
has only begun to flourish in the past decade. This rapidly growing interest in mental time 
travel into the future appears to have been motivated by increased recognition of the 
tremendous survival value of this ability (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; Szpunar, 2010). Specifically, mentally pre-experiencing future events allows humans 
to examine and compare multiple plausible future scenarios in their minds. Such 
consideration of possible future outcomes can in turn guide and shape actions in the present 
that might help secure future benefits and prepare for potential threats (Baumeister et al., 
2016; Suddendorf, 2017; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Many of the activities of daily 
living require mental time travel into the future, and range from trivial matters such as 
deciding what to wear to work tomorrow to making major life decisions such as getting 
married and buying a house (Bulley, Redshaw, & Suddendorf, in press; Henry et al., 2016; 
Suddendorf & Henry, 2013). As such, the ability to mentally simulate future scenarios is 
thought to have considerable impact on individuals’ capacity to flexibly adapt to various 
life circumstances, which in turn promotes independent living (Suddendorf, Addis, & 




2.2 Definition of Episodic Future Thinking 
The capacity to mentally project oneself into the future to simulate hypothetical 
scenarios has been referred to as ‘episodic future thinking’ by a number of researchers 
(Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Schacter et al., 2017; Schacter, Devitt, 
& Addis, 2019). The key characteristic that defines episodic future thinking has been 
proposed to be the subjective feeling of ‘pre-living’ an event that might happen in the near 
or distant future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007). For example, a person might 
imagine themselves going to the beach on their next summer holiday or giving a speech at 
their friend’s 50th birthday party in 20 years’ time. This sense of pre-experiencing future 
scenarios is what differentiates episodic future thinking from semantic future thinking, 
which refers to general knowledge of future events (e.g., who might be the next prime 
minister of Australia; Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Szpunar et al., 2014). A further distinction 
between episodic and semantic future thinking has been argued to be the involvement of 
different forms of consciousness (Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Szpunar, 2010). While semantic 
future thinking requires noetic consciousness (i.e., the sense of knowing general 
information in the absence of pre-experiencing personal events), episodic future thinking is 
the manifestation of autonoetic consciousness, which is the awareness of one’s own 
existence that extends across time (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Szpunar, 2010; Tulving, 
1985). Autonoetic consciousness has been argued to be the hallmark of episodic future 
thinking, without which it has been claimed that humans are deprived of the ability to 
experience events in subjective time (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2002).  
The ability to imagine specific future episodes that are plausible is another key 




episodic future thinking allows one to entertain endless possibilities of the future, the 
imagination of hypothetical future events is often not given free reign. Rather, episodic 
future thinking is constrained to reality and a person’s current life circumstances (Atance & 
O'Neill, 2001; Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Szpunar, 2010). For instance, it would be 
implausible for someone who has never skied before to imagine themselves winning a gold 
medal at the upcoming Olympics games or for an 8-year-old child to envisage himself 
driving to his friend’s birthday party on Saturday. Thus, the plausibility of an event is one 
key element that distinguishes episodic future thinking from broader concepts of 
imagination or daydreaming (Szpunar, 2010). 
 Functional aspect of episodic future thinking 
As previously mentioned, episodic future thinking has considerable adaptive value 
in everyday life because the primary function of imagining what might happen in the future 
is arguably to inform current behaviours that might influence future outcomes (Baumeister 
et al., 2016; Suddendorf, 2017). This functional aspect of episodic future thinking will be 
labelled ‘episodic foresight’ in the current thesis. It has been suggested that episodic 
foresight not only encompasses the ability to mentally simulate future scenarios (i.e., 
episodic future thinking), but also involves the practical capacity to adjust behaviours in the 
present in light of the imagined future (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). To illustrate episodic 
foresight in daily life, consider the possibility that I have a job interview next week and I 
imagine myself sitting in the interview room with the interviewer. As I continue to imagine 
myself answering each question that might be asked in the interview, I realise there is one 
question I do not know the answer to. This then prompts me to search for the answer in the 




likelihood of getting the job. This example demonstrates that episodic foresight may draw 
on processes that support the imagination of the future scene as well as those that are 
required to organise future-directed behaviours (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). 
Theoretical arguments thus far in the literature have mostly focused on possible 
processes that might be involved in mentally pre-experiencing future events, while much 
less has been discussed about mechanisms that might underpin the practical capacity for 
episodic foresight. However, given that episodic future thinking is considered an essential 
component of episodic foresight (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 
2013), it may be argued that processes that support episodic future thinking may also be 
involved in episodic foresight. The next section will cover theories and empirical evidence 
of potential cognitive abilities that have been suggested to be related to episodic future 
thinking and episodic foresight. For simplicity, the term ‘episodic future thinking’ will 
mainly be used in this next section. This partly reflects the increased research attention that 
episodic future thinking has received to date, compared to the dearth of knowledge about 
episodic foresight in the current field. 
2.3 Processes Involved in Episodic Future Thinking 
Episodic future thinking is a sophisticated cognitive faculty that has been argued to 
rely on a host of underlying cognitive mechanisms for its successful execution in real life 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013). In particular, the capacity 
to imagine hypothetical future scenarios requires a person to temporarily suspend attention 
to the present surroundings, perceive imagined events from a future perspective and create 




the construction of novel future scenarios in our imagination draws on the capacity to 
flexibly combine elements that are extracted from various cognitive systems and inhibit 
tendencies to simply project a past episode into the imagined future (Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; D'argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; 
Schacter et al., 2017; Suddendorf, 2017; Szpunar, 2010; Wang & Koh, 2015). As such, it is 
apparent that episodic future thinking potentially imposes demands on a range of cognitive 
abilities including episodic memory (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Schacter et al., 
2017; Suddendorf, 2010a), semantic memory (Irish, 2016; Irish & Piguet, 2013; Martin-
Ordas, Atance, & Louw, 2012), relational binding (Wiebels et al., 2019), theory of mind 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), and executive functions 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013), although the specific 
roles of these mechanisms in episodic future thinking remain a source of debate in the field. 
Executive functions and episodic memory are two of the cognitive abilities that have 
received increased empirical investigation in relation to episodic future thinking in recent 
years. 
 The role of executive functions in episodic future thinking 
Executive functions refer to a set of higher-order cognitive processes that govern the 
regulation of behaviours for successful problem solving and goal attainment, and include 
cognitive flexibility, inhibition and working memory (Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & 
Wallace, 2008). Executive functions are argued to be involved in episodic future thinking 
because the mental simulation of hypothetical future scenarios, as mentioned, requires the 
ability to flexibly combine disparate elements from past experiences, inhibit the retrieval of 




desirable outcome (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf, 2010a; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997, 2007). 
In terms of empirical evidence regarding the contribution of executive functions to 
episodic future thinking, findings to date have been mixed. For example, one study found 
episodic future thinking imposed the highest demands on executive functions (indexed by 
performance on verbal fluency tasks), relative to other cognitive processes such as visual-
spatial processing and verbal relational memory, in a group of young adults (D'Argembeau, 
Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der Linden, 2010). The authors thus posited that executive 
functions may be required to support the retrieval of autobiographical knowledge, and to 
support the search and selection of the most appropriate spatiotemporal context within 
which hypothetical future events may be simulated (D'Argembeau et al., 2010). These 
findings were supported in some subsequent studies that also found executive functions to 
be related to episodic future thinking (Atance & Jackson, 2009; Cole, Morrison, & 
Conway, 2013; Mercuri et al., 2018; Terrett, Lyons, et al., 2016; Ünal & Hohenberger, 
2017). However, a number of other studies have demonstrated no associations between 
executive functions and episodic future thinking (Cole et al., 2013; Gott & Lah, 2014; 
Hanson, Atance, & Paluck, 2014; Lyons, Henry, Rendell, Corballis, & Suddendorf, 2014; 
Lyons, Henry, Rendell, Robinson, & Suddendorf, 2015; Lyons, Henry, Robinson, Rendell, 
& Suddendorf, 2019; Mercuri et al., 2015). The contribution of executive functions to 
episodic future thinking therefore remains unclear in the current literature.  
It should, however, be noted that past studies addressing the relationship between 
executive functions and episodic future thinking differed in the ways episodic future 




experiences of imagining future scenarios. In particular, one study by Mercuri et al. (2015) 
investigated episodic future thinking in long-term opiate users by asking them to imagine 
and describe hypothetical future scenarios in response to a series of cue words. The 
capacity for episodic future thinking was determined by the level of episodic details 
provided (i.e., temporal and contextual details relevant to the described event). These 
authors found that executive functions were not significantly associated with the ability to 
mentally simulate future scenarios for controls or for opiate users. By contrast, other studies 
examined the practical capacity to secure items for future use. For instance, Terrett, Lyons, 
et al. (2016) used a behavioural measure to investigate the functional aspect of episodic 
future thinking (i.e., episodic foresight) by assessing participants’ ability to take actions in 
the present in anticipation of potential future problems. Episodic foresight was indexed 
using two measures: the ability to acquire items for future use and the ability to use items to 
solve problems at a future time point. Their results showed that executive functions were 
associated with item acquisition, but not item use, for both controls and long-term opiate 
users. The authors thus argued that episodic foresight may impose greater demands on 
executive functions than imagining and describing hypothetical future events (Terrett, 
Lyons, et al., 2016). Hence, it is possible that varying levels of executive functions are 
required for different aspects of episodic future thinking, which may partly explain the 
inconsistent pattern of findings across the literature. However, given that empirical studies 
on episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and executive functioning remain scarce, 
firm conclusions about the involvement of executive functioning in different aspects of 





 The role of episodic memory in episodic future thinking 
In contrast to the mixed findings on executive functions, a relationship between 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking has consistently been demonstrated in past 
studies across various areas of research (see Suddendorf, 2010a, for a review). For 
example, there has been behavioural evidence of a concurrent emergence of episodic 
memory and episodic future thinking in young children around the ages of 4 to 5 years 
(e.g., Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; 
Suddendorf, 2010b; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Ünal & Hohenberger, 2017), a parallel 
decline in both abilities associated with healthy aging (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2008; Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 2011; Madore, Gaesser, & Schacter, 2014; 
Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2013), and concurrent impairments in both abilities in a range 
of clinical groups (e.g., Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; D'Argembeau et 
al., 2008; El Haj, Antoine, & Kapogiannis, 2015; Gamboz et al., 2010; Rasmussen et al., 
2017; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2018). In addition, neuroimaging studies have provided 
further evidence of a link between episodic memory and episodic future thinking by 
revealing significant overlaps in the activation of several brain regions when past personal 
events were recalled and when future personal events were imagined (e.g., Addis, Wong, & 
Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 
2007).  
Several explanations as to why episodic future thinking might be closely linked to 
episodic memory have been offered in the literature. One of the most prominent theories is 
the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis proposed by Schacter and Addis (2007). 




specific past episode, this hypothesis stated that episodic future thinking is a constructive 
process that requires multiple elements to be drawn from past experiences to mentally 
create hypothetical future scenarios in our imagination. In other words, separate pieces of 
information from past memories are extracted, integrated and used as basic building blocks 
for the mental construction of novel future events (Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 
2012). As such, the primary function of episodic memory has been argued to support 
episodic future thinking, and thus has been recognised as a highly adaptive cognitive 
system (Schacter et al., 2008; Suddendorf, 2010a). However, recent views have shifted to 
place more emphasis on the processes that support and link episodic memory and episodic 
future thinking. More specifically, the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis now 
argues that episodic memory and episodic future thinking involve the same simulation 
process where schemas, episodic and semantic content are activated, integrated and 
encoded to construct event representations of the past or future (Addis, 2018). 
Similar lines of arguments about the link between episodic memory and episodic 
future thinking have also emerged in the literature. For example, they both depend on the 
same broader underlying processes (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). 
This hypothesis is based on neuroimaging data that suggest episodic memory and episodic 
future thinking share similar neurocognitive resources, thus indicating the presence of more 
general mechanisms that may underpin various cognitive abilities, including episodic 
memory and episodic future thinking (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 
2007, 2009). Reflecting this perspective, two prominent theories have been proposed in the 





 The self-projection and scene construction theories 
Buckner and Carroll (2007) identified a range of cognitive abilities, including 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking, as well as theory of mind and spatial 
navigation, that similarly activated the default mode network in the brain. These authors 
subsequently hypothesised that this activation of shared brain regions may reflect a 
common reliance on an underlying process they referred to as ‘self-projection’. Self-
projection is defined as the ability to shift perspective from the immediate environment to 
alternative perspectives, such as different mental, spatial or temporal perspectives (Buckner 
& Carroll, 2007). However, the self-projection theory has been criticised for being rather 
vague and appearing to refer to a process that is somewhat similar to the broader capacity 
of ‘thinking’ (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Lind & Williams, 2012). This then led to the 
suggestion embedded in Suddendorf and Corballis’s (1997) idea of mental time travel 
which places particular emphasis on the temporal aspect of self-projection. In other words, 
they suggest that re-experiencing past events and pre-experiencing future events both 
involve the projection of the self through time (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007).  
On the other hand, some researchers have argued the process of scene construction as 
an alternative to the focus on self-projection as a key factor that underlies episodic memory 
and episodic future thinking. More specifically, while Hassabis and Maguire (2007) 
recognised the importance of self-projection through time in episodic memory and episodic 
future thinking, they proposed that it is only an addition to the fundamental process of 
scene construction. Unlike visual imagery where single objects are visualised, scene 
construction involves the complex process of mentally generating and binding elements 




spatial representation in the mind (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, 2009). Hassabis and 
Maguire (2007) argued that the process of scene construction is not restricted to episodic 
memory and episodic future thinking but also underpins other cognitive abilities such as 
spatial navigation. As such, the process of scene construction is arguably atemporal 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Moreover, the scene 
construction theory may be argued to somewhat overlap with the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis in that both suggest the process of re-experiencing past events and 
pre-experiencing future events to be constructive in nature. However, the emphasis of the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis is on the process of constructing simulations of 
past or future experiences (Addis, 2018), whereas the scene construction theory focuses on 
the process of constructing scenes or spatial representations within which past or future 
events may be simulated (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  
To date, the theories of self-projection through time and scene construction have 
been supported in a limited number of studies in the literature. For example, a 
neuroimaging study revealed specific neural substrates that are differentially involved in 
these processes (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). In particular, the hippocampus, 
which is the part of the brain that has long been known to process memory and spatial 
information (Bird & Burgess, 2008; Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004), has been identified to 
primarily support the process of scene construction (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; 
Maguire, Intraub, & Mullally, 2016). By contrast, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, 
posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus are regions of the brain that have been associated 
with self-projection through time (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). Further evidence 




(2019) who found that scene construction, episodic memory and episodic future thinking 
loaded onto the same factor using principal component analysis. Additional analysis in this 
study revealed that the association between episodic memory and episodic future thinking 
was in fact fully mediated by scene construction, suggesting that scene construction may be 
an essential mechanism underpinning episodic memory and episodic future thinking. 
Moreover, past studies in clinical populations have suggested that difficulties in either the 
self-projection through time or scene construction process could lead to impairments in 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking. For example, some studies have found 
impairments in episodic future thinking to be associated with difficulties in self-projection 
through time in older adults (Jarvis & Miller, 2017; Rendell et al., 2012) and in opiate users 
(Mercuri et al., 2016), while other studies have linked deficits in episodic future thinking to 
compromised scene construction ability in individuals with schizophrenia (Raffard, 
D'Argembeau, Bayard, Boulenger, & Van der Linden, 2010), hippocampal amnesia 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, & Maguire, 2007), developmental amnesia (Maguire, Vargha-
Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010), and Alzheimer’s disease (Irish et al., 2015). Taken together, 
findings in the current literature highlight the importance of the functional integrity of the 
processes of scene construction and self-projection through time that appear to be required 
to support higher-order cognitive abilities such as episodic future thinking. 
2.4 Assessment of Episodic Future Thinking and Episodic Foresight 
As demonstrated thus far in this chapter, episodic future thinking appears to be a 
complex multifaceted construct, which consequently poses a variety of challenges for the 




adopted in the literature, measures of episodic future thinking to date have most often 
involved analysis and scoring of extended verbal descriptions of imagined future 
experiences. Such measures include word-cueing paradigms where participants are asked to 
imagine and describe hypothetical future scenarios in response to cue words (e.g., “imagine 
a specific event in the future that the word ‘birthday’ makes you think of”; Addis et al., 
2008), and paradigms that require participants to construct scenes in their minds in response 
to scenario cues (e.g., “imagine something you will be doing this weekend, but just give me 
one event”; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al., 2007). Different scoring methods have also 
been employed across studies in the literature. For example, some studies have categorised 
obtained verbal descriptions of future events into either internal details (i.e., episodic details 
including specific information related to time and place) or external details (i.e., irrelevant 
details including semantic details, errors and repetitions). In these studies, internal details 
are used as an indicator of episodic future thinking, with higher levels of internal details 
argued to represent better episodic future thinking (e.g., Gaesser et al., 2011; Gott & Lah, 
2014; Mercuri et al., 2015; Mercuri et al., 2018; Miloyan, McFarlane, & Echeverría, 2019; 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2018; Terrett et al., 2019; Wang, Capous, Koh, & Hou, 2014). 
Other studies have assessed episodic specificity of the future events described, with 
episodic future thinking indexed by the capacity to provide specific information such as the 
time or place of an imagined future episode (e.g., Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Coughlin, 
Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Quon & Atance, 2010; Suddendorf, 2010b; Weiler, Suchan, & 
Daum, 2010a, 2010b; see Williams & Broadbent, 1986, for scoring of episodic specificity 
originally used in memory research). Similar verbal paradigms have also been used to 




and self-projection through time. For example, in one of these paradigms, participants are 
asked to mentally construct and describe fictitious atemporal scenes that have been argued 
to primarily impose demands on scene construction (e.g., “imagine you’re sitting having a 
drink in a pub”; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). In 
addition, participants are asked to imagine and describe temporal self-relevant scenes (e.g., 
“imagine how you will spend next Christmas”), which require both scene construction and 
self-projection through time (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al., 2007; Mercuri et al., 2016). 
Participants’ relative performances on these tasks are then compared and used to 
disentangle the underpinning processes of scene construction and self-projection through 
time (e.g., Mercuri et al., 2016; Rendell et al., 2012). While such approaches in previous 
research have provided some understanding of episodic future thinking and its underlying 
mechanisms, it should be noted that these types of assessment have largely tapped the 
experiential component of this construct. By contrast, the practical application of imagining 
the future (i.e., episodic foresight) is not addressed in these verbal paradigms (Miloyan & 
McFarlane, 2018; Miloyan, McFarlane, & Suddendorf, 2019).  
Some recent investigations have employed measures that place more emphasis on 
the practical application of imagining the future. One such measure that has been used in 
the literature, especially in studies with children, is the Picture Book Trip task (Atance & 
Meltzoff, 2005; Ferretti, Adornetti, et al., 2018; Ferretti, Chiera, et al., 2018; Hanson & 
Atance, 2014; Marini et al., 2019). In the Picture Book Trip task, participants are presented 
with pictures of different locations and they are told to imagine going on a trip to these 
locations (e.g., a desert with a long road). Pictures of items that might or might not be 




one appropriate item to bring with them on the trip (e.g., an appropriate choice of item 
would be ‘water’ rather than ‘present’ or ‘plant’ in anticipation of thirst when walking in a 
desert). In addition, participants are asked to explain their choices as a means of probing 
whether their behaviours are indeed motivated by imagination of possible future scenarios 
(Atance & Meltzoff, 2005). While this task appears to involve some degree of episodic 
foresight because it requires the selection of items that might be beneficial in the future, it 
has been suggested that these behavioural choices may not necessarily reflect the 
application of episodic foresight. Rather, such future-directed actions could be driven by 
other factors such as behavioural predispositions, learned histories and chance (Suddendorf 
& Busby, 2005; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011). To eliminate such alternative 
reasons for observed future-directed behaviours in empirical investigations of episodic 
foresight, Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) proposed four stringent criteria for the 
development of episodic foresight measures. These criteria are: “(1) the use of single trials 
to avoid repeated exposure to the same stimulus-reward relationships; (2) the use of novel 
problems to avoid the influence of potential innate response tendencies as well as 
potentially relevant individual learning histories; (3) the use of clear temporal-spatial 
separation between the future-directed action and its consequence to avoid any potential 
cuing; and (4) the use of problems from a range of domains to avoid innate behavioural 
predispositions that drive the action and to demonstrate the flexibility that is characteristic 
of human foresight” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010, p. 296). The Picture Book Trip task 
does not appear to adhere to all of these criteria (e.g., violates criterion three), and as such, 




The first behavioural measure of episodic foresight that was developed according to 
Suddendorf and Corballis’s (2010) four criteria is the two-rooms task (Suddendorf et al., 
2011). In this task, participants are asked to solve novel problems which require the 
application of episodic foresight. For example, participants are first shown a box with a 
square key hole that cannot be opened with a triangular key that is initially presented to 
them. After a 15-minute delay involving unrelated activities in another room, participants 
are asked to choose among three different keys (circle, star and square) to take back with 
them to the first room. It is suggested that participants who are able to anticipate a return to 
the previously encountered problem in the first room (i.e., the inability to open the box with 
the triangular shaped key) will more likely select the square key which fits the square key 
hole. Therefore, success on this task is argued to reflect the capacity to apply episodic 
foresight because it necessitates the ability to link a specific past episode with an 
anticipated future scenario to subsequently guide appropriate decisions in the present 
(Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013; Suddendorf, 2017). To date, the two-rooms task has only 
been used in two past studies, both of which involved typically developing preschool 
children (Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013; Suddendorf et al., 2011). 
A recent behavioural measure based on the two-rooms task that has been developed 
for use in adults is the Virtual Week-Foresight (VW-Foresight; Lyons et al., 2014). The 
VW-Foresight measure is a computerised board game that presents a range of problem-
solving tasks that draw on episodic foresight for successful task resolution. These tasks 
require participants to independently identify and resolve problems without overt prompts, 
thus resembling the way in which episodic foresight is exercised in everyday life contexts. 




novel problems across various domains. This is an important aspect of the measure because 
the inclusion of multiple tasks can enhance reliability estimates, which permits greater 
confidence in the conclusions made based on obtained findings. The value of these positive 
features of the VW-Foresight measure is reflected in its increasing use in studies of 
different adult populations, including older adults (Lyons et al., 2014), adults with 
schizophrenia (Lyons et al., 2015), opiate users (Terrett, Lyons, et al., 2016), and stroke 
patients (Lyons et al., 2019). To date, however, there appears to be no behavioural measure 
of episodic foresight for use with primary school-aged children or adolescents in the 
published literature that has been developed according to the four criteria proposed by 
Suddendorf and Corballis (2010). An adaptation of the VW-Foresight measure for use with 
children and adolescents may therefore be a valuable tool for measuring episodic foresight 
in these younger populations. 
2.5 Episodic Future Thinking and Episodic Foresight in ASD 
Given the importance of episodic future thinking and episodic foresight for 
successful daily living, investigation of these abilities in individuals with ASD is crucial, as 
findings may shed light on the functional difficulties experienced by these individuals. In 
turn, effective interventions may be developed and implemented to improve independent 
functioning in this clinical population. The following section will review this topic in both 
adults and children with ASD. The term ‘episodic future thinking’ will be used throughout 
this section considering most past studies have utilised verbal measures to capture possible 




foresight that adhered to the four criteria proposed by Suddendorf and Corballis (2010), 
thereby limiting current understanding of episodic foresight in individuals with ASD. 
 Evidence of impairments in episodic future thinking in ASD 
It has been argued that individuals with ASD are vulnerable to deficits in episodic 
future thinking given that some of the core mechanisms that have been theorised to be 
important for this cognitive ability, such as executive functions and episodic memory, have 
been found to be compromised in this clinical population (Lind, 2010; Lind & Williams, 
2012; McCrimmon, Matchullis, Altomare, & Smith-Demers, 2016; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997, 2007). In addition, there have been suggestions that the restricted and rigid 
repertoires of behaviour often observed in individuals with the disorder may partly be 
explained by an impairment in episodic future thinking (Lind & Bowler, 2010). This is 
because a reduced capacity to mentally simulate plausible events in the future is likely to 
limit a person’s ability to flexibly modify behaviours in the present to accommodate future 
needs (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Terrett et al., 2013). Surprisingly, however, 
empirical studies investigating this issue are scarce in the current ASD literature.  
For example, investigations of episodic future thinking in adults with ASD are 
currently limited to three empirical studies, with two of these studies showing impairments 
in this clinical group. Specifically, Lind and Bowler (2010) found that adults with ASD 
described significantly fewer specific personally experienced future events across different 
time periods (e.g., ‘tomorrow’ or ‘in 10 years’) than controls. Consistent with these 
findings, Lind, Williams, Bowler, and Peel (2014) also found significantly poorer episodic 
quality in the verbal descriptions of imagined future scenarios for adults with ASD 




significant difference between the ASD and control groups on an online sentence 
completion task used to index episodic future thinking. In this task, participants were 
required to respond in written form to a series of sentence stems related to the future (e.g., 
“Next year…”). The capacity for episodic future thinking was measured by the level of 
specificity in their responses (i.e., descriptions of a single unique event that lasts less than a 
day). However, because specific future events were not explicitly probed, it has been 
suggested that this task design may have led participants in the control group to produce 
more general information about their described future events compared to controls in past 
studies that explicitly asked participants to describe specific future events (e.g., Lind & 
Bowler, 2010). Hence, the lack of group differences shown in this study may be explained 
by lower levels of response specificity in controls, rather than greater specific future event 
details produced by participants with ASD (Crane et al., 2013). In fact, the validity of 
sentence completion tasks as a measure of episodic future thinking has been questioned, as 
this approach appears to largely tap semantic knowledge while the mental simulation of 
future scenarios may not be required to complete the task (Miloyan & McFarlane, 2018). 
Overall, then, it appears that there are preliminary findings that suggest the presence of an 
impairment in episodic future thinking in adults with ASD, although research on this topic 
remains scarce. 
Similar to the adult ASD literature, there has been limited investigation of episodic 
future thinking in children with ASD. There are currently only eight studies that have 
examined episodic future thinking in this clinical group, with findings in most of these 
suggesting that this cognitive ability is impaired. For example, Lind, Bowler, et al. (2014) 




more likely to generate future events that were implausible when asked to describe specific 
future events (e.g., breakfast or evening meals). In addition, when compared to controls, the 
capacity to imagine and describe hypothetical future scenarios was found to be attenuated 
in children with ASD aged 8 to 12 years (Terrett et al., 2013), and in children and 
adolescents with ASD aged 7 to 15 years (Ciaramelli et al., 2018) as indicated by 
significantly less internal details being produced by these ASD groups. Another study by 
Marini et al. (2016) assessed episodic future thinking in children with ASD and controls 
using an approach originally developed by Jackson and Atance (2008). This approach 
involved presenting the children with two types of tasks: self-based tasks which required 
the mental simulation of future situations to solve problems (e.g., choosing whether the 
head or the body of an ant-costume is the most appropriate to put on first), and mechanical-
based tasks which involved the prediction of mechanical outcomes (e.g., choosing between 
a small and big ball when deciding what would fit into both wide and narrow tubes). The 
results revealed significantly poorer performance on both the self-based and mechanical-
based tasks in the ASD group relative to controls, thus providing evidence for diminished 
episodic future thinking capacity in children with ASD. Similar conclusions were also 
reported in two recent studies that utilised the Picture Book Trip task (Ferretti, Adornetti, et 
al., 2018; Marini et al., 2019), both of which showed that children in the ASD group 
performed significantly worse than controls.  
In contrast to these previous findings, however, one study obtained results that 
provided mixed evidence of impairments in episodic future thinking in children with ASD. 
Specifically, Hanson and Atance (2014) investigated episodic future thinking in preschool 




significantly worse than typically developing controls on only two of the five episodic 
future thinking tasks assessed. However, the authors suggested that the employment of 
insensitive measures, and exposure to intervention programs for children in the ASD group, 
may have partially contributed to the lack of group differences found on three of the tasks 
(Hanson & Atance, 2014). Another possible explanation for the discrepant findings relative 
to past studies may relate to differences in the samples included in these studies. For 
instance, Hanson and Atance (2014) tested young preschool children while other studies 
examined primary school-aged children (e.g., Ferretti, Adornetti, et al., 2018; Lind, Bowler, 
et al., 2014; Terrett et al., 2013). As episodic future thinking typically emerges in the 
preschool years, around the ages of 4 to 5 (see Atance & Mahy, 2016, for a review), it is 
possible that this ability may not yet have fully developed in the typically developing 
control group in Hanson and Atance’s (2014) study, hence limiting the capacity to detect 
significant group differences. Taken together, then, evidence from the current literature, 
albeit limited, appears to suggest some degree of impairment in episodic future thinking 
amongst individuals with ASD. 
 Cognitive contributors to episodic future thinking impairments in ASD 
A key question raised by the findings of the aforementioned studies in ASD relates 
to the issue of what might underpin deficits in episodic future thinking in this clinical 
population. As previously noted, there are a number of processes that have been proposed 
to be important for episodic future thinking including scene construction, self-projection, 
episodic memory and executive functioning (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2017; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013). 




impairments in individuals with ASD remains scarce. For example, there are only three 
studies to date that have attempted to investigate the roles of scene construction and self-
projection in explaining ASD-related deficits in episodic future thinking, but each of these 
studies have varied in their conclusions. In the first, Marini et al. (2016) concluded that 
episodic future thinking impairments in children with ASD appeared to reflect underlying 
difficulties in both scene construction and self-projection into the future, but that self-
projection into the future was more severely compromised in this clinical group. This is 
consistent with the conclusion reached by Jackson and Atance (2008) which showed that 
the ability to project oneself into future scenarios is impaired in children with ASD. By 
contrast, Ciaramelli et al. (2018) concluded that a diminished capacity for scene 
construction, but not self-projection, appears to underpin episodic future thinking 
impairments in children with ASD. In line with Ciaramelli et al.’s (2018) findings, another 
study on adults with ASD showed that deficits in episodic future thinking were linked to 
difficulties in scene construction, and that any difficulty in self-projection through time did 
not contribute to impairments in episodic future thinking over and above the difficulties in 
scene construction (Lind, Williams, et al., 2014).  
In relation to the relationship between episodic memory and episodic future 
thinking in individuals with ASD, there is one study that has demonstrated episodic 
memory to be a significant contributor to episodic future thinking in children with ASD 
(Terrett et al., 2013) while three other studies have failed to find an association between 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking in children (Lind, Bowler, et al., 2014) and 
adults with the disorder (Crane et al., 2013; Lind & Bowler, 2010). It has been proposed 




individuals with ASD to draw more heavily on semantic memory, rather than episodic 
memory, to envisage personal future events (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler, et al., 
2014). However, given that there have only been four studies that explored the relationship 
between episodic memory and episodic future thinking in ASD, the role of episodic 
memory in episodic future thinking remains somewhat unclear in this clinical population.  
Regarding the contribution of executive functioning to episodic future thinking, 
Hanson and Atance (2014) showed that children with ASD who performed worse on 
episodic future thinking tasks had poorer executive functioning, suggesting that poorer 
episodic future thinking ability may be linked to executive dysfunction. However, the 
relationship between these two cognitive capacities was not directly assessed in this study. 
Terrett et al.’s (2013) study is thus far the only study that has directly examined executive 
functioning as a potential contributing factor to episodic future thinking in children with 
ASD. The results showed that executive functioning, specifically cognitive flexibility, did 
not significantly contribute to episodic future thinking in this clinical group. However, the 
authors noted that because only cognitive flexibility was explored in this study, it is 
possible that other aspects of executive functioning may be more involved in episodic 
future thinking, such as verbal fluency (Terrett et al., 2013). Overall, it is apparent that 
there is currently limited understanding of the underlying mechanisms that might explain 
episodic future thinking deficits in individuals with ASD. 
 Gaps in the current ASD literature 
There is growing research on episodic future thinking in individuals with ASD, with 
emerging evidence showing persistent deficits in this capacity from early childhood years 




highlighted is that past studies of individuals with ASD have predominantly tapped the 
experiential component of episodic future thinking. More specifically, most studies have 
focused on the investigation of how well individuals with ASD are able to mentally 
simulate future scenarios based on their verbal responses. Consequently, there is currently 
little understanding of the functional aspect of episodic future thinking (i.e., episodic 
foresight) in this clinical population. It may be argued that findings in some previous 
studies of children with ASD have provided initial insights into their capacity to apply 
imaginations of the future, as demonstrated by the capacity to choose which piece of a 
costume to put on first in the self-based tasks (Jackson & Atance, 2008; Marini et al., 2016) 
or selection of an appropriate item in anticipation of future states of self in the Picture Book 
Trip task (Ferretti, Adornetti, et al., 2018; Hanson & Atance, 2014; Marini et al., 2019). 
However, the Picture Book Trip task and self-based tasks do not adhere to the four 
proposed criteria for a valid behavioural measure of episodic foresight (Suddendorf & 
Busby, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010). It is thus difficult to determine whether 
future-directed behaviours demonstrated by children with ASD specifically reflected 
episodic foresight ability in these past studies. In addition, another current gap in the 
literature relates to the limited understanding of what might underpin the identified deficits 
in episodic future thinking and the anticipated deficits in episodic foresight in this clinical 
population. A better understanding of the capacity for episodic future thinking and episodic 
foresight, as well as the processes that drive any impairments will be important for the 
development of tailored supports that can help promote functional independence in 

























This chapter provides a review of another form of prospection, namely prospective 
memory (PM). The chapter will begin with defining PM and will then discuss the proposed 
underlying cognitive mechanisms that may drive successful performance on PM tasks. 
Moreover, a range of assessment methods that have been employed thus far in the literature 
and their limitations will be covered before finally providing a critical analysis of past 
studies on PM abilities in the ASD population. The current gaps in the ASD literature in 





3.1 Definition of Prospective Memory 
PM refers to the ability to remember to carry out an intention at the appropriate 
moment in the future (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Daily life examples include 
remembering to attend a meeting at 10 a.m. tomorrow, remembering to return a book when 
you walk past the library, or remembering to meet a friend for a movie on Saturday night. 
PM failures in everyday living are common but in some cases these failures could lead to 
disastrous consequences. For instance, forgetting to turn off the stove before you leave the 
house for work in the morning or forgetting to pick up your child from school in the 
afternoon. As such, PM has been argued to be a cognitive ability that has important 
implications for an individual’s well-being, safety, social relationships, daily functioning 
and autonomy (Henry et al., 2014; Hering et al., 2018; Raskin, 2018; Woods et al., 2015).  
There are several phases involved in the successful performance of PM tasks. 
Firstly, individuals must form and encode an intended action that needs to be carried out in 
the future and must retain this intention in memory. The intention must then later be 
retrieved when the target cue appears, and finally the intended action needs to be executed 
and evaluated at the specified moment (Ellis, 1996; Ellis & Freeman, 2008; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000). PM tasks are thus typically characterised by: (1) a delayed interval 
between the initial formation of the intention and the execution of the intention at a later 
point (which can range from minutes to days); (2) self-initiation of the execution with an 
absence of explicit directions to perform the intention at the appropriate moment; and (3) a 
temporary suspension of one’s current activity to perform the delayed intention (Ellis & 





 Retrospective and prospective components of prospective memory 
Given that PM tasks involve delayed retrieval of the intention and execution at a 
particular future point, it is apparent that these tasks comprise two critical components: a 
retrospective component and a prospective component (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Ellis, 
1996; Graf & Uttl, 2001). The retrospective component involves the ability to remember 
the specific content of the PM tasks, that is, individuals are required to remember the 
details of the tasks that need to be done and the circumstances under which these tasks need 
to be carried out. By contrast, the prospective component refers to the ability to remember 
to retrieve details of, and execute, the intention at the appropriate point (Ellis & 
Kvavilashvili, 2000; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). The retrospective and prospective 
components of PM tasks have been argued to be independent, although difficulties in either 
can result in failures to successfully perform PM tasks (Graf & Uttl, 2001; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2007). In other words, it is possible for a person to remember the content of a PM 
task (retrospective component) while forgetting to carry it out at the appropriate moment in 
the future (prospective component). Alternatively, one may remember that a task needs to 
be performed (prospective component) but fail to recall what the task is or when to perform 
it (retrospective component). It is thus widely accepted that both components are necessary 
for the successful completion of PM tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Ellis, 1996; Ellis & 
Kvavilashvili, 2000). While there is a general consensus that remembering the content of 
PM tasks relies on successful encoding and storage of specific information related to the 
PM intentions (i.e., retrospective component; Bugg, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2013; Ellis & 
Freeman, 2008; Zöllig, Martin, & Kliegel, 2010), there has been increased debate regarding 




Several theories have been proposed, with the multiprocess framework being the most 
influential theory to date (see Bugg et al., 2013; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  
 Multiprocess framework 
According to the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), there are 
two distinct processes that can support the retrieval of PM tasks: spontaneous processing 
and strategic monitoring processes. Spontaneous processing usually occurs when salient or 
unusual target cues appear within the environment, which subsequently trigger retrieval of 
the PM tasks that need to be performed (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Hicks, Marsh, & 
Cook, 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007). By contrast, strategic monitoring 
processes are used when the performance of PM tasks relies on the detection of subtle 
target cues in the environment (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). As such, these strategic 
processes are argued to impose more demands on executive resources because target cues 
are constantly monitored and evaluated in the environment for the appropriate moment to 
perform the intention (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). McDaniel and Einstein’s 
(2000) multiprocess framework further emphasises that these two processes are flexibly 
used at varying degrees in different situations. The activation of either of these processes is 
largely dependent on the demands of the ongoing activity, the distinctiveness of the PM 
tasks and the type of cue available to complete the PM tasks (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 
2007).  
 Types of prospective memory 
The two most common types of PM investigated in the literature are event-based 




a target event cue such as remembering to take out the cake from the fridge (intention) 
when your friends arrive at your house (event cue). On the other hand, time-based PM is 
the ability to perform intentions at the appropriate time in the future, either at a specified 
time point or after a specific time interval (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). For example, 
remembering to attend class (intention) at 2 p.m. tomorrow (time cue) or remembering to 
take the boiled eggs out of the pot (intention) after three minutes (time cue). In relation to 
the multiprocess framework, it has been suggested that event-based PM relies more on 
spontaneous processing of target cues for task completion. This is because the appearance 
of external event cues is often sufficient to trigger the retrieval of the PM tasks that need to 
be carried out (Hicks et al., 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007). By contrast, time-
based tasks tend to involve self-initiated and effortful monitoring processes. More 
specifically, unlike event-based tasks where there is an inherent environmental event cue, 
the completion of time-based tasks at the appropriate time require individuals to monitor 
the time elapsed while engaging in their ongoing activities (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; 
McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). As such, time-based PM tasks are arguably more difficult to 
successfully complete as they impose more cognitive demands than event-based PM tasks 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1990, 1996).  
3.2 Processes Involved in Prospective Memory 
A number of cognitive processes have been theorised to be involved in the 
completion of PM tasks, including retrospective memory and executive functions abilities. 
These cognitive abilities have been argued to support performance at various stages of PM 




retrospective memory is thought to play a crucial role during the encoding and retention 
stages as the intention must first be properly encoded and retained in memory so that it may 
be retrieved at the appropriate point later (Ellis & Freeman, 2008; Zöllig et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, to successfully complete PM tasks, individuals are required to monitor the 
environment for PM cues, flexibly alternate between an ongoing task and the PM task, and 
inhibit any irrelevant response that might hinder the successful completion of the PM task 
at the appropriate moment (Altgassen, Vetter, Phillips, Akgün, & Kliegel, 2014; Kliegel, 
Mackinlay, & Jäger, 2008). As such, it has been proposed that executive functions such as 
working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibition may also be critical to the 
performance of PM tasks (Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014; Yi et al., 2014). However, the extent 
to which these cognitive abilities are involved in PM may be dependent on the demands 
required to complete different types of PM tasks. For example, as previously noted, time-
based PM tasks are argued to be more cognitive demanding than event-based PM tasks and 
therefore potentially require greater executive function resources (Einstein & McDaniel, 
1990).  
Empirically, it has been shown that retrospective memory is associated with PM 
task performances in children (Mahy et al., 2018; Mattli, Schnitzspahn, Studerus-Germann, 
Brehmer, & Zöllig, 2014; Terrett et al., 2019; Wang, Kliegel, Liu, & Yang, 2008) and 
adults (Cavuoto, Ong, Pike, Nicholas, & Kinsella, 2017; Foster et al., 2013; Mattli et al., 
2014; Yang, Wang, Lin, Zheng, & Chan, 2013). For example, Terrett et al. (2019) found 
strong correlations between retrospective memory for PM task content and PM task 
performances in typically developing children aged 8 to 12 years. In addition, the results 




study. A similar pattern of findings has also been demonstrated in adult clinical 
populations. In one study by Henry and colleagues, retrospective memory was assessed 
using a verbal learning and delayed recall task and results showed that poorer retrospective 
memory was significantly related to poorer ability to carry out PM tasks in adults with 
schizophrenia (Henry et al., 2007). These findings thus reinforce the importance of 
retrospective memory in the completion of PM intentions.  
On the other hand, the empirical evidence regarding the role of executive functions 
in PM has been mixed, with some studies showing that working memory, cognitive 
flexibility and inhibition were related to event-based PM (e.g., Spiess, Meier, & Roebers, 
2016; Wang et al., 2008) and time-based PM (e.g., Kerns, 2000; Voigt et al., 2014). 
Conversely, other studies have failed to find significant associations between event-based 
PM and inhibition (Cottini, Basso, & Palladino, 2018), or between time-based PM and 
inhibition (Kretschmer, Voigt, Friedrich, Pfeiffer, & Kliegel, 2014), working memory 
(Mackinlay, Kliegel, & Mäntylä, 2009) and cognitive flexibility (Mäntylä, Carelli, & 
Forman, 2007). Therefore, it appears that the relationship between executive functions and 
PM performance remains somewhat unclear in the current literature. One possible reason 
for the conflicting results may be because of the varying PM task complexity in each study 
which imposed different levels of demands on executive functioning. For instance, Shum, 
Cross, Ford, and Ownsworth (2008) found that working memory, inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility were significant contributors to event-based PM in typically developing children. 
Event-based PM was assessed by asking participants to substitute the name ‘Henry’ with 
‘Tom’ or the word ‘lower’ with ‘upper’ each time they came across this name or word in 




working memory but not inhibition significantly predicted event-based PM performance 
when age was controlled for. The PM task in this study required children to name objects 
on a stack of cards and every time they came across an animal card, they were required to 
place it in a box. A proportion of children were additionally asked to place cards depicting 
a car in a separate box. Because these two types of event-based PM tasks appear to vary in 
terms of task difficulty, the precise executive functions that might be required to complete 
these tasks may consequently differ, which could partially explain the inconsistent findings.  
One way to investigate the extent to which executive function demands differ across 
various PM tasks is to examine whether working memory, inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility might be related to event-based and time-based PM in a single sample of 
participants. Adopting this approach, a recent investigation with 6- to 11-year-old children 
by Zuber, Mahy, and Kliegel (2019) illustrated that time-based PM task performance was 
significantly predicted by working memory but not inhibition and cognitive flexibility. 
Event-based PM tasks were further investigated as two subtypes that are commonly 
distinguished in the literature: focal (i.e., when the defining features of PM cues largely 
overlap with the information relevant to the ongoing task) and non-focal (i.e., when the PM 
cues are present in the environment but not part of the ongoing task information processing; 
Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). Results showed that working memory and inhibition, but not 
cognitive flexibility, were significant predictors of focal event-based PM task performance. 
By contrast, working memory, inhibition and cognitive flexibility significantly contributed 
to non-focal event-based PM task performance. The authors argued that because focal tasks 
involved more spontaneous processing while non-focal tasks required increased strategic 




allow one to switch between completing the ongoing task and monitoring for task cues. In 
addition, it was suggested that whilst cognitive flexibility may be involved in other phases 
of time-based PM task completion, working memory may be primarily required in actually 
carrying out the task (Zuber et al., 2019). These findings have therefore provided valuable 
insights into the specific contributions of different executive functions to event-based and 
time-based PM. While further research into these relationships within the same cohort of 
participants are needed, there is nevertheless growing evidence demonstrating that 
executive functions are involved in the completion of PM tasks, although the nature and 
extent may vary as a function of PM task demands.  
3.3 Assessment of Prospective Memory 
Many of the early studies of PM relied on naturalistic paradigms which included 
asking participants to remember to call the experimenter on a specific day, or for children 
to remind their parents to buy milk (Harris, 1984; Somerville, Wellman, & Cultice, 1983). 
However, such paradigms have been criticised for their lack of experimental control 
including experimenters’ inability to assess or manipulate the use of external supports such 
as calendars that might aid PM task performance (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990, 2005). 
Consequently, the reliability as well as the internal validity of findings from such studies 
may be questioned. By contrast, laboratory-based methods such as the dual-task paradigm 
have been extensively used in the PM literature across different clinical populations and 
age groups (e.g., Altgassen, Schmitz-Hubsch, & Kliegel, 2010; Mäntylä et al., 2007; 
Phillips et al., 2018; Schnitzspahn, Stahl, Zeintl, Kaller, & Kliegel, 2013; Williams, Jarrold, 




asked to perform a prescribed intention at particular points in the experiment by pressing 
specific keys on a keyboard while engaging in an unrelated ongoing activity on a 
laboratory-based computer (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). The 
benefit of the dual-task paradigm is the inclusion of all three key features that characterise 
PM tasks (Ellis & Freeman, 2008; Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000), as mentioned earlier, 
allowing PM ability to be reliably assessed in controlled laboratory settings.  
Several criticisms have, however, been raised in the literature regarding the use of 
such laboratory-based paradigms. Firstly, there is low ecological validity because the PM 
and ongoing tasks included often fail to reflect those that are typically performed in real life 
(Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012; Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014). More specifically, 
pressing keys in response to target cues may have limited value in improving understanding 
of the ability to perform PM intentions in real-world settings. Moreover, laboratory-based 
tasks may fail to capture important aspects of PM, as PM tasks in everyday life tend to be 
more complex and less structured in comparison (Altgassen et al., 2010; Ellis & 
Kvavilashvili, 2000). Secondly, the reliability of such paradigms has been questioned as 
past studies have mostly assessed only one or two PM tasks that are performed over 
multiple trials (Kelemen, Weinberg, Alford, Mulvey, & Kaeochinda, 2006; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2007; Rendell & Henry, 2009). In addition, the assessment of PM is usually 
limited to either event-based or time-based tasks thus restricting our understanding of PM 
ability across tasks types within the same sample. Finally, and perhaps the most important 
issue to consider in regards to investigations of PM in children is that, adult laboratory-
based paradigms are generally not suitable for the assessment of PM ability in paediatric 




that using adult laboratory-based paradigms with children raises issues regarding 
motivation and sustained engagement in task completion. Although various adaptations of 
these adult paradigms have been made to be more appropriate for children to overcome 
these issues (e.g., Guajardo & Best, 2000; Kvavilashvili, Messer, & Ebdon, 2001; Walsh, 
Martin, & Courage, 2014), the varying capacities to complete an ongoing task while 
carrying out PM tasks in different age groups across childhood remains a problem. This is 
because the cognitive resources allocated to perform the ongoing task versus PM tasks are 
likely to be different depending on age and therefore could impact PM performance. For 
example, younger children may need greater cognitive resources to complete an ongoing 
task such as a working memory task compared to older children due to their less well-
developed working memory ability. Consequently, there may be less cognitive resources 
allocated to carrying out PM tasks for younger children (Kvavilashvili et al., 2008). To 
minimise the impacts of age on performances across the ongoing task and PM tasks, it has 
been suggested that asking children to watch cartoons or play video games as the ongoing 
activity is useful in equating the ongoing task difficulty so that PM abilities across different 
age groups may be reliably assessed (Kerns, 2000; Kvavilashvili et al., 2008).  
One measure of PM that accounts for the limitations of naturalistic and laboratory-
based paradigms is Virtual Week (VW-PM; Rendell & Craik, 2000). VW-PM is a 
computerised board game that attempts to simulate daily life-like PM tasks while also 
ensuring that a certain level of experimental control is maintained within a laboratory-based 
setting. Moreover, it assesses both event-based and time-based PM within the one measure, 
therefore allowing the systematic investigation of these two PM task types (Rendell & 




been shown to have good psychometric properties (e.g., Henry et al., 2007; Mioni, Rendell, 
Stablum, Gamberini, & Bisiacchi, 2015; Mioni, Stablum, Biernacki, & Rendell, 2017) as 
has the recently developed children’s version (e.g., Henry et al., 2014; Terrett et al., 2019). 
The VW-PM has also been shown to be a sensitive measure in various clinical populations 
(e.g., Henry et al., 2007; Mioni, Rendell, Henry, Cantagallo, & Stablum, 2013; Terrett et 
al., 2014). Hence, VW-PM has been increasingly recognised as a valuable measure of PM. 
3.4 Evidence of Impairments in Prospective Memory in ASD 
Individuals with ASD have been argued to be susceptible to impairments in PM 
considering that retrospective memory and executive processes that support PM 
performance have commonly been found to be compromised in this clinical group (Boucher 
et al., 2012; Bowler et al., 2011; Kenworthy et al., 2008). The following sections will 
present a critical review of the current literature on event-based and time-based PM in 
individuals with ASD across all age groups. Studies on adults with ASD will first be 
presented, followed by findings in children and adolescents with ASD. The current gaps in 
the literature as well as suggestions for future research will be highlighted. 
 Prospective memory in adults with ASD 
There is a growing number of studies on PM in individuals with ASD. In general,  
time-based PM has consistently been shown to be impaired, while findings on event-based 
PM have somewhat been mixed (see Landsiedel, Williams, & Abbot-Smith, 2017; 
Sheppard, Bruineberg, Kretschmer-Trendowicz, & Altgassen, 2018). For example, 
Williams et al. (2014) revealed significantly poorer performance on time-based PM tasks in 




performance on event-based PM tasks using the typical laboratory-based PM paradigm. 
Employing the same method of assessment, Altgassen and Koch (2014) also found that 
event-based PM was not impaired in adults with ASD relative to controls, independent of 
inhibition load during PM task performance. However, two other studies, while they 
replicated the results of an impairment in time-based PM ability, also demonstrated deficits 
in event-based PM in adults with ASD (Altgassen et al., 2012; Kretschmer, Altgassen, 
Rendell, & Bölte, 2014). It should be noted though that the latter two studies assessed more 
plausible everyday life PM tasks such as preparing breakfast in a laboratory-based setting 
(Altgassen et al., 2012) or completing daily life-like tasks on the VW-PM (Kretschmer, 
Altgassen, et al., 2014) as opposed to completing the typical laboratory-based paradigm 
used in the former two studies (Altgassen & Koch, 2014; Williams et al., 2014). 
Consequently, it could be argued that the more life-like event-based tasks in Altgassen et 
al.’s (2012) and Kretschmer, Altgassen, et al.’s (2014) studies are more complex and thus 
may have required increased cognitive resources than the tasks in Altgassen and Koch’s 
(2014) and Williams et al.’s (2014) studies. Thus, it is possible that differences in the 
cognitive demands needed to complete event-based tasks in these past studies may explain 
the discrepant findings on this aspect of PM in this clinical group. 
 Prospective memory in children and adolescents with ASD 
The same pattern of findings reported above for adults with ASD is also observed in 
studies of children and adolescents with the disorder, whereby time-based PM has 
consistently been shown to be impaired while the capacity for event-based task 
performance remains unclear. For example, early studies by Altgassen, Williams, Bolte, 




respectively revealed compromised task performance on time-based PM but comparable 
performances on event-based PM tasks relative to age- and IQ-matched controls. These 
findings were supported by two subsequent studies that examined both types of PM using 
different measures, specifically, the typical laboratory-based paradigm (Williams, Boucher, 
Lind, & Jarrold, 2013) and the VW-PM measure (Henry et al., 2014). By contrast, other 
studies have found that event-based PM ability was significantly poorer in children and 
adolescents with ASD than controls (Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia, Altgassen, & 
Kliegel, 2011; Jones et al., 2011; Sheppard, Kvavilashvili, & Ryder, 2016; Yi et al., 2014). 
The methods of assessment also varied in the studies that showed impaired event-based 
PM, with two of these studies employing laboratory-based paradigms (Brandimonte et al., 
2011; Yi et al., 2014) and two others assessing responses to pre-planned events during the 
experiment (e.g., clapping your hands when you hear the music; Jones et al., 2011; 
Sheppard et al., 2016). Therefore, unlike the pattern of differences observed in the adult 
population as discussed above, there appears to be no systematic pattern of results 
associated with specific assessment methods that could explain the conflicting findings in 
event-based PM in children and adolescents with ASD. 
However, several other factors including variability in age and cognitive abilities 
(e.g., retrospective memory and executive functions), as well as heterogeneity of the 
disorder may have contributed to the inconsistent findings in children and adolescents with 
ASD. Firstly, the age ranges included in past studies have varied considerably where some 
studies have examined both young pre-schoolers and primary school-aged children (e.g., 
Sheppard et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2014), while others included primary school-aged children 




et al., 2009). Because PM abilities undergo significant developmental changes from pre-
school to adolescence years (Mattli et al., 2014; Voigt et al., 2014), the inclusion of such 
wide age ranges in different studies may increase sample variability and consequently 
makes comparisons across studies challenging. Secondly, it is possible that variations in 
retrospective memory ability have contributed to the differences in the capacity to perform 
event-based tasks in this clinical group. More specifically, poor event-based PM task 
performance may be attributed to failures in retrospective memory for PM task content in 
some studies (e.g., Jones et al., 2011), while individuals with ASD who were able to 
remember PM task content showed intact event-based PM (e.g., Williams et al., 2013). 
Indeed, one study revealed impaired event-based PM in adolescents with ASD but when 
participants with difficulties remembering PM task content were excluded, comparable task 
performances relative to the controls were observed (Jones et al., 2011; Williams et al., 
2013). It has therefore been argued that the assessment of retrospective memory is 
important when attempting to understand PM deficits in individuals with ASD (Landsiedel 
et al., 2017; Lind & Williams, 2012). Surprisingly, however, most past studies have failed 
to consider the role of retrospective memory in PM task performances. Thirdly, varying 
abilities in executive functions across different ASD samples may also have contributed to 
the inconsistent findings in event-based PM performances. For example, children with ASD 
who showed intact performances on executive functioning tasks also had intact event-based 
PM (e.g., Henry et al., 2014), while impaired event-based PM ability were observed in 
children with ASD who showed executive dysfunctions (e.g., Yi et al., 2014). As such, the 
capacity to perform event-based PM tasks may vary based on their executive functioning 




executive functions on event-based PM performance given the scarce research on these 
factors in the ASD literature. Finally, most past studies have investigated only one type of 
PM, which has been argued to be problematic considering that ASD is a heterogenous 
disorder so the clinical presentations of the participants in each sample may markedly differ 
(Henry et al., 2014). Therefore, differences in sample characteristics rather than variations 
in the capacity to perform different types of PM tasks may partly explain the inconsistent 
findings in the current literature.  
 Gaps in the current ASD literature 
Overall, there is converging evidence showing time-based PM to be compromised 
in individuals with ASD across all age groups. However, the capacity to carry out event-
based PM tasks currently remains unclear in the ASD literature. Further investigation is 
needed to clarify this picture in this clinical population with careful considerations given to 
the methods of assessment and the inclusion of specific age ranges especially in children. 
Moreover, the assessment of retrospective memory and executive functions have largely 
been neglected in past studies with children in this clinical population, despite the 
suggested importance of these abilities in PM task performance in the wider literature. 
Future research should thus consider these factors when designing studies that aim to 







In light of the current gaps in the literature for children with ASD, three empirical 
studies were designed to address the key research questions outlined in Chapter 1. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology of these three empirical studies. A 
comprehensive overview of the data collection process will be provided, followed by 
detailed descriptions of the measures used in this research project. The development of 
measures designed to examine episodic foresight and prospective memory (PM) in Studies 





4.1 Participant Groups 
Two participant groups were included in the three empirical studies conducted: 
children with ASD and healthy controls. Participants in each group were screened with 
reference to inclusion and exclusion criteria as outlined below. 
 Eligibility criteria for healthy controls 
To be included in the healthy control group, participants were required to meet the 
following inclusion criteria: 
a) aged between 8 and 12 years 
b) fluent English speakers 
c) had an IQ score of above 80 
Participants were excluded if they met one of the following criteria: 
d) had an existing diagnosis of a developmental or mental health disorder 
e) had an existing neurological disorder 
f) had significant visual impairment or hearing loss 
 Eligibility criteria for children with ASD 
Children with ASD were screened for the following inclusion criteria: 
a) aged between 8 and 12 years 
b) fluent English speakers 
c) had an IQ score of above 80 
d) had an existing formal diagnosis of high-functioning autism or Asperger’s 




DSM-5 as provided by a qualified health professional (e.g., psychologist, 
paediatrician, psychiatrist) 
Participants were excluded from the ASD group if they met any of the following criteria: 
e) had a comorbid diagnosis of another developmental disorder 
f) had a comorbid diagnosis of a mental health disorder 
g) had an existing neurological disorder 
h) had significant visual impairment or hearing loss 
 Participant recruitment 
An existing database of 19 participants with ASD and 42 healthy controls formed 
part of the sample for Study 1. These participants were exposed to a similar testing protocol 
in a previous research project to the one implemented in the current thesis. The remaining 
participants for Study 1 (18 ASD, 18 healthy controls), and all participants in Studies 2 and 
3 were recruited and tested by the research candidate. Healthy controls were recruited 
through independent schools and personal contacts, whereas participants with ASD were 
recruited via local communities, independent schools, ASD organisations (e.g., AMAZE), 
local events (e.g., Melbourne Autism Expo), psychology clinics, and Facebook pages. 
Figure 4.1. presents a flow diagram of the recruitment process, detailing the number of 
children recruited and tested for each group in each session.  
As previously noted, for Study 1 an additional 18 participants with ASD and 18 
healthy controls were included to form a total sample of 37 participants with ASD and 60 
healthy controls. These additional participants also completed measures for Studies 2 and 3. 




participants in Study 2 (32 participants with ASD and 42 healthy controls) took part in 
Study 3 as they completed the extended test battery which included key measures such as 
the PM measure for Study 3 (see Figure 4.2.). 
 
 






Figure 4.2. Total number of participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and healthy 





4.2 Background Measures 
Participants who were recruited and tested for the studies completed a range of tasks 
across two testing sessions, one-on-one with the research candidate. The durations of the 
sessions were 2 to 2.5 hours for session 1, and 1 to 1.5 hours for session 2. Parents were 
also asked to complete three questionnaires about their child. These measures are described 
in detailed in the following section.  
 Background questionnaire 
The background questionnaire gathers basic information about the child participants 
such as their name, gender, date of birth, first language spoken at home and the number of 
siblings. It also contains questions about their recent physical health, the presence of speech 
and behavioural issues or other mental health disorders such as anxiety, depression and 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.  
 Screener for ASD  
The Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2008) is a 
screening measure for ASD that is based on the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised 
(ADI-R; Rutter, LeCouteur, & Lord, 2003). There are two forms: Lifetime Form and 
Current Form. The Lifetime Form was used to support the diagnosis of ASD in the clinical 
group, and to screen for symptoms of ASD in healthy controls. It comprises 40 parent-
report forced-choice items (i.e., responses are either “yes” or “no”) that assess social 
reciprocity and verbal/nonverbal communication skills across a child’s developmental 




core impairments in ASD. The SCQ shows good internal consistency with Cronbach’s 
alpha ranging from .81 to .92 for children with and without ASD (Rutter et al., 2008). 
 Intellectual functioning 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II; 
Wechsler, 2011) was used to obtain an estimate of participants’ intellectual functioning. It 
is an abbreviated version of other Wechsler intelligence tests (e.g., Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children – Fourth Edition; Wechsler, 2003) and is designed for individuals aged 6 
to 90 years. It consists of four subtests: Block Design, Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning, and 
Similarities. Scores on these four subtests are combined to provide a Full Scale IQ score. In 
addition, the combination of scores on the Vocabulary and Similarities subtests form the 
Verbal Comprehension Index score, and scores on the Block Design and Matrix Reasoning 
subtests together form the Perceptual Reasoning Index score. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of intellectual functioning. The WASI-II has internal consistency ranging from .92 
to .96, and test-retest reliability ranging from .79 to .95 for children aged 6 to 16 years. It 
also shows good concurrent validity (Wechsler, 2011).  
 Executive functioning 
 
The Trail Making Test from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-
KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) was used to assess cognitive flexibility. The subtest 
has five conditions: visual scanning, number sequencing, letter sequencing, number-letter 
switching and motor speed. Cognitive flexibility is measured in the fourth condition, 




draw lines and switch between connecting numbers and letters in a sequential order as fast 
as possible without making mistakes. Participants’ performances are timed and the 
completion time is recorded as a raw score. Higher scores indicate poorer cognitive 
flexibility ability. The D-KEFS Trail Making Test has internal consistency ranging 
from .57 to .78 for children aged 8 to 12 years, and test-retest reliability ranging from .20 
to .82 for children and adolescents aged 8 to 19 years (Delis et al., 2001).  
 
The Color-Word Interference Test from the D-KEFS (Delis et al., 2001) was used to 
assess inhibition. The subtest has four conditions: colour naming, word reading, inhibition 
and inhibition/switching. Inhibition is measured in the third condition, namely the 
inhibition condition. In this condition, names of colours are presented in a different 
coloured ink, and participants are required to name the ink colour and not read the colour 
words, as fast as possible without making mistakes. Performance is timed and the 
completion time is recorded as a raw score. Higher scores indicate poorer ability to inhibit 
automatic responses. The D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test has internal consistency 
ranging from .72 to .79 for children aged 8 to 12 years, and test-retest reliability ranging 
from .77 to .90 for children and adolescents aged 8 to 19 years (Delis et al., 2001).  
 
The Letter Number Sequencing subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children – Fifth Edition (WISC-V; Wechsler, 2016) was used as an index of working 
memory. On this subtest, participants are verbally presented with a combination of letters 




then required to recall the numbers first, in order, starting with the smallest number, then 
the letters in alphabetical order. Each item consists of three trials and each trial is presented 
until participants obtain three incorrect trials within the same item. The sum of scores on all 
items form a total raw score, with higher scores indicating better ability to mentally hold 
and manipulate verbal information. The Letter Number Sequencing has an internal 
consistency of .86 (Wechsler, 2016). 
 Retrospective memory 
The List Memory Delayed of the NEPSY-II (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) was 
used to assess retrospective memory. The List Memory Delayed is part of the List Memory 
and List Memory Delayed subtest where participants are first read a list of 15 words and 
then asked to recall the words in any order over five separate trials. Following this, an 
interference list of 15 new words is presented and participants are asked to recall the new 
list. Immediately after this trial, participants are instructed to recall the first list they 
previously learned without the experimenter repeating the list of words prior to recall. After 
an interval of approximately 25 to 35 minutes, the List Memory Delayed is administered 
where participants are asked to recall the first list of words with only the first word on the 
list provided as a cue. The raw score of List Memory Delayed was used as an index of 
retrospective memory. Higher scores indicate better retrospective memory ability. Internal 
consistency for the List Memory and List Memory Delayed subtest is .91 and test-retest 






 Functional capacity 
The Parent Form of the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System – Second Edition 
(ABAS-II; Harrison & Oakland, 2003) assesses adaptive functioning in everyday life. It is a 
parent-rated questionnaire designed for ages 5 to 21 years and consists of items that are 
categorised into 10 skill areas. The Self-Direction scale is particularly of interest in Studies 
2 and 3 as it assesses daily living skills that are mostly likely dependent on future-oriented 
thinking abilities (i.e., episodic foresight and PM). For example, this scale assesses the 
ability to follow instructions, stick to time limits and adhere to daily routines, all of which 
are skills associated with independence, responsibility and self-control. This scale requires 
parents to rate how frequent their children displays the behaviours (e.g., “Routinely arrives 
at places on time”) on a 4-point Likert scale. The sum of these ratings provides a total raw 
score for the subscale. Higher scores indicate higher levels of self-direction and functional 
independence. The Self-Direction scale has internal consistency ranging from .91 to .94 for 
children aged 8 to 12 years and inter-rater reliability of .84 for individuals aged 5 to 21 
years (Harrison & Oakland, 2003).  
4.3 Key Measures 
 Imagination task 
An imagination task was used to investigate the underlying component processes of 
episodic future thinking. This task is an adaptation of the Adapted Autobiographical 
Interview (AI; Addis et al., 2008), which is a semi-structured interview that assesses 
episodic and non-episodic details of past and future events. As Study 1 required a measure 




was included. The future condition requires participants to imagine and describe a self-
relevant, plausible event that might happen in their next summer holiday. The imagination 
task also has two additional conditions, namely atemporal and narrative. The atemporal 
condition involves participants mentally creating a novel, fictitious scene in a familiar 
context, specifically imagining sitting at a café and having a drink. The narrative condition 
requires participants to describe their experience of climbing to a tower in a medieval castle 
(see Table 4.1. for the provided verbal cues). These latter two conditions were derived from 
a task originally developed by Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007).  
On the imagination task, all three conditions require the basic process of scene 
construction. The atemporal and future conditions have similar scene construction demands 
because both scenarios are required to be self-generated. However, these demands are 
substantially reduced in the narrative condition because a story structure to set the scene is 
provided (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). In addition, the demands on self-projection are 
differentiated for each condition in the task. The atemporal and narrative conditions 
impose similar demands on self-projection whereas the future condition has an additional 
temporal element thus requiring self-projection through time. Given that the demands of 
scene construction and self-projection are systematically varied in this task, the pattern of 
performance across all three scenarios allows the identification of which process may be 





Table 4.1.  
Verbal Cues Provided in Each Condition on the Imagination Task 
Conditions Verbal Cues 
  
Narrative Imagine you are standing in the middle of an entrance hall of a large 
medieval castle. There is tower somewhere in the castle and the top of 
the tower can be reached by climbing up a tall winding staircase. I 
want you to describe to me in as much detail as possible your way 
through the castle’s many rooms and floors until you reach the top of 
the tower. Use all of your senses including what you see, feel, and do 
on the way to the tower.  
  
Atemporal Imagine you are sitting having a drink in a café. I want you to describe 
the experience and the surroundings in as much detail as possible using 
all your senses including what you can see, hear, and feel.  
  
Future Imagine something you will be doing on your next summer holidays, 
but just give me one event. I want you to describe that event and the 
surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your senses 




Participants are asked to imagine and describe each scenario in as much details as 
possible, providing details using all of their senses including what they see, hear, smell, and 
feel. Participants are specifically instructed to create new scenes in their minds and not just 
describe a past event. Prompts are given when participants’ responses are short and vague 
(e.g., “I see people”) to elicit more detailed descriptions of their imagined scenes. The 
experimenter is only allowed to provide the task’s prescribed set of prompts where 
appropriate and is strictly prohibited from introducing any concept, idea, detail, or entity 
that participants have not already mentioned (e.g., “What do the people look/sound/smell 
like?”). The number of prompts provided to each participant may slightly vary, but all 




(i.e., two to three minutes per scenario). Prior to presenting the three test conditions, an 
example of a scenario is given to the participants (i.e., sitting on a bench at the park), with a 
sample response to ensure that participants understand the instructions of the task. All 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants in both groups to minimise possible 
order effects.  
 
Standardised scoring procedures for the imagination task were followed as outlined 
in the training manuals provided by Donna Rose Addis. For each transcribed scenario 
description, a central event is first identified and then details are segmented and categorised 
as either internal (episodic details specific to the central event) or external (semantic 
information, repetitions and errors). The number of internal details generated in each 
condition provides an index of the extent to which participants personally experience the 
event in their imagination.  
For Study 1, two independent scorers who were blinded to the aims of the study and 
group membership scored all transcripts. Both scorers completed the training procedures 
where they were asked to segment 20 training events into internal and external details. 
Inter-rater reliability between each scorer and the scoring of these events provided in the 
training manuals were examined using two-way mixed-design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) intraclass correlation analysis. The Cronbach alphas obtained for the scorers and 






 Episodic foresight 
The Virtual Week-Foresight task (VW-Foresight; Lyons et al., 2014) is a 
computerised board game that assesses an individual’s ability to engage in episodic 
foresight in an everyday life context. It attempts to simulate real life situations where this 
cognitive capacity is demonstrated and flexibly used. For example, after hearing a forecast 
of rain later today, a person may imagine themselves getting caught in the rain on the way 
home from work and subsequently decide to pack an umbrella before leaving home for 
work in the morning. Behaviours as in this example are largely guided by episodic 
foresight, where current actions are implemented in light of an imagined future event in 
order to avoid potential future problems. The VW-Foresight task is designed to specifically 
capture the ability to apply episodic foresight in daily life. This measure was originally 
developed at the University of Queensland for use with adults. It has been employed in past 
studies with older adults (Lyons et al., 2014), adults with schizophrenia (Lyons et al., 
2015), opiate users (Terrett, Lyons, et al., 2016) and stroke patients (Lyons et al., 2019). 
The VW-Foresight task was recently adapted at the Cognition and Emotion Research 
Centre at the Australian Catholic University to be appropriate for use in school-aged 
children. The adaptation involved changing wording, scenarios and pictures to be more age-
appropriate for 8- to 12-year-olds. For instance, going to university in the adult version was 
changed to attending school in the children’s version.  
 
On the VW-Foresight, participants are required to move a token around the board 
on the roll of a die. A circuit around the board represents one virtual day (see Figure 4.3. 




required to make decisions about daily activities and carry out tasks that draw on episodic 
foresight. Each episodic foresight task consists of three components: (1) A plausible 
everyday situation is presented in which a problem arises (problem); (2) A daily activity 
which subsequently occurs and presents an opportunity to select an item from five possible 
options that allows the problem to be solved (daily activity); and (3) A similar situation is 
presented in which the previous problem is still present and provides the opportunity to use 
the previously acquired item to solve the problem (resolution).  
 
 





During the game, participants pass a total of ten green ‘S’ squares on the board each 
virtual day. Every time they land on or pass an ‘S’ square, they are prompted to pick up a 
Situation Card. On each Situation Card, a realistic daily situation, such as eating breakfast, 
is presented. Participants are asked to choose one of the options on the card in response to 
the situation. Depending on the option the participants select, they are then prompted to roll 
a specific number on the die to continue moving around the board (e.g., roll a three, roll an 
even number or roll any number). Most of these Situation Cards are related to the episodic 
foresight tasks embedded within the game, that is, some Situation Cards consist of a 
problem which participants are required to independently identify (problem) and some 
Situation Cards present situations that provide the context for the problem to be resolved in 
(resolution). Other Situation Cards are not linked to any of the episodic foresight tasks but 
act as distractor situations.  
In addition, participants are asked to pick up Daily Activities Cards on which five 
items are presented, and they are required choose one item. Some Daily Activities Cards 
contain an item on the list that allows participants to solve a problem previously 
encountered on a Situation Card. Other Daily Activities Cards are included as distractor 
activities where no items on these cards would help to solve a previous problem. 
Participants acquire an item from the list presented on the Daily Activities Cards by 
clicking on it, and it is then stored in a repository labelled Your Stored Items and can be 
retrieved later to solve a problem. The presentation of problem, resolution and distractor 
Situation Cards are interspersed throughout the day, with Daily Activities Cards presented 
in between the Situation Cards. On average, there are two intervening cards between 




intervening cards are presented between item acquisition and problem resolution situations. 
Thus, participants encounter cards that are either (a) an initial problem presentation 
situation, (b) a problem resolution situation, (c) a distractor situation, (d) an opportunity to 
acquire a target item, or (e) a list of distractor items, as they move around the board. The 
purpose of including distractor situation cards, daily activities cards and distractor items 
throughout the game is to simulate problems related to episodic foresight that are typically 
encountered in everyday life, but which are commonly embedded among other ongoing 
activities.  
The following is an example of an episodic foresight task to provide further 
understanding of the VW-Foresight game. Participants first encounter a situation in which a 
problem is required to be independently identified (e.g., “As you are rushing around to get 
ready for school you drop your glasses and one of the lenses breaks! You tell yourself that 
you will deal with it later because you can’t be late”). Problems such as this cannot be 
solved immediately so participants are asked to keep them in mind. At a later point during 
the game, participants are presented with an opportunity to acquire an item that would later 
allow the problem to solved (e.g., acquire “your old pair of glasses”). The acquired item is 
‘stored’ in Your Stored Items which is accessible via a button on the game board and on 
every Situation Card. Participants continue moving around the board until a different 
Situation Card is presented where a situation related to the same problem arises but is still 
unresolved (e.g., “After a long day, you look for a comfy spot to sit to watch your movie. 
You turn on your movie and realise it looks blurry!”). At this point, participants should 
retrieve and use the appropriate item (i.e., “your old pair of glasses”) from Your Stored 





The first version of the children’s VW-Foresight task adapted from the adult version 
consisted of ten episodic foresight tasks which were presented across three virtual days 
(Monday to Wednesday). However, a pilot study involving six healthy children indicated 
that the three-day version was extremely time consuming and led to a decline in motivation 
towards the end of the game. Therefore, it was decided that the game should be reduced to 
two virtual days. To develop the two-day version, all Situation Cards and Daily Activities 
Cards for the ten episodic foresight tasks were carefully assessed. It appeared that Monday 
had the least episodic foresight tasks to be solved, so Monday was removed from the game. 
Consequently, two episodic foresight tasks that were presented on Monday were omitted. 
Additionally, there were two foresight-related problems that were presented on Monday but 
items were not acquired and used until Tuesday. In order to retain as many episodic 
foresight tasks as possible, only one of these tasks was omitted. The Daily Activities Card 
to acquire the item to solve the problem for this omitted task was replaced with a distractor 
card on Tuesday. The Situation Card to use the item for this task on Tuesday was also 
replaced with the presentation of the other problem that had previously been presented on 
Monday. Tuesday and Wednesday in the three-day version were subsequently relabelled as 
Monday and Tuesday, respectively, in the two-day version (see Table 4.2. for summary 
changes). In sum, the two-day version consists of a total of seven episodic foresight tasks. 
There are 20 Situation Cards, 14 of which are related to episodic foresight tasks (i.e., seven 
Situation Cards present episodic foresight problems and seven Situation Cards provide the 
context in which these problems are solved). The remaining six Situation Cards are 




Table 4.2.  
Children Virtual Week-Foresight Summary Changes from Three-Day to Two-Day Version 
Three-Day Version Two-Day Version 
Monday Monday removed 









Scenario 2 omitted 
Scenario 3 
Problem presented 
Scenario 3 omitted 
Scenario 4 
Problem presented 
Scenario 4 moved to the following day 
  
Tuesday Relabelled as Monday 




Scenario 3 omitted 
Daily Activities Card to acquire item replaced with a 
distractor card 
Situation Card to solve the problem was replaced by 





No changes required 
No changes required 
  
Wednesday Relabelled as Tuesday 
Scenarios 5 to 10* No changes required 
*Scenarios 4 to 10 were presented throughout Monday and Tuesday on the two-day version 






Participants are first taken through a Trial Day during which instructions on how to 
play the game are explained. When participants complete the Trial Day, they are then asked 
to complete the testing days. It is ensured that all participants understand the instructions of 
the game before proceeding to the test conditions because no further prompts are given 
after Trial Day. Two outcome measures are produced at the end of the game, namely the 
number of correct items acquired and the number of correct items used. The number of 
correct items acquired assesses the ability to secure future benefits in the present (i.e., 
obtain an appropriate item), whereas the number of correct items used assesses the ability 
to apply items to resolve a problem at the appropriate future time point. These two 
measures together assess the capacity to flexibly exercise episodic foresight in an everyday 
life context. All participants in Study 2 were tested on the two-day version of the children 
VW-Foresight.  
 Prospective memory 
The Virtual Week (hereafter referred to as VW-PM; Rendell & Craik, 2000) is a 
computerised board game that has a similar interface to the VW-Foresight but involves 
different activities and places different cognitive demands on participants (see Figure 4.4. 
for the VW-PM game interface). On the VW-PM, participants roll a die and move a token 
around the board. Each circuit of the board represents a virtual day with the time of the 
virtual day displayed in the centre of the board. Fifteen virtual minutes go by for every two 
squares moved. Participants are prompted to pick up an Event Card each time they land on 
or pass an ‘E’ square. Each virtual day consists of ten Event Cards and each event card 




an Event Card presented at the start of the day reads ‘This morning at school you sit next to 
your friend. You are both…’). Participants then choose from three options on these event 
cards (e.g., participating in the lesson actively, drawing a picture while listening, chatting a 
lot). In addition, participants carry out PM tasks that are embedded in the ongoing activity 




Figure 4.4. Children Virtual Week-Prospective Memory iPad version game interface 
 
Participants encounter two types of PM tasks throughout the game: event-based and 




participants are asked to complete. Event-based tasks are required to be performed when 
the appropriate Event Card (e.g., buy some pencils at the event card of “Go Shopping”) is 
encountered, whereas time-based tasks are to be performed when the appropriate time is 
shown in the middle of the board (e.g., help set up the school hall when the virtual clock 
shows 10:30 a.m.). Four of the PM tasks (two event-based and two time-based) are the 
same each day and are expected to be carried out every day in the game. These tasks are 
presented on task cards with verbal and visual instructions provided once at the end of the 
Trial Day (i.e., a practice day around the board to familiarise participants with the features 
of the game board). The two event-based tasks involve taking antibiotics at breakfast and at 
dinner, and the two time-based tasks are to take an asthma inhaler at 11 a.m. and 9 p.m. 
Participants are asked to read these tasks out aloud twice, and then repeat them once while 
looking away from the iPad to ensure that the tasks are learned before proceeding to the 
first testing day. Two other PM tasks (one event-based and one time-based) are presented 
on Start Cards which are picked up at the start of each virtual day. Two additional PM 
tasks (one event-based and one time-based) are presented later as participants move around 
the board during each virtual day. These latter four event-based and time-based task cards 
display written instructions that are required to be read aloud. When participants are 
required to carry out a PM task (either in response to an event on an Event Card or at a 
particular time on the virtual clock), they are asked to press a ‘Perform Task’ button and 
select the appropriate task to perform.  
At the completion of each virtual day, participants are also presented with Task 
Review Cards to assess retrospective memory for PM task content. This requires each PM 




PM cue (e.g., when shopping). Four distractor tasks are also included on the Task Review 
Cards and participants are expected to indicate that these actions are ‘not required’. Tasks 
are individually presented on the screen and are automatically swiped to the next task once 
participants have responded to each task. This recognition task provides an index of the 
retrospective memory component of the PM tasks (see Appendix B). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the 2-day version of the VW-PM was used in 
Study 3. This version differs from longer versions (e.g., 3-day and 7-day versions) used in 
past studies in that the longer versions allow further differentiation of event-based and 
time-based tasks into irregular event-based and time-based tasks, and regular event-based 
and time-based tasks. Irregular event-based and time-based tasks are different each day and 
simulate tasks that occasionally need to be performed in everyday life. By contrast, regular 
event-based and time-based tasks are the same each day and are carried out daily in the 
game. This repetition is argued to lead to stronger encoding of task content and reduces the 
demands on retrospective memory, making the regular tasks less cognitively taxing than the 
irregular tasks. However, given the 2-day version of the game restricts the opportunity for 
the regular tasks to be overlearned due to the limited exposure in this shorter version of the 
game, the regular versus irregular task distinction was not addressed in Study 3. 
 
Similar to the VW-Foresight task, participants are first taken through a Trial Day 
where instructions to play the game are explained before the commencement of the testing 
days. When participants complete the Trial Day and indicate that they understand the 




Participants’ responses are calculated as a percentage of the total number of PM tasks 
correctly performed, separately for event-based and time-based PM tasks.  
 
The VW-PM game was originally developed and administered on a computer. 
However, as all of the participants in Study 3 had previously completed the VW-Foresight 
task for Study 2, which was administered on a computer, an iPad version of the VW-PM 
was developed for Study 3 to reduce any possible practice effects. The iPad app was 
developed using HockeyApp and CloudKit Dashboard with the assistance of a computer 
programmer. In addition, any overlaps in content with the VW-Foresight measure were 
examined and addressed. Specifically, all birthday-related themes in the VW-PM were 
removed to avoid confusion with the storyline in the VW-Foresight (e.g., changed “send 
out invitations for your birthday party” to “send out invitations for your Halloween party”). 
Any images that were used in both VW-Foresight and VW-PM were also replaced with 
new images in the VW-PM. The VW-PM was also streamlined by reducing the amount of 
written instructions presented throughout the game and more explicitly flagging the time of 
day to avoid potential misunderstanding, especially in younger participants (e.g., changing 
“at 10:30 a.m. help set up the school hall” to “in the morning at 10:30 a.m. help set up the 
school hall”). The adaptations from the VW-PM computer version to the iPad version were 
relatively minor, and there were no major content changes. All participants in Study 3 
completed the VW-PM on an iPad.  
The children’s version of the VW-PM has been employed with children with ASD 




Reliability of the measure has been demonstrated to be relatively good in typically 
developing children and moderate in children with ASD, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging 
from .78 to .84 and .57 to .58, respectively for the 3-day version (Henry et al., 2014).  
4.4 Procedure 
Parents of children with ASD or healthy controls who expressed interest in the 
study were contacted via phone or email and an interview was conducted to determine their 
child’s eligibility to participate. A number of screening questions were asked, including the 
child’s date of birth, diagnosis of ASD, and the presence of other mental health disorders or 
neurological disorders. A mutually convenient time and location for the first testing session 
was then arranged with eligible participants.  
During the first testing session, written consent and written assent were obtained 
from all parents and child participants prior to the commencement of testing. Parents were 
then asked to complete three questionnaires while their child completed the first testing 
session. For both sessions, all child participants were tested individually in a room free of 
distractions. The first session took approximately 2 to 2.5 hours to complete while the 
second session took around 1 to 1.5 hours to complete, with regular small breaks 
incorporated between tasks in both sessions to reduce fatigue. The order of task 
administration for all participants in each session is outlined in Figure 4.5. However, 
participants who had completed a cognitive assessment in the past two years were exempt 
from completing the WASI-II in the first session as their previous assessment scores were 
still valid and were therefore used. As such, an alternative testing protocol was followed for 




exposed to the alternative protocol. All participants were rewarded with a certificate of 
participation and reimbursed with one adult and one child movie voucher at the end of the 
second session. Collected data used for all studies in the current thesis were de-identified.  
4.5 General Statistical Analyses 
To ensure that all analyses in each study were sufficiently powered, G*Power 
3.1.9.4 was used to calculate the minimum sample sizes required (see Table 4.3.). An alpha 
level of .05, power of .80 and effect sizes obtained from past studies with similar research 
designs were used in these calculations (Field, 2018; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Overall, 
the sample sizes included in Studies 1, 2 and 3 were larger than the calculated sample sizes 
to perform analysis of variance (ANOVA) and thus the analyses would be sufficiently 
powered. By contrast, the included sample sizes in Studies 2 and 3 were smaller than the 
required sample sizes to run correlations and multiple regressions and therefore may lack 
statistical power to detect significance. However, given that Studies 2 and 3 were the first 
to investigate a range of cognitive contributors to episodic foresight and PM, obtained 
results will be considered exploratory in the current thesis. In addition, data collected in 
each study were cleaned prior to data analyses, and appropriate steps were taken to address 
outliers and violations of assumptions. Analyses were performed using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 25 for Windows (IBM Corp). Specific data 
screening and analyses are described within the method section of each empirical paper in 





Figure 4.5. Procedure for the screening and testing phases 
aTasks were counterbalanced in each group to avoid order effects 
b18 participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and 18 healthy controls were administered the imagination task to be included 






Calculated Sample Sizes Required for Studies 1, 2 and 3 Using G*Power 
 Types of Analysis Expected Effect Sizes Required Sample Sizes Included Sample Sizes 
     
Study 1 ANOVA Large effect (Terrett et al., 2013) N = 16 (n = 8 in each group) ASD (n = 37) 
Control (n = 60) 
     
Study 2 ANOVA Large effect (Terrett et al., 2013) N = 14 (n = 8 in each group) 
ASD (n = 40) 
Control (n = 55) 
  Medium effect (Ferretti et al., 2018) N = 60 (n = 30 in each group) 
  Medium effect (Marini et al., 2019) N = 78 (n = 39 in each group) 
    
 Correlation Large effect for ASDs 
Medium to large effect for Controls 
(Terrett et al., 2013) 
ASD n = 25 
Control n = 11 to n = 46 




n = 50 in each group (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2014) 
n = 109 in each group 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) 
     
Study 3 ANOVA Medium effect (Henry et al., 2014) N = 48 (24 in each group) 
ASD (n = 32) 
Controls (n = 42) 
    
 Correlation Small effect for ASDs (Henry et al., 2014) 
Small to medium effect for Controls 
(Henry et al., 2014; Yi et al., 2014) 
ASD n = 159 
Control n = 79 to n = 239 
     






As reviewed in Chapter 2, several past studies have shown that episodic future 
thinking (i.e., the ability to mentally pre-experience hypothetical future events) is impaired 
in children with ASD. However, the underlying mechanisms that might be driving these 
deficits remain largely unknown. The current study aimed to shed light on why this form of 
prospection might be impaired in this clinical group, specifically by investigating the 
contributions of scene construction and self-projection through time. A task that is based on 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) paradigm was employed to systematically 





ASD is a lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by impairments in 
social and communication skills and the presence of repetitive and restricted repertoires of 
behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). While large research efforts have 
primarily been focused towards understanding factors that contribute to the social and 
communication deficits observed (Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Zalla & Korman, 
2018), much less is known about what might explain the inflexible behaviours commonly 
seen in this clinical population. It has recently been suggested that these behaviours may 
relate to a compromised ability to mentally pre-experience hypothetical future events, 
known as episodic future thinking (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Terrett 
et al., 2013). Episodic future thinking is thought to have considerable adaptive value as it 
allows one to imagine and evaluate plausible future scenarios without actually engaging in 
the behaviours. This ability is argued to lead to increased behavioural flexibility and 
promote functional independence in everyday living (Henry et al., 2016; Suddendorf et al., 
2009). Indeed, several clinical groups who display poor functional skills have been found to 
have difficulty imagining themselves experiencing future situations, including individuals 
with generalised anxiety disorder (Wu, Szpunar, Godovich, Schacter, & Hofmann, 2015) 
and long-term opiate users (Mercuri et al., 2015). 
In the context of ASD, evidence now shows that deficits in episodic future thinking 
are apparent in both children (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2018; Terrett et al., 2013) and adults 
(e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2010) with this disorder. What is currently unclear, however, are the 
mechanisms underpinning this impairment. Given the potential value for this type of 




to investigate the underlying basis of episodic future thinking deficits in children with 
ASD.  
Episodic future thinking is a complex cognitive capacity that has been argued to 
involve a range of underlying processes (D'Argembeau et al., 2010; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013). For example, it has 
been proposed that scene construction – the ability to mentally generate and bind multiple 
elements to create coherent scenes – is a basic necessary process that underpins episodic 
future thinking (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). This proposal appears to somewhat overlap 
with the prominent constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which argues that episodic 
future thinking is a constructive process whereby schematic, episodic and semantic 
information is retrieved and used to create novel hypothetical future scenarios in our 
imaginations (Addis, 2018). Episodic future thinking has also been argued to require the 
ability to mentally travel forward in time and “pre-live” an event that is anticipated to 
happen in one’s future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2002). Given this, it has 
also been suggested that episodic future thinking involves self-projection, which refers to 
the ability to shift the self from an immediate environment to an alternative perspective, 
such as a different mental or spatial perspective (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). This general 
ability to shift perspectives has been suggested to underpin various cognitive abilities 
including theory of mind and spatial navigation. In the case of episodic future thinking, 
self-projection has been argued to specifically involve adopting a different temporal (i.e., 
future) perspective which in turn enables pre-experiences of hypothetical future scenarios 





 Given that both scene construction and self-projection through time have been 
suggested to play key roles in episodic future thinking, disruptions in either process could 
lead to a breakdown in this capacity. In relation to potential disruptions in scene 
construction ability, individuals with ASD may be vulnerable to such an impairment for a 
variety of reasons. For example, difficulties in scene construction may stem from a 
diminished capacity for relational binding, with several studies showing that individuals 
with ASD tend to focus on individual elements of an experience while struggling to 
identify and combine relevant features among these elements to form coherent episodes 
(Bowler et al., 2014; Bowler et al., 2011; Gaigg, Gardiner, & Bowler, 2008). Moreover, the 
hippocampus is argued to be the part of the brain that plays a vital role in supporting 
processes of binding separate elements within a coherent spatial context (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vaan, et al., 2007; Maguire et al., 2016). Individuals with ASD have often been 
found to show hippocampal abnormalities which may limit their ability to bind and 
construct mental experiences as required in scene construction (Nicolson et al., 2006; 
Sussman et al., 2015). 
In terms of possible difficulties with self-projection through time, this may be 
linked to reduced self-awareness through time which had been reported among individuals 
with ASD (see Lind, 2010; Lind & Bowler, 2008 for comprehensive reviews). If these 
individuals lack self-awareness through time, then the process of projecting oneself into an 
imagined future scenario is likely to be disrupted given that awareness of the continuous 
existence of the self in subjective time has been argued to be one of the hallmarks of mental 




Presently, the extent to which ASD-related impairments in episodic future thinking 
reflect difficulties in scene construction or self-projection through time (or both) is 
currently unclear, with limited empirical investigations undertaken, especially in children 
with the disorder. To date, only two studies have addressed this question in children with 
ASD. In the first, Marini et al. (2016) compared 6- to 11-year-old children with ASD and 
healthy controls on two types of tasks. The first were self-based tasks which required the 
projection of the self into hypothetical future situations (e.g., choosing whether to first put 
on the head or the body of a two-piece ant costume). The second were mechanical-based 
tasks which involved the prediction of mechanical outcomes (e.g., choosing between a 
slotted spoon and a small box without a lid to successfully transfer tapioca beads). The 
authors argued that the self-based tasks drew on self-projection into the future whereas the 
mechanical-based tasks relied on scene construction. Their findings showed that children 
with ASD performed worse than controls on both the self-based and mechanical-based 
tasks. In addition, the authors found that children with ASD performed significantly worse 
on the self-based tasks than on the mechanical-based tasks. Overall, it was concluded that 
episodic future thinking impairments in ASD appear to reflect underlying difficulties in 
both scene construction and self-projection into the future, but that self-projection into the 
future is more severely compromised in this clinical group.  
The second study by Ciaramelli et al. (2018) yielded findings that only partially 
supported the conclusions in Marini et al.’s (2016) study. In this study, Ciaramelli et al. 
(2018) compared children and adolescents with ASD aged 7 to 15 years with healthy 
controls and concluded that diminished capacity for scene construction, but not 




group. This conclusion was based on two findings of that study. The first was that, relative 
to controls, children with ASD showed significantly more difficulty generating specific 
episodic details about their imagined future scenarios compared to their ability to provide 
general details about these scenarios (which was similar to controls). This suggests a 
selective impairment in the process of generating and combining elements into a complex 
future experience (i.e., scene construction; Ciaramelli et al., 2018). The second was that 
individuals with ASD revealed not only impairments in imagining future events that were 
self-relevant, but also difficulties in imagining the future from another person’s perspective. 
On the basis of these data, it was therefore argued that impairments in episodic future 
thinking were less likely attributable to difficulties in the projection of the self into the 
future, but more due to the compromised constructive processes of generating and 
combining details into coherent future experiences (Ciaramelli et al., 2018). This 
conclusion is also in line with a study of adults with ASD that concluded that scene 
construction difficulties rather than reduced ability to project the self through time was the 
major contributor to impairments in episodic future thinking. (Lind, Williams, et al., 2014). 
Given the discrepancy in these two studies, further work is required to establish the extent 
to which scene construction and self-projection difficulties contribute to episodic future 
thinking impairments in children with ASD.  
 In order to better understand the basis of these deficits in children with ASD, a 
useful approach would be to systematically vary demands of scene construction and self-
projection to disentangle the contribution of these two processes to episodic future thinking. 
This approach was taken in the current study by using an imagination task previously 




various situations and give a detailed description of those imagined experiences. This task 
was developed based on Hassabis et al.’s (2007) paradigm and comprises three conditions 
(i.e., narrative, atemporal and future) which differ in their scene construction and self-
projection demands. More specifically, all three conditions require scene construction 
although this is substantially reduced in the narrative condition because a story structure to 
set the scene is provided. The demands on self-projection are also differentiated for each 
condition in the task. The atemporal and narrative conditions place similar demands on self-
projection as in both cases participants must adopt alternative perspectives in order to 
construct hypothetical scenarios that are removed from the immediate environment. 
However, while the future condition also requires adopting an alternative perspective, it has 
an additional temporal element whereby participants must describe experiencing an event 
in the future. It is therefore the only condition that requires self-projection through time. 
Since the demands on scene construction and self-projection are systematically 
differentiated on this imagination task, the pattern of performance across all three 
conditions allows investigation of the underlying processes that might be compromised in 
ASD.  
As noted, the aim of the current study was to establish the extent to which scene 
construction and self-projection through time underpin episodic future thinking deficits in 
children with ASD. In terms of hypotheses, should scene construction deficits primarily 
contribute to episodic future thinking impairments, performance of children with ASD 
would be expected to be equally compromised on the atemporal and future conditions 
(which have similar scene construction demands) relative to the narrative condition (which 




hippocampal abnormalities previously reported in individuals with ASD could be 
contributing to problems in relational binding (Bowler et al. 2011; Sussman et al., 2015). 
However, should deficits in self-projection through time primarily contribute to episodic 
future thinking impairments, performance of children with ASD would be expected to be 
poorer on the future condition relative to the other conditions. As noted, this is the only 
condition which requires the projection of the self through time, while both the atemporal 
and narrative conditions require general self-projection, but not into the future. Such a 
pattern of performance would potentially reflect difficulties with self-awareness through 
time among individuals with ASD as previously highlighted in the literature (Lind, 2010; 
Lind & Bowler, 2008). Finally, should deficits in both scene construction and self-
projection through time contribute to episodic future thinking impairments, the 
performance of children with ASD would be poorer on the atemporal and future conditions 
compared to the narrative condition as the former two conditions have similarly higher 
scene construction demands than the narrative condition. However, the future condition 
would be further impaired than the atemporal condition because only the future condition 
requires projecting the self into a future time period. 
5.2 Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-seven children with ASD (68% males) and 60 healthy controls (50% males) 
aged 8 to 12 years participated in the current study. The two groups did not differ with 
respect to the proportion of males and females, χ² (1, N = 97) = 2.88, p = .09, and there 




for background characteristics). Clinical reports by paediatricians or psychologists were 
provided by parents of children with ASD confirming their diagnosis based on the DSM-
IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) or DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Consistent with these diagnoses, participants with ASD scored 
significantly higher than the controls on the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Rutter et al., 2008). The SCQ is a 40-item parent-report questionnaire that assesses 
children’s social and communication skills across their developmental history. Higher 
scores on the SCQ indicate poorer social and communication skills, which are the core 
areas of impairment commonly observed in individuals with ASD (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). 
 
Table 5.1.  
Background Characteristics of Participants in the ASD and Control Groups 
 ASD group  Control group   
 n = 37  n = 60   
 M SD  M SD t(95)a d 
Age (in years) 9.78 1.37  10.20 1.35 1.48 0.31 
Intelligence        
FSIQ 109.32 13.09  111.48 11.25 0.86 0.18 
VCI 107.97 13.94  110.70 10.38 1.10 0.22 
PRI 109.78 15.81  109.53 12.92 0.09 0.02 
SCQ        
Total Score  12.00 5.10  2.95 2.86 9.87* 2.19 
Note. *p < .001; d = Cohen’s index of effect size; Cohen (1988) defines effect sizes of 0.2 
as small, 0.5 as medium and 0.8 as large 
aAll ns = 37 for ASD and ns = 60 for controls, except SCQ n = 59 for controls. 
Homogeneity of variance was violated therefore df = 50.34 for SCQ. 
ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, VCI = Verbal Comprehension 






The imagination task used in the current study was previously used in Mercuri et 
al.’s (2016) study. The measure is an adaptation of the Adapted Autobiographical Interview 
(AI; Addis et al., 2008), which is a semi-structured interview that assesses the number of 
episodic and non-episodic details generated by participants when describing past and future 
events. As the main variable of interest in the current study was episodic future thinking, 
only the future condition was used. The future condition requires participants to imagine 
and describe a plausible self-relevant event that might happen in their next summer holiday. 
Two other conditions, namely narrative and atemporal, were added to the AI. The narrative 
condition requires participants to describe their experience of climbing to a tower in a 
medieval castle. The atemporal condition involves participants mentally creating a novel, 
fictitious scene in a familiar context, specifically imagining having a drink in a café (see 
Table 5.2. for verbal cues). These latter two conditions were derived from a task originally 
developed by Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007).  
As previously mentioned, demands for scene construction and self-projection vary 
in each condition on this imagination task, therefore allowing the processes that may 
underlie episodic future thinking impairments to be disentangled. More specifically, the 
narrative condition places lower demands on scene construction relative to the atemporal 
and future conditions. This is because a story structure is provided in the former condition, 
but new scenes need to be generated in the latter two conditions. In addition, the future 




temporal element, although it relies on scene construction to a similar extent as the 
atemporal condition.  
 
Table 5.2.  
Verbal Cues Provided in Each Condition on the Imagination Task 
Conditions Verbal Cues 
  
Narrative Imagine you are standing in the middle of an entrance hall of a large 
medieval castle. There is tower somewhere in the castle and the top of 
the tower can be reached by climbing up a tall winding staircase. I 
want you to describe to me in as much detail as possible your way 
through the castle’s many rooms and floors until you reach the top of 
the tower. Use all of your senses including what you see, feel, and do 
on the way to the tower.  
  
Atemporal Imagine you are sitting having a drink in a café. I want you to describe 
the experience and the surroundings in as much detail as possible using 
all your senses including what you can see, hear, and feel.  
  
Future Imagine something you will be doing on your next summer holidays, 
but just give me one event. I want you to describe that event and the 
surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your senses 




The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II; 
Wechsler, 2011) was used to estimate participants’ intellectual functioning. The WASI-II 
consists of four subtests: Block Design, Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning and Similarities. 
Scores on these four subtests are combined to form a Full-Scale IQ score. In addition, the 
combination of scores on Vocabulary and Similarities subtests form the Verbal 




form the Perceptual Reasoning Index score. Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
intellectual functioning. The WASI-II shows good concurrent validity, and has internal 
consistency ranging from .92 to .96, and test-retest reliability ranging from .79 to .95 in 
children aged 6 to 16 years (Wechsler, 2011). 
 Testing session 
All participants were tested individually in a room free of distraction. Standardised 
procedures were followed as outlined in the manual for the WASI-II. On the imagination 
task, participants were asked to imagine and describe each scenario in as much detail as 
possible using all their senses including what they can see, hear, smell, and feel. 
Participants were specifically instructed to create new scenes in their minds and not just 
describe a past event. Prompts were given when participants’ responses were short and 
vague (e.g., “I see people”) to elicit more detailed descriptions of their imagined scenes. 
The experimenter was only allowed to provide the task’s prescribed set of prompts where 
appropriate and was strictly prohibited from introducing any concept, idea, detail, or entity 
that participants had not already mentioned (e.g., “What do the people look/sound/smell 
like?”). The number of prompts provided to each participant slightly varied (i.e., from one 
to four prompts per participant), but all participants in both groups were given an 
approximately equal amount of time to describe each scenario (i.e., two to three minutes 
per scenario). An example of a scenario was first given to the participants with a sample 
response to ensure that participants understood the instructions of the task. Responses were 
audio recorded for later scoring and all conditions were counterbalanced across all 
participants. Parents were asked to complete the SCQ during the session while their child 




to the commencement of testing. The research was conducted with the approval of the 
human research ethics committee of Australian Catholic University (No. V201012; 
“Prospective memory and episodic future thinking in middle childhood”). 
 Scoring 
Standardised scoring procedures for the imagination task were followed as outlined 
in the training manuals provided by Donna Rose Addis. For each transcribed scenario 
description, a central event was first identified and then details were segmented and 
categorised as either internal (episodic details specific to the central event) or external 
(semantic information, repetitions, errors, and information not specific to the central event). 
The number of internal details generated in each condition provided an index of the extent 
to which participants were personally experiencing the scenario in their imagination.  
Two independent scorers who were blinded to the aims of the study and group 
membership scored all transcripts. Both scorers completed training procedures where they 
were required to segment 20 training events into internal and external details. Inter-rater 
reliability between each scorer and the scoring of these events provided in the training 
manuals were examined using a two-way mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
intraclass correlation analysis. The Cronbach alphas obtained for the scorers and those in 
the manual were .99 for internal details and .94 for external details. 
 Data analyses 
All statistical tests were two-tailed. An alpha level of p < .05 was considered 
significant in all analyses. Three cases were identified as univariate outliers, with z-scores 




the scores to the next highest score plus one (Field, 2013). There were no significant 
deviations from normality for any variables. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied in 
analyses where the assumption of sphericity was violated.  
5.3 Results 
A mixed 2 × 3 × 2 ANOVA was conducted comparing the ASD and control groups 
on the number of internal and external details generated across the three conditions. The 
between-groups variable was group (ASD, control), and the within-groups variables were 
condition (narrative, atemporal, future) and type of details (internal, external). The number 
of details generated for narrative, atemporal and future conditions is displayed in Figure 
5.1. as a function of group, condition and type of details. Results revealed significant main 
effects of group, F(1, 95) = 13.58, p < .001,  = 0.13, condition, F(1.80, 171.24) = 44.08, 
p < .001,  = 0.32, and type of details, F(1, 95) = 463.93, p < .001,  = 0.83. All two-
way interactions were found to be significant: group and condition, F(2, 190) = 3.95, p = 
.02,  = 0.04, group and type of details, F(1, 95) = 23.16, p < .001,  = 0.20, and 
condition and type of details, F(1.72, 163.15) = 51.82, p < .001,  = 0.35. There was also 
a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 190) = 5.18, p = .006,  = 0.05. This three-way 
interaction was further investigated with two mixed-model 2 (group status: ASD, control) × 




















Figure 5.1. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the imagination task 
as a function of group (ASD, n = 37; control, n = 60) and condition. Error bars represent 
mean standard error. 
 
 Analysis of the number of internal details 
Of primary interest for the research questions addressed in the current study were 
the follow-up analyses regarding internal details. The results showed significant main 
effects of group, F(1, 95) = 18.62, p < .001,  = 0.16, and condition, F(1.70, 161.48) = 
54.28, p < .001,  = 0.36. More importantly, the two-way interaction of group and 
condition was found to be significant, F(2, 190) = 4.53, p = .01,  = 0.05. This interaction 





























narrative condition, F(1, 95) = 15.31, p < .001,  = 0.14, the atemporal condition, F(1, 95) 
= 11.09, p = .001,  = 0.11, and the future condition, F(1, 95) = 18.22, p < .001,  = 
0.16, with the ASD participants providing less internal details than healthy controls in all 
conditions (see Figure 5.1.). Further analysis of the interaction revealed a simple effect of 
condition within the control group, F(2, 94) = 39.58, p < .001,  = .46, and within the 
ASD group, F(2, 94) = 10.41, p < .001,  = .18. Post-hoc analyses showed that controls 
generated significantly less internal details in the atemporal and future conditions than the 
narrative condition, ds = 0.95 (large) and 0.77 (medium), respectively. However, no 
difference in performance was found between the atemporal and future conditions in the 
control group. A similar pattern was found for the participants with ASD who also 
produced significantly less internal details in the atemporal and future conditions than the 
narrative condition, ds = 0.52 (medium) and 0.72 (medium), respectively. Participants with 
ASD performed no differently in the atemporal and future conditions (see Table 5.3. for 
means and standard deviations).  
 Analysis of the number of external details 
The analyses focused on the number of external details revealed there was no main 
effect of group, F(1, 95) = 2.53, p = .12,  = 0.03. However, there was a significant main 
effect of condition, F(1.53, 144.93) = 10.45, p < .001,  = 0.10, and a significant two-way 
interaction of group and condition, F(2, 190) = 4.89, p = .008,  = 0.05. This interaction 
was analysed with tests of simple effects that revealed a simple effect of group for the 






















F(1, 95) = .06, p = .82,  = .001, or the atemporal condition, F(1, 95) = .06, p = .81,  = 
.001. Specifically, participants with ASD generated more external details than controls in 
the future condition. Further analysis of the interaction showed a simple effect of condition 
within the ASD group, F(2, 94) = 9.40, p < .001,  = .17, but not within the control 
group, F(2, 94) = 1.11, p = .33,  = .02. Post-hoc analyses revealed that participants with 
ASD provided significantly more external details in the future condition than the narrative 
and atemporal conditions, ds = 0.52 (medium) and 0.69 (medium), respectively. There was 
no difference in the number of external details produced in the narrative and atemporal 
conditions by the ASD group (see Table 5.3. for means and standard deviations). 
 
Table 5.3. 
Means and Standard Deviations in Each Condition for ASD and Control Groups 
 ASD  Control 
 n = 37  n = 60 
 M SD  M SD 
Narrative      
Internals 70.30 36.45  102.78 41.59 
Externals 9.24 7.65  8.88 7.19 
Atemporal      
Internals 54.59 22.55  70.78 23.67 
Externals 7.57 5.25  7.88 6.70 
Future      
Internals 48.11 24.37  74.25 31.93 














As expected, children with ASD produced significantly fewer internal details than 
controls when imagining the future scenario, consistent with other literature showing that 
episodic future thinking is impaired in this clinical group (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2018; 
Terrett et al., 2013). Moreover, it was found that children with ASD provided significantly 
more external details than controls in the future condition, and more external details in this 
condition than in the narrative and atemporal conditions. This indicates that children with 
ASD found the task of imagining themselves experiencing a future event to be the most 
cognitively challenging of the three conditions, leading to the production of more non-
relevant information.  
However, of primary interest was the pattern of performance in the ASD group in 
relation to the number of internal details generated across the three conditions, given the 
main aim of the current study was to identify processes that might underlie deficits in 
episodic future thinking in children with ASD. In this regard, the findings showed that 
children with ASD generated a similar number of internal details in the atemporal and 
future conditions, which in both cases was less than for the narrative condition. Since the 
atemporal and future conditions have been argued to place similar demands on scene 
construction, but these demands are reduced in the narrative condition, these findings 
suggest that difficulties with scene construction may contribute to impairments in episodic 
future thinking in children with ASD. Further support for this possibility is provided by the 
finding that, compared to controls, children with ASD demonstrate a reduced capacity to 
describe themselves experiencing an atemporal scene, a condition which is argued to 




Importantly, our findings that impaired scene construction ability may particularly 
contribute to episodic future thinking deficits in children with ASD is also consistent with 
Ciaramelli et al.’s (2018) study of children, and Lind et al.’s (2014) study of adults, with 
the disorder. Taken together, then, these findings suggest that difficulties mentally 
constructing scenes persistently disrupt episodic future thinking ability throughout 
development in individuals with ASD. Theoretically, such impairments in scene 
construction may reflect a reduced capacity for relational binding potentially stemming 
from hippocampal abnormalities which have previously been reported in individuals with 
the disorder (Bowler et al., 2014; Gaigg et al., 2008; Sussman et al., 2015). As such, it may 
be that these individuals experience difficulties with processing information in an 
integrative manner that is essential for the construction of coherent subjective experiences. 
Consequently, this may contribute to their impairments in pre-experiencing meaningful 
future episodes. This argument aligns with claims made in previous studies implicating 
relational binding deficits and hippocampal abnormalities in episodic memory impairments 
(i.e., difficulty re-experiencing personal past events; Bowler et al., 2011; Lind, 2010). 
Overall then it is possible that disruption in the processes of generating and combining 
separate elements as mediated by the hippocampus impairs the capacity for mental time 
travel in children with ASD. Further cognitive and neuroimaging studies are however 
needed to provide more empirical support for this claim. 
Another key finding in the current study was that difficulties with self-projection 
through time did not appear to contribute to the deficits in episodic future thinking 
observed in children with ASD. This is indicated by the results which, as previously noted, 




future conditions compared to the narrative condition in the ASD group. Thus, it appears 
that the additional demand for self-projection through time in the future condition was not 
associated with any greater impairment than that shown in the atemporal condition which 
largely required scene construction and general self-projection ability. This conclusion is, 
again, in alignment with the findings of Ciaramelli et al. (2018) who showed that the ability 
to project the self through time did not appear to contribute to episodic future thinking 
deficits in children with ASD. The current findings are, however, not consistent with 
Marini et al. (2016) who found diminished performances on tasks that required self-
projection into the future among children with ASD, as well as on tasks requiring scene 
construction.  
One possible explanation for the discrepancy in these findings may relate to the 
different methodological approaches used across these studies. For example, unlike the 
current study (which asked children to verbally describe themselves mentally experiencing 
different scenarios), Marini et al. (2016) investigated scene construction and self-projection 
through time separately using two independent tasks that required participants to solve 
problems. Thus, it is possible that participants could to some extent have used problem-
solving strategies that did not necessarily involve scene construction or self-projection 
through time. By contrast, Ciaramelli et al. (2018) utilised a verbal measure that was more 
similar to that used in the current study. However, it should be noted that the lack of an 
atemporal condition in Ciaramelli et al.’s (2018) study meant that demands for scene 
construction and self-projection through time were not systematically varied, consequently 
restricting the conclusions that can be made regarding the specific contributions of these 




While difficulties with self-projection through time was not found to be a critical 
process impairing episodic future thinking in children with ASD in the current study, the 
findings however suggest that these impairments may be attributable, at least in part, to a 
general deficit in perspective shifting. This claim is based on the results showing that the 
clinical group had attenuated performance in the narrative condition, as well as the 
atemporal and future conditions, compared to controls. Given that the narrative condition 
imposes substantially reduced demands on scene construction but overlaps with the other 
two conditions in its requirement to adopt the perspective of the self in another spatial 
context, it appears that children with ASD may have a more generalised difficulty with self-
projection that may also be contributing to their deficits in episodic future thinking. 
However, it is notable that this difficulty was more prominent when the self-projection 
demand involved a temporal element, as children with ASD performed similarly worse on 
the future condition, which required projection of the self into a future event, as the 
atemporal condition, which did not involve mental time travel.  
 Conclusions and future directions 
While recent evidence has highlighted impairments in episodic future thinking in 
children with ASD, the underlying processes contributing to these deficits remain poorly 
delineated. This is the first empirical study to provide key insights into the mechanisms that 
underpin these impairments, implicating difficulties in scene construction and a general 
deficit in perspective shifting ability as contributors. One consideration for future studies is, 
however, the inclusion of a verbal description task to assess whether verbal ability might 
contribute to the group differences across all conditions on the imagination task. 




effective early interventions where specific compromised processes may be targeted to 
improve episodic future thinking and in turn potentially reduce behavioural inflexibility in 
children with ASD. For example, interventions that have been used to target impairments in 
episodic memory and/or relational binding may be extended to remediate episodic future 
thinking deficits in this group of children. In turn, this may assist in improving their 






Findings of Study 1 supported past studies that showed significant impairments in 
episodic future thinking in children with ASD and indicated that these impairments may be 
linked to difficulties in scene construction and general perspective shifting. This second 
study (Study 2) aimed to investigate whether children with ASD also show impairments in 
the adaptive application of episodic future thinking (i.e., episodic foresight). In other words, 
Study 2 endeavoured to explore whether the ability to take actions in the present in 
anticipation of future needs might be attenuated in this clinical group. In addition, Study 2 
examined cognitive abilities that might contribute to any identified deficits in episodic 
foresight in children with ASD, as well as the relationship between episodic foresight and 
functional capacity in daily life in this clinical group. This is the first study to investigate 







ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder that encompasses a broad spectrum of 
symptom severity and varying levels of intellectual functioning (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Regardless of the severity of symptoms and level of intellectual 
functioning, significant impairments in daily living skills are often apparent in all children 
with the disorder (Chang, Yen, & Yang, 2013; Howlin, 2003). For example, children with 
ASD often struggle to complete homework on time, follow instructions or transition from 
one activity to another in the classroom (Jordan, 2011; Thomeer et al., 2019). These 
behavioural issues often place substantial burden on parents and teachers due to the 
increased need for support in these children’s everyday functioning, and heightened stress 
in parents and teachers is frequently reported as a result (Bonis, 2016; Green & Carter, 
2014). Given the increasing prevalence of ASD diagnoses (May, Sciberras, Brignell, & 
Williams, 2017; Özerk, 2016), identification of specific factors that might be contributing 
to difficulties coping with the demands of everyday life in children with the disorder 
becomes critically important, and may lead to the development of effective strategies to 
help parents and teachers better manage the challenges these children may face at home and 
at school. 
One recent proposed contributor to the functional difficulties observed in children 
with ASD is a reduced capacity for episodic foresight. Episodic foresight involves the 
capacity to mentally simulate hypothetical future events and to use such future event 
simulations to guide behaviours in the present (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). This capacity 
has been argued to have considerable adaptive significance in daily life (Baumeister et al., 




ability may limit the identification of, and preparation for, potential future obstacles, in turn 
reducing the chance of achieving optimal future outcomes. Thus, impaired episodic 
foresight may result in reduced behavioural flexibility and adaptability to various life 
circumstances, and limit independent functioning across different domains of daily living 
(Henry et al., 2016; Schacter et al., 2017; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), all of which are 
features commonly seen in children with ASD (Boulter, Freeston, South, & Rodgers, 2014; 
Thomeer et al., 2019). 
There has been emerging evidence from studies using a range of measures that 
showed the capacity to imagine hypothetical future scenarios is impaired in children with 
ASD (Ferretti, Adornetti, et al., 2018; Hanson & Atance, 2014; Jackson & Atance, 2008; 
Marini et al., 2016, 2019). For example, past studies showed that children with the disorder 
were impaired in the ability to verbally provide rich episodic details about an imagined 
future scenario (Ciaramelli et al., 2018; Terrett et al., 2013), and showed a reduced capacity 
to generate specific and plausible future events (Lind, Bowler, et al., 2014). However, in 
these studies, participants were explicitly asked to imagine and construct events that might 
happen to them in a specified future time period and their verbal responses were analysed 
in terms of the quantity of episodic details produced (Ciaramelli et al., 2018; Terrett et al., 
2013), or the level of specificity in the plausible future events generated (Lind, Bowler, et 
al., 2014). Whilst these previous studies showed that children with ASD were compromised 
in the capacity to pre-experience hypothetical future scenarios, the functional application of 
imagining the future was not assessed. Therefore, the nature and extent of impairment in 
the more applied capacity of episodic foresight remains unclear in this clinical group. This 




more closely tied to successful daily functioning than the capacity to simply imagine the 
self in a future scenario (Baumeister et al., 2016; Bulley et al., in press). 
Suddendorf and colleagues have highlighted that it is challenging to capture 
behaviours that specifically reflect episodic foresight as not all future-directed actions 
necessarily reflect this capacity. Indeed, in some cases, future-directed actions may be the 
result of an innate predisposition, learned behaviour from previous experiences, or a 
behaviour that occurs coincidentally (Suddendorf & Busby, 2003, 2005; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2010). To exclude these possible alternative explanations for the occurrence of 
future-directed behaviours, Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) proposed four stringent 
criteria that should be met in behavioural measures that aim to capture episodic foresight. 
These criteria are (a) the use of single trials; (b) the use of novel problems; (c) the use of 
different temporal and/or spatial contexts within which the targeted future-directed action is 
demonstrated; and (d) the use of problems across different domains (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2010; Suddendorf et al., 2011). To date, there have been no studies of children 
with ASD that have investigated the capacity to imagine the future from this applied 
perspective using a behavioural measure developed according to the four criteria proposed 
by Suddendorf and Corballis (2010). There have however been a limited number of studies 
with other clinical groups that have utilised a measure based on those criteria. For example, 
in one recent study by Lyons et al. (2015), episodic foresight was examined in adults with 
schizophrenia using a behavioural measure called Virtual Week-Foresight (VW-Foresight). 
It is a computerised board game that includes a range of problems that need to be resolved 
through the application of episodic foresight. More specifically, problems are presented that 




relevant items without overt prompts, thus resembling everyday life situations where 
episodic foresight is flexibly applied. Results of Lyons et al.’s (2015) study showed that 
adults with schizophrenia acquired and later used significantly less items than controls, 
which led the authors to conclude that the capacity for episodic foresight is impaired in this 
clinical group. Two subsequent studies also used the VW-Foresight paradigm in clinical 
populations and reported deficits in episodic foresight in opiate users (Terrett, Lyons, et al., 
2016) and stroke patients (Lyons et al., 2019). The current study will be the first to test 
episodic foresight ability in children with ASD using the VW-Foresight measure.  
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate whether impairments in 
episodic foresight might be apparent in children with ASD using a version of the VW-
Foresight measure adapted for children. Given that episodic foresight encompasses the 
capacity to pre-experience future events, an ability that has consistently been found to be 
impaired in children with ASD, it was anticipated that impairments would extend to 
episodic foresight. Should such a deficit be identified, a key follow-up question to be 
addressed in the current study relates to what might underpin this deficit. While there is a 
lack of studies on episodic foresight, past studies that investigated the capacity of children 
with ASD to imagine themselves in future scenarios could provide some guidance as to 
which potential cognitive abilities might be involved in the functional application of 
imagining the future. In this regard, Hanson and Atance (2014) found that children with 
ASD who had poorer ability than controls to imagine themselves in future situations also 
showed poorer performances on a range of executive function tasks. It should be noted 
though that this study did not directly assess the relationships between these capacities. By 




functioning (indexed by cognitive flexibility) to be a significant contributor to deficits in 
the ability to imagine and describe future events in children with ASD. However, they 
found that retrospective memory significantly contributed to the capacity to imagine future 
scenarios, supporting the suggestion that memories of past events provide the building 
blocks for the construction of future scenes in imagination (Schacter & Addis, 2007; 
Schacter et al., 2008). The authors thus concluded that retrospective memory, but not 
executive functions, may be an important contributor to the capacity to mentally simulate 
hypothetical future scenarios (Terrett et al., 2013). Episodic foresight might be considered 
more cognitively demanding than future event simulation alone, however, given that it 
arguably requires not only the imagination of the self experiencing the future, but also 
involves identifying future needs, taking steps in the present to ensure those future needs 
are met, remembering the nature of the preparatory steps, and actioning them at the 
appropriate future point. It could thus be suggested that executive functions and 
retrospective memory might be particularly implicated in episodic foresight (Terrett, Lyons, 
et al., 2016). Given that children with ASD have often been reported to show deficits in 
both of these abilities (Bowler et al., 2011; Craig et al., 2016), a secondary, exploratory aim 
in the current study was to investigate whether any impairment in episodic foresight 
identified in children with ASD might be contributed to by deficits in retrospective memory 
and/or executive functions. A final aim of the current study was to examine whether any 








Forty children with ASD (75% males) and 55 healthy controls (56% males) aged 8 
to 12 years participated in the present study. Independent-samples t-tests showed no 
significant differences between participants with ASD and controls on age, intellectual 
functioning and retrospective memory. Executive functioning and functional capacity were, 
however, found to be significantly poorer in participants with ASD than controls (see Table 
6.1.). In addition, the ASD and control groups also did not differ in the proportion of males 
and females, χ² (1, N = 95) = 3.50, p = .06. Clinical reports from psychologists or 
paediatricians were provided by parents of participants with ASD to confirm their 
diagnosis. The Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter et al., 2008) was used to 
further support the diagnosis of ASD for participants in the clinical group, and to screen for 
possible symptoms of ASD in healthy controls. The SCQ is a 40-item parent-report 
questionnaire that evaluates communication skills and social functioning in individuals who 
may or may not have ASD. Consistent with their diagnosis of ASD, participants in the ASD 
group were rated as having significantly poorer social and communication skills than the 





Table 6.1.  
Characteristics of Participants in the ASD and Control Groups 
 ASD group  Control group   
 n = 40  n = 55   
 M SD  M SD t(93)a d 
Age (in years) 9.75 1.35  10.27 1.33 1.81 0.37 
Intelligence        
FSIQ 107.98 11.79  111.07 12.09 1.35 0.28 
VCI 107.08 12.76  108.69 11.15 0.75 0.16 
PRI 108.23 13.25  111.58 14.65 1.19 0.25 
Retrospective memory 9.90 3.01  10.96 2.37 1.93 0.39 
Executive functions        
Cognitive flexibility 119.60 50.27  91.80 29.35 3.13** 0.68 
Inhibition 98.65 23.68  80.38 22.10 3.86*** 0.80 
Functional capacity 39.83 10.33  52.53 11.88 5.43*** 1.14 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
d = Cohen’s index of effect size; Cohen (1988) defines effect sizes of 0.2 as small, 0.5 as 
medium and 0.8 as large 
aHomogeneity of variance was violated for cognitive flexibility, df = 58.16 
ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, VCI = Verbal Comprehension 
Index, PRI = Perceptual Reasoning Index, Retrospective memory = Retrospective memory 




The VW-Foresight (Lyons et al., 2014) is a computerised board game that simulates 
real life situations where episodic foresight might be flexibly exercised in an everyday life 




require participants to independently identify and resolve. The current version used in this 
study is an adapted children’s version of the measure.  
On this measure, participants are required to roll a die and move a token around the 
board. A circuit around the board represents one virtual day (see Figure 6.1. for the game’s 
interface). As participants move around the board, they are required to make decisions 
about daily activities and carry out tasks that draw on episodic foresight. Participants pass a 
total of 10 green ‘S’ squares on the board on each virtual day and every time they land on 
or pass an ‘S’ square, they are prompted to pick up a Situation Card. Each Situation Card 
presents a realistic daily situation (e.g., having breakfast) and participants are asked to 
choose one of the options on the card in response to the situation (e.g., choosing yogurt, 
honey or chocolate milk to have with your breakfast). Depending on the option the 
participants select, they are then prompted to roll a specific number on the die to continue 
moving around the board (e.g., roll a three, roll an even number, or roll any number).  
Each participant is asked to complete two virtual days in which they encounter 20 
Situation Cards. Seven of these cards present an episodic foresight problem; seven present 
the context for a resolution of that problem; and the remaining six are distracters that are 
unrelated to the episodic foresight problems. Problem, resolution, and distracter Situation 
Cards are encountered interchangeably throughout each virtual day. In addition to Situation 
Cards, seven Daily Activity Cards are presented to provide an opportunity for participants 
to acquire one item (from a list of five items, with four items being distracter items) that 
may be used to resolve a previously encountered problem. Other Daily Activity Cards are 
distracter activities where no items on these cards are useful for problem resolution. The 




throughout the game is to simulate problems related to episodic foresight that are typically 
encountered in everyday life, which are commonly embedded among other ongoing 
activities. 
There are two outcomes measures in the VW-Foresight game: item acquisition and 
item use. The ability to imagine future scenarios to secure benefits and avoid problems later 
is indexed by percentage of correct items acquired. The ability to subsequently follow 
through by applying items to resolve problems at the appropriate future time is 
operationalised as percentage of items correctly used. Both the acquisition and use stages 
are critical for the flexible application of episodic foresight in everyday life contexts, and 
issues with either stage alone are suggestive of difficulties in this capacity (see Chapter 
4.3.2 for detailed description of VW-Foresight). Reliability estimates were calculated using 
Cronbach’s alpha in the current study: item acquisition, .58 for ASD and .35 for controls; 





Figure 6.1. Children’s version of Virtual Week-Foresight game interface 
 
 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II; 
Wechsler, 2011) is a reliable measure of intellectual functioning. It consists of four subtests 
(Block Design, Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning and Similarities) that provide scores on 
Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Reasoning and Full Scale IQ. Higher scores indicate 
higher levels of intellectual functioning. The WASI-II has internal consistency ranging 
from .92 to .96, and test-retest reliability ranging from .79 to .95 for children aged 6 to 16 





The List Memory Delayed of the NEPSY-II (Korkman et al., 2007) was used to 
assess retrospective memory ability. A list of 15 words is first presented to participants and 
they are asked to recall them in any order on five separate trials, followed by an 
interference trial where another list of 15 words is presented, and participants are again 
asked to recall these words. After approximately 25 to 35 minutes, List Memory Delayed is 
administered where participants are instructed to recall the first list of words, with the first 
word on the list provided as a cue. The raw score of List Memory Delayed was used as an 
index of retrospective memory (maximum score = 15). Higher scores indicate better 
retrospective memory ability. Internal consistency for this subtest is .91 and test-retest 
reliability is .75 for children aged 7 to 10 years (Korkman et al., 2007). 
 
The Trail Making Test and Color-Word Interference Test from the Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Functioning System (D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001) were used to index cognitive 
flexibility and inhibition, respectively. The Number-Letter Switching condition in the Trail 
Making test assesses participants’ ability to switch between connecting numbers and letters 
in a sequential order as fast as possible without making mistakes. On the Inhibition 
condition of the Color-Word Interference Test, colour names are presented in different 
coloured ink, and participants are asked to name the ink colour, and not read the word, as 
fast as possible without making mistakes. Performances on both these subtests are timed 
and the completion times are recorded as raw scores. Higher scores indicate poorer 
cognitive flexibility and inhibition. The D-KEFS Trail Making Test and Color-Word 




years, and test-retest reliability ranging from .20 to .90 for children and adolescents aged 8 
to 19 years (Delis et al., 2001). 
 
The Self-Direction scale from the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System – Second 
Edition (ABAS-II; Harrison & Oakland, 2003) was used to assess participants’ functional 
capacity in everyday living. This scale requires parents to rate how frequently their child 
displays the behaviours listed (e.g., “Routinely arrives at places on time”) on a 4-point 
Likert scale. The sum of all items on this scale provides a raw score. Higher scores indicate 
higher levels of self-direction and functional independence. The Self-Direction scale has 
internal consistency ranging from .91 to .94 for children aged 8 to 12 years and inter-rater 
reliability of .84 for individuals aged 5 to 21 years (Harrison & Oakland, 2003). 
 Procedure 
Written consent was obtained from all participants prior to the commencement of 
testing sessions. Participants were then tested in their homes in a room free from 
distractions. All participants took approximately two hours to complete all cognitive 
measures included in the current study. For VW-Foresight, participants took on average an 
hour to complete it. Two movie vouchers were given as an appreciation for their time in 
participating in the research project. The research was conducted with the approval of the 
human research ethics committee of Australian Catholic University (No. V201012; 






 Data analyses 
All statistical tests were two-tailed and an alpha level of p < .05 was considered 
significant in all analyses. Raw scores on all measures were used in all analyses, except for 
the FSIQ, Verbal Comprehension and Perceptual Reasoning Index on the WASI-II where 
the composite scores were used. One participant in the control group was found to be an 
outlier on most of the variables (z > ±3.29; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and was excluded. 
Another participant in the control group did not appear to understand the instructions of the 
VW-Foresight and was also excluded from the analyses. In addition, one participant in the 
control group was identified as a univariate outlier on the D-KEFS Trail Making Test. This 
was rectified by replacing the obtained score with the next highest score plus one (Field, 
2013). Missing values for one control participant and one ASD participant on the D-KEFS 
Trail Making Test and Color-Word Interference Test were replaced with the respective 
group means (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). All assumptions were checked and found to be 
satisfied.  
 
Item acquisition was the percentage of target items correctly acquired from the 
Daily Activities Cards and item use was the percentage of target items correctly used when 
the appropriate Situation Cards was encountered. Three controls and one participant with 
ASD experienced technical errors during administration where a target item could not be 
acquired because the target Daily Activities Card did not appear in the game. Prorated 
scores were used for these participants where item acquisition and item use were calculated 




opportunities they had to acquire or use items in the game. All scores for item acquisition 
and item use were expressed as percentages in all analyses. 
6.3 Results 
The two outcome measures produced on the VW-Foresight task were analysed 
using a mixed-model two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), with group (ASD, control) 
as the between-groups variable and foresight task (item acquisition, item use) as the within-
groups variable. The results showed a main effect of group, F(1, 93) = 5.03, p = .03,  = 
.05 (small effect), and of foresight task, F(1, 93) = 197.21, p < .001,  = .68 (large effect). 
More importantly, there was a significant interaction between group and foresight task, F(1, 
93) = 5.30, p = .02,  = .05 (small effect). This interaction was followed up with tests of 
simple effects that revealed a simple effect of group for item use, F(1, 93) = 6.71, p = .01, 
 = .07 (small effect), with participants with ASD using significantly less items to resolve 
problems than controls. However, there was no group difference for item acquisition, F(1, 
93) = 1.64, p = .20,  = .02. Further analysis of the interaction revealed a simple effect of 
condition within the ASD group, F(1, 93) = 115.36, p < .001,  = .55 (large effect), and 
within the control group, F(1, 93) = 81.86, p < .001,  = .47 (large effect), with both 




















Figure 6.2. Mean proportion of the number of items acquired and used expressed as a 
percentage of seven possible items for participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
and controls. Error bars represent mean standard error. 
 
 Correlation analyses 
Pearson’s bivariate correlations were performed for age, intellectual functioning, 
measures of episodic foresight (item acquisition and item use), measures of executive 
functioning (cognitive flexibility and inhibition), retrospective memory and functional 
capacity for ASD and control groups separately (see Table 6.2.). For the ASD group, it was 






























performances. For the control group, better episodic foresight abilities were found to be 
associated with better functional capacity1. 
 
Table 6.2.  
Correlations between Intellectual Functioning, Measures of Cognitive Functioning and 
Functional Capacity for ASD and Controls Separately 
 ASD  Control 
 n = 40  n = 55 
 Acquired Used  Acquired Used 
Full Scale IQ .42**  .22   .25 .35** 
Retrospective memory .25 .21  .23 .23 
Executive functions      
Cognitive flexibility - .41** - .44**   - .23 - .24 
Inhibition - .06 - .13   - .24 - .19 
Functional capacity .06 .13  .53*** .42** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, Acquired = Item acquisition on VW-Foresight, Used = 
Item use on the VW-Foresight 
 
 Cognitive predictors of episodic foresight 
Hierarchical regressions were then performed to investigate the contributions of 
cognitive flexibility, inhibition and retrospective memory to item acquisition and item use 
 
1 Partial correlations were also performed on measures of foresight, executive functions, retrospective 
memory and functional capacity while controlling for age in ASD and controls separately. A similar pattern of 
results to those reported in Table 6.2. was obtained where measures of foresight significantly correlated with 
cognitive flexibility in ASD and measures of foresight significantly correlated with functional capacity in 





in children with ASD and controls separately. The contributions of age and intellectual 
functioning was first controlled by entering age and Full Scale IQ in step 1 of the analyses, 
followed by cognitive flexibility, inhibition and retrospective memory in step 2. For the 
ASD group, the regression models in step 2 for both items acquired and items used were 
not found to be significant, with measures of executive function and retrospective memory 
not significantly predicting item acquisition (ΔR2 = .09, p = .25) or item use (ΔR2 = .12, p = 
.17) over and above age and intellectual functioning. This was also the case for the control 
group, where the regression models in step 2 were not significant, with measures of 
executive function and retrospective memory again not significantly predicting item 
acquisition (ΔR2 = .05, p = .43) and item use (ΔR2 = .02, p = .82) over and above age and 






Table 6.3.  
Cognitive Predictors of Episodic Foresight Controlling for Age and Intellectual 
Functioning in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Controls Separately 
  ASD  Control 
  n = 40  n = 55 
  R2 B (SE) β  R2 B (SE) β 
Item acquisition         
Step 1  .15*    .07   
Age   2.30 (2.14) .16   2.63 (1.66) .21 
Full Scale IQ   0.72 (0.25)     .44**   0.36 (0.18) .26 
Step 2  .18    .07   
Age   0.97 (2.69) .07   1.32 (2.01) .10 
Full Scale IQ   0.45 (0.29) .28   0.18 (0.22) .13 
Cog flex   - 0.14 (0.08) .35   - 0.02 (0.09) .04 
Inhibition   0.16 (0.15) .19   - 0.09 (0.12) .11 
Memory   0.21 (0.28) .12   0.38 (0.30) .20 
 
Item use 
        
Step 1  .09    .12*   
Age   5.86 (2.97) .30   3.18 (2.50) .16 
Full Scale IQ   0.59 (0.34) .27   0.78 (0.27) .36** 
Step 2  .15    .08   
Age   3.65 (3.69) .19   1.53 (3.09) .08 
Full Scale IQ   0.17 (0.39) .07   0.67 (0.34) .31 
Cog flex   - 0.20 (0.11) - .38   - 0.08 (0.15) .09 
Inhibition   0.19 (0.21) .18   - 0.09 (0.18) .08 
Memory   0.40 (0.38) .17   0.11 (0.46) .04 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
R2 = Adjusted R2, Outcome variables = item acquisition and item use measured on the 





The current study is the first to investigate the practical capacity to apply episodic 
foresight in a simulated everyday life context in children with ASD. The first key finding 
was that children with ASD showed comparable performance to typically developing 
children on item acquisition, indicating that the capacity to initiate preparatory behaviours 
in anticipation of future events may be intact in children with the disorder. This is a positive 
finding for the ASD group who showed capability in a core component of episodic 
foresight. Assuming this aspect of foresight relies on the creation of future scenes in 
imagination on which judgements about future needs are based (Suddendorf, 2017; 
Suddendorf & Moore, 2011), however, this finding does not appear consistent with 
previous studies showing children with ASD are less able than controls to provide detailed 
descriptions of themselves experiencing hypothetical future scenarios (Ciaramelli et al., 
2018; Ferretti, Adornetti, et al., 2018; Hanson & Atance, 2014; Lind, Bowler, et al., 2014; 
Marini et al., 2016, 2019; Terrett et al., 2013).  
One possible explanation to reconcile these findings could be that while children 
with ASD may indeed be less able to imagine experiencing a future event with the rich 
level of details that typically developing children are capable of, taking preparatory action 
(indexed in the current study by item acquisition) may not require the generation of high 
levels of episodic details about an imagined future event. Rather, all that may be required 
are enough details to be able to identify future needs, which then allows steps to be taken in 
the present to meet those needs. If this is the case, children with ASD may be able to 
generate an adequate level of details to be able to successfully acquire relevant items. This 




2007) which suggests there are two phases involved in the mental simulation of future 
scenarios – a basic construction phase which involves the retrieval of information from 
various cognitive systems to create a hypothetical future event, followed by an elaboration 
phase which involves the generation of additional episodic and contextual details that aid 
the simulation of the future event (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). As 
participants in most past studies have been probed to provide rich details about their 
imagined future (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2018; Terrett et al., 2013), both the construction and 
elaboration phases may have been involved in the imagination of future events in those 
studies. By contrast, in the current study, it is possible that the successful acquisition of 
items only needed to tap into the construction phase, with a basic mental representation of a 
future scenario proving sufficient to guide preparatory behaviours in the present. Thus, 
children with ASD may be comparable to typically developing children on the initial 
construction of a future event in their imagination but show impairments at the point of 
elaboration. This would explain why children with ASD were equally as capable as 
typically developing children on item acquisition in the current study but did not perform as 
well as controls in previous studies that explicitly required rich details of imagined future 
events.  
The second key finding in the current study was that children with ASD performed 
significantly worse than controls on item use, indicating that the capacity to subsequently 
follow through and use acquired items to resolve problems at the appropriate future point 
was impaired. This is an important finding because even if items are appropriately 
acquired, not using those items at the relevant future time essentially means episodic 




negative consequences for successful daily functioning. Given the value of following 
through and using items appropriately, the current study then investigated what might be 
underpinning this deficit in children with ASD. As previously noted, using items at the 
appropriate time in the future is likely to be a cognitively demanding aspect of the foresight 
process as conceptualised in the current study given that it is the point at which an 
individual must remember what items they previously acquired as well as the contexts they 
might use them in, and must also action the preparatory steps (i.e., use the acquired items) 
when an appropriate context presents itself. This argument is in fact supported by findings 
of the current study showing that participants in both groups used significantly fewer items 
than they acquired, suggesting that item use may be more cognitively challenging than item 
acquisition. It was therefore anticipated that impaired ability to use items in children with 
ASD might reflect executive functioning and/or retrospective memory deficits. However, 
the results of the current study suggest this is not the case. More specifically, while the 
ASD group were indeed worse than controls on executive functioning, this capacity did not 
significantly contribute to item use in the regression analyses. In addition, our findings 
showed that children with ASD did not differ from controls on the retrospective memory 
task, and retrospective memory was not a significant contributor to item use in the ASD 
group. Together, then, these findings indicate that the observed deficits in the capacity for 
item use in children with ASD do not appear to be contributed to by impairments in 
executive functions or retrospective memory and raise the question of what other processes 
might underpin this deficit.  
One possible explanation could be that while item acquisition may not be affected 




future events shown in previous studies of children with ASD (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2018), 
item use may be more adversely affected by this impairment. It should be noted that the 
contexts in which the acquired items might be used to resolve anticipated problems in the 
future were not explicitly stated in the current study (as also often the case in real life). As 
such, it is suggested that individuals engaging in foresight may generate images of 
themselves in multiple plausible future situations that are likely to be adversely affected by 
the presented problem (e.g., breaking glasses), and which would benefit from acquiring 
particular items (e.g., old pair of glasses). If those future plausible situations are imagined 
in high levels of detail, they are likely to be more strongly encoded in memory 
(Kretschmer-Trendowicz, Ellis, & Altgassen, 2016; Kretschmer-Trendowicz, Schnitzspahn, 
Reuter, & Altgassen, 2019; Terrett et al., 2019), thus making them more likely to be 
recognised when encountered later in the game, a proposal consistent with the levels of 
processing model (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). This in turn may lead to greater likelihood that 
the acquired items will be used at the appropriate future point. However, this suggestion is 
speculative and requires further investigation. 
Lastly, our findings showed that item acquisition and item use were significantly 
associated with functional capacity in the control group, suggesting that the capacities to 
secure and apply items to resolve anticipated problems in the future are linked to the ability 
to function independently in daily life in typically developing children. Our study is the 
first to provide evidence for the association between episodic foresight and functional 
capacity in typically developing children, and supports widespread claims in the literature 
that episodic foresight is a cognitive ability with significant adaptive value in everyday 




2017). By contrast, functional capacity was not found to be associated with item acquisition 
or item use in children with ASD, suggesting that episodic foresight may not be a key 
contributor to their functional difficulties. However, it should be noted that only one, quite 
restricted, domain of daily functioning was assessed in the current study. It is possible that 
other domains of daily functioning may be more impacted by difficulties in the capacity to 
follow through for successful problem resolutions in the future that might be associated 
with episodic foresight ability in children with ASD. Future studies should therefore 
consider assessing a range of functional skills to determine the specific area of deficit in 
daily functioning that may be more closely linked with impairments in episodic foresight in 
this clinical group.  
In sum, the current findings have provided novel evidence of impairments in the 
capacity to complete episodic foresight tasks in children with ASD. More specifically, 
while an intact capacity to initiate preparatory behaviours in anticipation of future scenarios 
was observed, significant difficulties in subsequently following through to ultimately 
achieve desirable future outcomes were apparent. In addition, our findings showed that 
retrospective memory and executive function deficits did not underpin difficulties in item 
use in the ASD group. Rather, we suggest that the difficulties in using items appropriately 
may reflect impoverished ability to imagine richly detailed future scenes, although this 
proposal requires further exploration. Future studies that aim to investigate episodic 
foresight and the mechanisms that underpin it in children with ASD will be important given 
the adaptive value of this ability in everyday life. Such findings will be beneficial in 
informing parents and teachers of the specific cognitive limitations in children with ASD 




although our study found no associations between episodic foresight and our measure of 
daily functioning in this clinical group, we do not rule out the possibility that the 
impairments in episodic foresight, as reflected in poorer capacity to use items when 
appropriate, may impact other domains of daily functioning in children with ASD. This 































Studies 1 and 2 focused on the investigation of episodic future thinking in children 
with ASD. More specifically, findings of Study 1 showed that children with ASD have 
limited capacity to mentally pre-experience hypothetical future scenarios and that these 
difficulties may be underpinned by the compromised processes of creating coherent 
complex scenes and shifting to different perspectives in the mind. Results of Study 2 
addressed a more applied form of episodic future thinking and revealed that the ability to 
initiate preparatory behaviours in anticipation of potential future problems may be intact 
but the capacity to follow through to resolve these problems at the appropriate future time 
point may be impaired in this clinical group. The final study (Study 3) investigated another 
form of prospection, namely prospective memory (PM), in order to further extend current 
understanding of the cognitive impairments in relation to prospection in children with ASD. 
In this study, the primary aim was to investigate PM ability across two types of PM tasks 
using a reliable measure called Virtual Week-Prospective Memory (VW-PM). In addition, 
the relationships between retrospective memory, executive functioning and PM were 







ASD is an increasingly common neurodevelopmental disorder that involves 
impaired social and communication skills, as well as repetitive and restricted patterns of 
behaviour. The disorder presents in childhood with widely varying levels of intellectual 
functioning (e.g., from intellectually disabled to average and above average), and with a 
broad spectrum of severity in core symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Regardless of intellectual ability or symptom severity, however, poor daily living skills are 
frequently observed in ASD (Chang et al., 2013; Howlin, 2003; Thomeer et al., 2019). In 
children with the disorder, such difficulties in daily functioning can lead to higher levels of 
parenting stress due to an increased demand for parental monitoring of children’s everyday 
needs (Bonis, 2016; Jordan, 2011). Children with ASD also experience heightened distress 
from struggling to cope with various demands across different areas in daily life (Jordan, 
2011; Thomeer et al., 2019). Therefore, a better understanding of specific factors that may 
underpin these difficulties is necessary so that effective strategies can be developed for the 
management of the daily life challenges that children with ASD and their parents 
encounter.  
The capacity to independently complete future tasks is an important factor in 
meeting the demands of daily life, with expectations regarding this capacity increasing as 
children move through the school years (Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014). For example, once 
children enter school, they may be expected to remember to bring homework to school for 
submission tomorrow or to remember to go to sports practice at 5 p.m. As such, one 
suggested contributor to poor functional outcomes in children with ASD is difficulties with 




an appropriate moment in the future (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990), and has been argued to 
be crucial for independent functioning (Hering et al., 2018; Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014). 
There are generally considered to be two main types of PM tasks: event-based and time-
based. Event-based PM tasks are carried out in relation to an event and are thus prompted 
by external environmental cues (e.g., remember to buy dog food at the supermarket), while 
time-based PM tasks are required to be completed at a particular time, or after a period of 
time has passed, and lack the inherent environmental cue associated with event-based tasks 
(e.g., ring a friend at 6 p.m.; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990).  
The proposal that PM might be impaired in children with ASD is supported by past 
evidence of deficits in retrospective memory in this clinical group (Boucher et al., 2012; 
Bowler et al., 2011). Retrospective memory is the ability to remember past information and 
has been argued to play a key role in the completion of PM tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 
1990; Ellis & Freeman, 2008). This is because PM task performance involves not only the 
ability to remember to carry out the task at the appropriate point (prospective component), 
but also the capacity to remember what the task is and when to perform it (retrospective 
component; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000). As such, the 
retrospective component of PM relies heavily on retrospective memory and indeed previous 
studies have shown that retrospective memory is significantly associated with PM task 
performance in children (e.g., Terrett et al., 2019) and adults (e.g., Foster et al., 2013). 
Impaired retrospective memory ability has been shown in numerous studies of children 
with ASD (Bowler et al., 2011) and would therefore potentially render this group 




Another line of evidence to suggest that PM might be compromised in children with 
ASD is reduced executive functioning (Humphrey, Golan, Wilson, & Sopena, 2011; 
McCrimmon et al., 2016). Executive functioning is an umbrella term that encompasses a 
range of higher-order cognitive control processes that are responsible for behavioural 
regulation and goal attainment (Kenworthy et al., 2008). PM tasks have been argued to 
involve executive functioning through processes such as cognitive flexibility which may be 
needed to switch from an ongoing task to perform PM tasks at appropriate future points, 
and thus may be particularly relevant for the prospective component of PM (Mahy, Moses, 
et al., 2014; Spiess et al., 2016; Zuber et al., 2019). However, it has been suggested that 
different PM tasks may impose different demands on executive functioning depending on 
factors such as the type of cue available to support the execution of future intentions 
(Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007). For example, time-based 
PM tasks are often claimed to place higher demands on executive functioning than event-
based PM tasks because for time-based tasks an individual has to self-initiate processes to 
monitor for appropriate task cues (i.e., the specific time) to execute the intention (Einstein 
& McDaniel, 1996). As such, it has been suggested that time-based PM might be 
particularly sensitive to ASD-related impairments given that executive dysfunction is a 
typical cognitive characteristic of the disorder (Craig et al., 2016; McCrimmon et al., 2016). 
Whilst investigations of PM in children with ASD is currently limited to seven 
studies, there is converging evidence showing that time-based PM is impaired in this 
clinical group (see Landsiedel et al., 2017, for a review). By contrast, findings regarding 
event-based PM have been mixed, with some studies showing impairment (Brandimonte et 




reported intact event-based task performance (Altgassen et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2013). 
However, there are several limitations that need to be noted in these past studies. For 
example, the assessment of PM ability has often been restricted to only one or two tasks 
which consequently limits the reliability of these measures (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; 
Rendell & Henry, 2009; Rose et al., 2010). In addition, most past studies have employed 
the typical laboratory-based paradigm which generally has low ecological validity and thus 
findings may be limited in the extent to which they reflect PM abilities in real-world 
settings. Furthermore, most previous studies have examined only one type of PM (i.e., 
either event-based or time-based). This is problematic when attempting to make 
conclusions about the profile of event-based versus time-based PM ability in children with 
ASD given the heterogeneity of the disorder. To address the question of event-based versus 
time-based PM ability, therefore, studies should ideally measure both in the same sample of 
children.  
The current literature also remains scarce in terms of empirical investigation of 
factors that might underpin ASD-related deficits in PM. As previously noted, retrospective 
memory deficits are commonly observed in individuals with the disorder (Boucher et al., 
2012; Bowler et al., 2011) potentially placing them at risk of PM impairment. It is thus 
surprising that no study to date has directly measured retrospective memory and 
investigated its relationship with PM performance in children with ASD. While two of the 
seven studies on PM in children with ASD assessed retrospective memory for PM task 
content, these studies did not examine the association between retrospective memory and 
PM performance. Rather, the purpose of assessing retrospective memory was to exclude 




prospective component of PM task completion (Brandimonte et al., 2011; Williams et al., 
2013). Thus, the extent to which failures in retrospective memory are associated with poor 
PM task completion in this clinical group remains unclear. Furthermore, few studies thus 
far have examined the possible link between executive dysfunction and PM impairments in 
children with ASD. Findings from one of these studies showed that poorer event-based PM 
was associated with reduced working memory but not cognitive flexibility or inhibition (Yi 
et al., 2014), while another found no association between time-based PM and cognitive 
flexibility (Williams et al., 2013). Conclusions that can be made from these studies 
regarding the role of executive functions in PM performance are however restricted given 
that they each investigated a different type of PM task, and only Yi et a. (2014) assessed 
more than one executive function.  
To date, one study has attempted to investigate PM abilities in children with ASD 
addressing a number of the limitations of previous studies. Henry et al. (2014) assessed 
both event-based and time-based PM in the same sample of 8- to 12-year-old children with 
ASD in a simulated everyday life context using a reliable computer-based measure of PM, 
namely Virtual Week-Prospective Memory (VW-PM; Rendell & Craik, 2000). On the VW-
PM, children are required to carry out plausible PM tasks that are embedded in everyday 
life-like activities. Results showed that while time-based PM was impaired, event-based 
PM was intact in the ASD group. In addition, the authors concluded that retrospective 
memory may not be underpinning the time-based PM impairment identified in this clinical 
group. It should however be noted that this study did not include a direct measure of 
retrospective memory and based this conclusion on the finding that the performance of the 




terms of the role of executive functions, Henry et al. (2014) focused on cognitive flexibility 
and found the children with ASD did not differ from controls on this ability. In addition, 
only one of the three measures used to index cognitive flexibility was associated with time-
based PM performance, and none was associated with event-based PM performance in the 
clinical group. Together, these findings indicate that poorer executive functioning may not 
underpin the time-based PM deficits in children with ASD and makes only a limited 
contribution to time-based and event-based PM performance in this group. However, the 
assessment of executive functions was restricted to cognitive flexibility in this study, and it 
is possible that other executive functions could be more relevant. Given the apparent dearth 
of literature and limitations elucidated above, the specific role of retrospective memory and 
the range of executive functions in PM performance across different task types currently 
remain unclear in ASD. 
The primary aim of the current study, therefore, was to extend the work of Henry et 
al. (2014) and further clarify the extent of ASD-related impairment on event-based and 
time-based PM tasks in children with the disorder using the VW-PM. Given the consistent 
evidence of impaired time-based PM reported in previous studies, we hypothesised that this 
ability would be impaired in our clinical sample. However, the predictions for event-based 
PM in children with ASD remain open considering the mixed findings thus far in the 
literature.  
The secondary aim of the current study was to further explore possible cognitive 
mechanisms that might underpin PM impairments in children with ASD. The role of 
retrospective memory in PM performance was investigated by (1) participants’ ability to 




In terms of executive functioning, three key executive functions were assessed in relation to 
PM performance (i.e., working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibition). While there is 
currently limited empirical evidence of the relationships between retrospective memory, 
executive functioning and PM in the ASD literature, theoretical models lead to the 
prediction that poorer retrospective memory and executive functioning should be associated 
with poorer time-based PM task performances in the ASD group. In addition, it was 
expected that any difficulty in event-based PM would also be linked to poorer retrospective 
memory and executive functioning. Finally, the extent to which PM difficulties might be 
related to poor functional capacity was examined so that a better understanding of the 
implications of these deficits in daily life may be established in children with ASD. 
7.2 Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-two children with ASD (72% males) and 42 healthy controls (60% males) 
aged 8 to 12 years participated in the current study2. The two groups did not differ with 
respect to the proportion of males and females, χ² (1, N = 74) = 1.22, p = .27. Paediatric or 
psychological assessment reports were provided by parents of children with ASD to 
confirm their diagnosis. Consistent with these diagnoses, the Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter et al., 2008) revealed significantly lower social and 
communication skills in children with ASD compared to controls, t(38.37) = 9.28, p < .001, 
 
2 This is a subset of participants with ASD and controls who also took part in Study 2. All participants in 
Study 3 completed the full battery of cognitive measures across the two testing sessions (see Chapter 4 for 
details). However, only data on the VW-PM, retrospective memory and executive functions were included 




d = 2.28. The SCQ is a 40-item parent-report questionnaire that evaluates social and 
communication skills in a child’s developmental history. Higher scores on the SCQ indicate 
poorer social and communication functioning. 
  Materials 
 
VW-PM (Rendell & Craik, 2000) is a computerised board game that assesses PM 
presented in an everyday life context where tasks are required to be carried out at specific 
points in the game (see Figure 7.1. for the game interface). The VW-PM used in this study 
was the two-day version presented on an iPad. In this game, participants roll a die and 
move a token around the board. Each circuit of the board represents a virtual day with the 
time of the virtual day displayed in the centre of the board. Fifteen virtual minutes go by for 
every two squares moved. Participants are prompted to pick up an Event Card each time 
they land on or pass an ‘E’ square. On each virtual day, participants pick up ten Event 
Cards, and each event card presents a different activity that relates to the time of the day 
(e.g., This morning at school you sit next to your friend. You are both…). Participants then 
choose from the three options on these event cards (e.g., participating in the lesson actively, 
drawing a picture while listening, or chatting a lot). In addition, participants carry out PM 
tasks while engaging in the ongoing activities of rolling the die, moving the token, reading 
event cards, and making decisions related to each event card. 
Participants encounter two types of PM tasks throughout the game: event-based and 
time-based tasks. Each virtual day has four event-based and four time-based PM tasks that 




participants encounter the appropriate Event Card (e.g., buy some pencils when the event 
card “Go Shopping” is encountered). Time-based tasks are performed when the appropriate 
time is shown on the virtual clock shown in the middle of the board (e.g., help set up the 
school hall when the virtual clock shows 10:30 a.m.). In total, participants are asked to 
complete eight PM tasks on each virtual day. When participants are required to carry out a 
task (either in response to an event presented on an Event Card, or at a particular time on 
the virtual clock), they are asked to press a ‘Perform Task’ button and select the appropriate 
task to perform. The percentage of correct responses for each of the PM task types was 
used as the measure of PM performance.  
At the completion of each virtual day, participants are also presented with Task 
Review Cards to assess retrospective memory for task content. This requires each PM task 
completed on the day (e.g., buy some pencils) to be matched with the corresponding PM 
cue (e.g., when shopping). Four distractor tasks are also included on the Task Review Cards 
and participants are expected to indicate that these actions are ‘not required’. Tasks are 
individually presented on the screen and are automatically swiped to the next task once 
participants have responded to each task. This recognition task provides an index of the 
retrospective memory component of the PM tasks (see Chapter 4.3.3 for detailed 
description of VW-PM). The overall reliability of the PM tasks was found to be relatively 
good in both the children with ASD and controls in the current study (Cronbach’s α = .82 






Figure 7.1. Children Virtual Week-Prospective Memory iPad version game interface 
 
 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II; 
Wechsler, 2011) is a reliable measure of intellectual functioning. It consists of four subtests 
(Block Design, Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning and Similarities) that provide scores on 
Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Reasoning and Full Scale IQ. Higher scores indicate 
higher levels of intellectual functioning. The WASI-II has internal consistency ranging 
from .92 to .96, and test-retest reliability ranging from .79 to .95 for children aged 6 to 16 





The List Memory Delayed of the NEPSY-II (Korkman et al., 2007) was used to 
assess retrospective memory ability. A list of 15 words is first presented to participants and 
they are asked to recall them in any order on five separate trials, followed by an 
interference trial where another list of 15 words is presented. Then, participants are 
immediately asked again to recall the first list of words. After approximately 25 to 35 
minutes, List Memory Delayed is administered where participants are instructed to recall 
the first list of words, with the first word on the list provided as a cue. The raw score of List 
Memory Delayed was used as an index of retrospective memory (maximum score = 15). 
Higher scores indicate better retrospective memory ability. Internal consistency for this 
subtest is .91 and test-retest reliability is .75 for children aged 7 to 10 years (Korkman et 
al., 2007). 
 
The Trail Making Test and Color-Word Interference Test from the Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Functioning System (D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001) were used to index cognitive 
flexibility and inhibition, respectively. The Number-Letter Switching condition in the Trail 
Making test assesses participants’ ability to switch between connecting numbers and letters 
in a sequential order as fast as possible without making mistakes. On the Inhibition 
condition on the Color-Word Interference Test, colour names are presented in different 
coloured ink, and participants are asked to name the ink colour and not read the word as 
fast as possible without making mistakes. Performances on both these subtests are timed 
and the completion time is recorded as raw scores. Higher scores indicate poorer cognitive 




Test have internal consistency ranging from .57 to .79 for children aged 8 to 12 years, and 
test-retest reliability ranging from .20 to .90 for children and adolescents aged 8 to 19 years 
(Delis et al., 2001). 
The Letter Number Sequencing subtest from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children – Fifth Edition (WISC-V; Wechsler, 2016) was used to index working memory. 
Participants are verbally presented with a combination of letters and numbers and are asked 
to recall the numbers first, in order, starting with the smallest number, then the letters in 
alphabetical order. The number of correct responses is summed to form a total raw score. 
Higher scores indicate better working memory ability. The Letter Number Sequencing has 
an internal consistency of .86 (Wechsler, 2016). 
 
The Self-Direction scale from the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System – Second 
Edition (ABAS-II; Harrison & Oakland, 2003) was used to assess participants’ functional 
capacity in everyday living. This scale requires parents to rate how frequent their child 
displays the 25 behaviours listed (e.g., “Routinely arrives at places on time”) on a 4-point 
Likert scale. The sum of all items on this scale provides a raw score. Higher scores indicate 
higher levels of self-direction and functional independence. The Self-Direction scale has 
internal consistency ranging from .91 to .94 for children aged 8 to 12 years and inter-rater 
reliability of .84 for individuals aged 5 to 21 years (Harrison & Oakland, 2003). 
 Procedure 
After obtaining written consent, participants were tested at their homes in a room 




measures were completed in approximately four hours over two sessions. For the VW-PM, 
participants took on average an hour to complete. At the end of the second session, 
participants were given movie vouchers as reimbursement of their time. The research was 
conducted with the approval of the human research ethics committee of Australian Catholic 
University (No. V201012; “Prospective memory and episodic future thinking in middle 
childhood”).  
 Data analysis 
All statistical tests were two-tailed and an alpha level of p < .05 was considered 
significant in all analyses. Raw scores on all measures were used in all analyses, except for 
the WASI-II where composite scores were used. Two participants in the control group were 
excluded from all analyses due to technical failure during task administration of the VW-
PM. Another control participant was also excluded because scores of 0 were obtained on all 
variables of the VW-PM, suggesting that this participant might not have understood the 
instructions of the game or was not sampled from our population of interest. Moreover, a 
missing value on the Letter Number Sequencing subtest for one control participant was 
replaced with the group mean (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). All assumptions were checked 
and found to be satisfied3.  
 
3 Given the smaller sample sizes included in Study 3 (n = 32 ASD, n = 42 controls) compared to Study 2 (n = 
40 ASD, n = 55 controls), only correlations were run to address the secondary research question regarding 
which cognitive ability might be related to PM in Study 3. Additional multiple regression analyses could not 





One of the time-based PM tasks had to be excluded due to an unforeseen technical 
error across all participants. In total, there were 15 PM tasks included in the analyses which 
comprised eight event-based PM tasks and seven time-based PM tasks. The retrospective 
memory variables obtained on Task Review Cards were also categorised into eight event-
based and seven time-based tasks, with the same time-based task excluded from all 
analyses. The percentages of correct PM tasks performed and retrospective memory for PM 
task content were used in all analyses. 
7.3 Results 
 Cognitive function and functional capacity 
Independent samples t-tests were performed to examine group differences on all 
cognitive function and functional capacity measures. Results revealed that there were no 
significant differences in age, Verbal Comprehension and retrospective memory between 
the ASD and control groups. However, children with ASD performed significantly lower 
than controls on Full Scale IQ4, Perceptual Reasoning, cognitive flexibility, inhibition and 
 
4 Two children with ASD were identified with comorbid medical conditions. These participants were initially 
included in the sample because additional information collected during the screening phase indicated that they 
showed no cognitive impairments (e.g., they attended mainstream schools and performed academically at the 
level expected for their age). When these two participants were excluded from the analyses, FSIQ and 
Perceptual Reasoning were not significantly different between the ASD and control groups (ps > .05, ds = 
0.41 and 0.45, respectively). However, the same pattern of results was obtained in the ANOVA analyses 
where ASD participants performed significantly poorer than controls on PM task performances. This indicates 
that the significant group difference in FSIQ with these two participants included in the sample is not likely to 
be the major cause for the poor PM task performance observed in the ASD group. Considering the challenges 
with recruiting ASD participants, these two participants were therefore included in the final analyses of the 
current study. Furthermore, it has been argued that groups are considered matched when the effect size of the 
group difference is d ≤ 0.5 (Landsiedel et al., 2017; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004; Williams et al., 2013). 
Since the group difference on FSIQ obtained d ≤ 0.5, our groups were considered matched on intellectual 




working memory. In addition, children with ASD were rated significantly lower on the 
ABAS-II Self-Direction scale than controls, indicating poorer functional behaviour (see 
Table 7.1. for descriptive statistics). 
 
Table 7.1.  
Background Characteristics of Participants in the ASD and Control Groups 
 ASD group  Control group   
 n = 32  n = 42   
 M SD  M SD t(72)a d 
Age (in years) 9.83 1.42  10.26 1.27 1.35 0.32 
Intelligence        
FSIQ 107.22 11.89  112.52 9.72 2.11* 0.49 
VCI 106.78 11.43  109.79 10.62 1.17 0.27 
PRI 106.44 13.33  112.76 11.47 2.19* 0.51 
Retrospective memory 10.06 2.65  10.88 2.42 1.38 0.32 
Executive functions        
Cognitive flexibility 123.09 55.45  91.69 29.89 2.90** 0.70 
Inhibition 98.75 25.39  76.24 20.96 4.18*** 0.97 
Working memory 15.61 3.68  18.02 2.84 3.24** 0.73 
Functional capacity 40.09 10.60  53.24 11.05 5.16*** 1.21 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
d = Cohen’s index of effect size; Cohen (1988) defines effect sizes of 0.2 as small, 0.5 as 
medium and 0.8 as large 
aHomogeneity of variance was violated for cognitive flexibility, df = 44.59 
ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, VCI = Verbal Comprehension 
Index, PRI = Perceptual Reasoning Index, Retrospective memory = Retrospective memory 





 Prospective memory 
A mixed-model two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to assess group 
differences and compare performance on event-based and time-based PM task types. Group 
(ASD, control) was the between-groups variable and PM task type (event, time) was the 
within-groups variable5. The dependent variable was the percentage of PM tasks correctly 
performed. The results showed a significant main effect of group, F(1, 72) = 14.41, p < 
.001,  = .17 (medium effect), with participants with ASD performing significantly 
poorer than controls across all PM tasks. Results also showed a significant main effect of 
PM task type, F(1, 72) = 48.96, p < .001,  = .41 (large effect), where all participants 
performed significantly poorer on time-based PM than event-based PM tasks. The two-way 
interaction between group and PM task type was not significant, F(1, 72) = .12, p = .73,  
= .002. Figure 7.2. presents task performance on each PM task type as a function of group. 
 
 
5 An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was considered to control for FSIQ as a potential confound. 
However, this analysis was deemed inappropriate in this situation because a significant difference in FSIQ 
was found between the ASD and control groups (Field, 2018; Miller & Chapman, 2001). Moreover, as 
previously noted, when two of the ASD participants were excluded, FSIQ was no longer found to be 
significant between the ASD and control group but the group difference in PM task performances remained 











Figure 7.2. Mean percentage of the correct number of prospective memory (PM) tasks 
performed for participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and controls. Error bars 
represent mean standard error. 
 
 Retrospective component of prospective memory 
A further two-way ANOVA was performed to assess participants’ ability to 
remember the task content of the PM tasks they were required to carry out, with the same 
between-groups variable of group (ASD, control) and the same within-groups variable of 
PM task type (event, time). The dependent variable was the percentage of PM tasks 
correctly remembered. Results revealed a significant main effect of group, F(1, 72) = 8.86, 
p = .004,  = .11 (medium effect), which suggested that participants with ASD showed 































addition, there was a significant main effect of PM task type, F(1, 72) = 6.30, p = .01,  = 
.08 (small effect), where all participants showed more difficulties remembering the content 
of time-based PM tasks than event-based PM tasks. There was no significant interaction 
between group and PM task type, F(1, 72) = .44, p = .51,  = .01 (see Figure 7.3.).  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Mean percentage of the correct number of prospective memory (PM) tasks 
remembered for participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and controls. Error bars 
represent mean standard error. 
 
 Correlates of prospective memory 
Partial correlations were run on measures of executive functioning, retrospective 

































based and time-based PM while controlling for age in ASD and control groups separately 
(see Table 7.2.). For the ASD group, retrospective memory for PM task content and 
retrospective memory (as measured on the List Memory Delayed) were significantly 
associated with event-based and time-based PM. By contrast, only the relationship between 
retrospective memory for PM task content and event-based PM task performance was 
significant for the control group. In addition, better event-based and time-based PM task 
performances were significantly correlated with executive functions for participants with 
ASD, but only time-based PM task performance was significantly correlated with working 
memory for controls.  
 
Table 7.2.  
Partial Correlations between PM Task Types, Retrospective Memory, Executive Functions 
and Functional Capacity, Controlling for Age for ASD and Control Groups Separately 
 ASD  Control 
 n = 32  n = 42 
 PM event PM time  PM event PM time 
Retrospective memory      
Task content .77*** .50**  .66*** .28 
LMD .65*** .40*  .05 .09 
Executive functions      
Cognitive flexibility - .57** - .37*  - .07 - .24 
Inhibition - .37* - .22  - .04 - .15 
Working memory .57** .55**  .12 .43** 
Functional capacity .02 .29  .05 .13 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, PM = Prospective Memory, Task content = 
Retrospective memory for PM task content measured on Virtual Week-Prospective 





The current study adds to a growing body of literature demonstrating PM 
impairment in children with ASD relative to typically developing children. More 
specifically, consistent with our hypothesis, the first key finding was that children with 
ASD performed worse than controls on time-based PM tasks. This is in line with six 
previous studies that have identified ASD-related impairment on time-based PM (Altgassen 
et al., 2012; Altgassen, Williams, et al., 2009; Henry et al., 2014; Kretschmer, Altgassen, et 
al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014), and as such supports the claim that 
these types of PM tasks are challenging for this clinical population. In addition, the current 
study provided insights into the possible contributions of retrospective memory and 
executive functions to this difficulty. In terms of retrospective memory, the results showed 
that children with ASD were poorer at remembering the content of the time-based PM tasks 
relative to the controls, which is consistent with past findings reporting retrospective 
memory deficits associated with the disorder (Boucher et al., 2012; Bowler et al., 2011). 
We also found that poorer retrospective memory for PM task content was significantly 
associated with poorer time-based PM task performance the ASD group. Together, then, 
the current findings suggest that children with ASD have significant difficulties encoding 
and retaining PM task information, and that these difficulties may contribute to their time-
based PM impairments. This finding contrasts with that of Henry et al. (2014) who 
concluded that difficulty with time-based PM tasks in children with ASD was unlikely to 
be related to reduced retrospective memory. However, as previously noted, their conclusion 
was based on the ASD group’s lack of difference in performance on PM tasks that varied in 




PM task content. Although other studies have directly examined retrospective memory for 
PM task content (Brandimonte et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2013), the specific contribution 
of retrospective memory to PM performance was not explored in these studies. In sum then, 
our study is the first to investigate the role of retrospective memory in PM in children with 
ASD using a direct measure of retrospective memory. Our findings suggest that failures in 
the retrospective component of PM may, at least in part, contribute to failures on time-
based PM tasks in this clinical group, and supports the argument that retrospective memory 
is integral to the successful completion of PM tasks (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; McDaniel 
& Einstein, 2007). Interestingly, our findings revealed that the ASD group did not 
significantly differ from controls on the delayed recall task which indexes the ability to 
recall general past information. Hence, this suggests that it is more valuable to assess 
retrospective memory for specific PM task content when investigating factors that might 
affect PM performance in children with ASD, rather than assessing more general 
retrospective memory ability.  
Consistent with the possibility that time-based PM deficits might also be linked to 
reduced executive functioning ability in children with ASD, significant group differences 
were found on all three measures of executive function in the current study (i.e., cognitive 
flexibility, working memory and inhibition). This is in line with the broader literature that 
highlights executive dysfunction as being a common feature of the disorder (Humphrey et 
al., 2011; McCrimmon et al., 2016). Furthermore, two of the three executive function 
measures (i.e., cognitive flexibility and working memory) were significantly associated 
with time-based PM performance in the ASD group. These findings therefore suggest, 




which may compromise the ability to maintain the PM intention during the completion of 
the ongoing task while monitoring for task cues. They also suggest that time-based PM 
deficits may be related to lower cognitive flexibility, possibly by hindering efficient 
switching between the ongoing tasks and execution of the PM tasks at the appropriate 
points. However, it should be noted that the current findings are not in line with a past 
study that failed to find an association between cognitive flexibility and time-based PM in 
children with ASD (Williams et al., 2013) nor with another study that showed limited 
evidence of this relationship (Henry et al., 2014). As such, future work is needed to 
establish the robustness of the current pattern of findings to other clinical samples.  
With regard to event-based PM, the current study showed that children with ASD 
performed significantly worse than controls, suggesting deficits in this aspect of PM. This 
finding supports past evidence from some studies that reported similar impairment 
(Brandimonte et al., 2011; Sheppard et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2014), but is inconsistent with 
others showing intact event-based PM ability in this clinical group (Altgassen et al., 2010; 
Henry et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013). Our results also revealed impaired ability to 
remember the content of event-based PM tasks in children with ASD relative to controls 
and showed that poorer retrospective memory for task content was associated with poorer 
event-based PM in the clinical group. Because previous studies investigating event-based 
PM in ASD did not assess the association between retrospective memory for PM task 
content and PM performance (Altgassen et al., 2010; Henry et al., 2014; Williams et al., 
2013; Yi et al., 2014), our findings provide the first evidence for this relationship and 
reinforce the argument that reduced retrospective memory for PM task content may be an 




In relation to executive functions, as previously noted, the children with ASD 
showed poorer performances on all three measures of executive functions than controls in 
the current study. Furthermore, given that all three executive functions were also 
significantly associated with event-based PM performance, this suggests that executive 
dysfunction may also be an important contributor to event-based PM deficits in the ASD 
group. While these findings are not in line with Henry et al.’s (2014) study, which did not 
suggest a key role for cognitive flexibility in event-based PM, they do align to some degree 
with the study by Yi et al. (2014). Specifically, Yi et al. (2014) found impaired event-based 
PM to be related to reduced working memory, although not to reduced cognitive flexibility 
or inhibition in children with ASD. Taken together, then, it appears that there is some 
evidence to suggest that executive dysfunctions are related to poorer event-based PM 
function in children with ASD, further emphasising the importance of executive functions 
in supporting the completion of PM tasks (Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014). However, given 
limited number of studies and the mixed findings to date, more work is needed to further 
clarify the nature and extent of these relationships in this clinical group. 
Within the context of typical development, our findings revealed that better 
retrospective memory for PM task content was associated with better event-based PM 
performance, but not with better time-based PM performance in the control group (i.e., 
typically developing children). Such a pattern of findings is perhaps unsurprising as event-
based PM task performance is more likely to be a reflection of the capacity to remember 
PM task content and less influenced by variations in other complex cognitive skills, at least 
for typical developing populations, considering that cognitive demands are generally lower 




& Einstein, 2007). This claim is supported, for example, by the current findings which 
showed a lack of association between executive functions and event-based PM, but a 
positive association between executive function (specifically working memory) and time-
based PM. This relationship between time-based PM and working memory was also 
reported in another recent study of typically developing children (Zuber et al., 2019). Given 
that time-based tasks require the ability to self-monitor for task cues, as previously 
mentioned, these findings together may suggest that time-based PM specifically imposes 
demands on working memory because PM intentions may need to be constantly rehearsed 
in mind so that PM tasks can be performed at the appropriate time (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007; Williams et al., 2014; Zuber et al., 2019). That said, because the current study and the 
study by Zuber et al. (2019) found that time-based PM was not associated with cognitive 
flexibility and inhibition, these findings together suggest that executive functions may play 
a less central role in time-based PM for typically developing populations than previously 
argued in the literature (Kliegel et al., 2008; Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014). As such, future 
studies should aim to explore other possible cognitive abilities such as time-monitoring to 
achieve a more comprehensive picture of the contributors to time-based PM performance in 
typically developing children. 
Other notable findings in the current study were that both children with ASD and 
controls performed significantly worse on time-based PM relative to event-based PM tasks, 
and also showed poorer retrospective memory for time-based PM task content than event-
based PM task content. These results therefore suggest that the greater impairments in time-
based PM relative to event-based PM in the ASD group may partly be explained by poorer 




then raises the question of why this might be the case. It is unlikely to be due to varying 
retrospective demands across the two PM task types, as both similarly require the ability to 
encode and retain information related to the PM tasks. Instead, one possibility is that during 
the process of encoding PM intentions, it might be easier to imagine the context in which 
an event-based task needs to be carried out (e.g., buy milk at the supermarket) than when a 
time-based PM task is to be performed (e.g., ring the plumber at 5 p.m.). Mentally pre-
experiencing the specific context in which the PM task needs to be completed may thus 
strengthen encoding of the association between event-based PM task cue and execution of 
the PM task, leading to greater likelihood that the PM intention will be retrieved and 
executed when the task cue is encountered (Altgassen et al., 2015; Schacter et al., 2017; 
Szpunar, 2010). There is indeed emerging evidence showing a link between episodic future 
thinking (i.e., the ability to mentally pre-experience hypothetical self-relevant future 
scenarios; Atance & O'Neill, 2001), retrospective memory for PM task content, and PM 
performance in typically developing children of a similar age group to that in the current 
study (Terrett et al., 2019). Episodic future thinking may therefore be another important 
contributor that underpins PM task performance in children with ASD. This possibility is 
worthy of direct investigation in future empirical studies, particularly given that episodic 
future thinking has been shown to be impaired in this clinical group (e.g., Hanson & 
Atance, 2014; Terrett et al., 2013). 
The final aim of the current study was to examine whether PM difficulties were 
related to functional capacity in children with ASD. Our results revealed that there were no 
associations between functional capacity and event-based or time-based PM in either 




is crucial in supporting daily functioning in children (Mahy, Moses, et al., 2014), and are 
not in line with past findings of a relationship between time-based PM and functional 
capacity in children with ASD (Henry et al., 2014). It is possible that these discrepant 
findings could reflect differences between the two samples of children with ASD in their 
exposure to interventions that aim to improve daily functioning, which were neither 
assessed in the current study nor reported in Henry et al.’s study. Another possibility is that 
the Self-Direction subscale on the ABAS-II may be limited in capturing the relevant 
aspects of daily functioning that might be related to PM in children. Since this is only the 
second study to examine whether PM difficulties relate to functional outcomes in children 
with ASD, further research will be needed to clarify these relationships.  
In sum, our findings contribute to the growing evidence of impaired time-based PM 
ability in children with ASD and add to the currently mixed literature on event-based PM 
ability, specifically supporting past studies that suggest this aspect of PM is also impaired. 
Importantly, our results identified difficulties in retrospective memory for PM task content 
and executive functioning as potential cognitive abilities that contribute to the pervasive 
impairments in PM performance in children with the disorder. Given that there remains 
limited understanding about the mechanisms underlying PM performance in this clinical 
group, it is suggested that future studies focus on delineating these mechanisms. Such 
research could shed further light on the possible preserved or impaired mechanisms that 
support or hinder the completion of PM tasks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that 
retrospective memory for PM task content and executive functioning could be targeted in 
interventions to improve PM performance in children with ASD. Finally, although 




the current study, future studies could explore the influence of PM on functional outcomes 
in children with ASD using a more appropriate daily functioning measure that might be 






This final chapter aims to integrate the findings of the three empirical studies 
presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 in the current thesis. The chapter will begin by reiterating 
the objectives of the three studies and summarising the results of each, followed by a 
discussion of the implications of these findings. Limitations and strengths of the overall 
research project will be presented before concluding the chapter with a section highlighting 





8.1 Summary of Aims and Results of Empirical Studies 
 Study 1 
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate whether difficulties in scene construction 
and/or self-projection through time might contribute to impairments in episodic future 
thinking in children with ASD. The results firstly demonstrated that children with ASD 
performed worse than controls when asked to imagine and describe a personal future 
scenario, thus confirming past findings of an impairment in episodic future thinking in this 
group. However, the findings of Study 1 also extended the ASD literature by showing that 
difficulties in scene construction may be a key factor underlying these episodic future 
thinking deficits, while difficulty in self-projection through time does not appear to be a 
major contributor. In addition, the data revealed that compromised general perspective 
shifting ability may be additionally contributing to impairments in episodic future thinking 
in this clinical group. 
 Study 2 
The primary aim of Study 2 was to extend prior research in ASD by investigating 
whether the functional aspect of episodic future thinking (i.e., episodic foresight) might be 
impaired in children with the disorder. This study also aimed to identify the extent to which 
any deficits in episodic foresight in ASD might be contributed to by difficulties in 
retrospective memory and/or executive functions. Moreover, Study 2 examined whether 
any deficits in episodic foresight in ASD might be related to poor adaptive functioning. 
This study provided the first evidence of a reduced capacity for episodic foresight in 
children with ASD using a novel behavioural measure that was developed based on the four 




& Corballis, 2010; Suddendorf et al., 2011). More specifically, the findings revealed that 
while children with ASD were able to correctly acquire beneficial items in anticipation of 
potential future problems as well as controls, they were less able to subsequently use these 
items to solve the problems at the appropriate point in the future. This difficulty was not 
attributable to deficits in retrospective memory or executive functions. Finally, the results 
of Study 2 showed that better episodic foresight ability was associated with better 
functional capacity in controls, but no relationship was found between episodic foresight 
and adaptive behaviour in daily life in children with ASD. 
 Study 3 
The primary aim of Study 3 was to investigate the pattern of performances on event-
based and time-based PM tasks in children with ASD using a reliable measure called VW-
PM. In addition, this study aimed to explore whether PM impairments might be related to 
difficulties in retrospective memory and/or executive functions, and poor adaptive 
behaviour in daily life in this clinical group. Study 3 is only the second in the literature to 
examine both event-based and time-based PM within the same sample of children with 
ASD in a context that simulates everyday life using a reliable PM measure. The findings 
revealed pervasive deficits across both event-based and time-based PM tasks types in 
children with ASD relative to controls. Failures to complete event-based and time-based 
PM tasks were related to poor retrospective memory for PM task content as well as 
disruptions in executive functioning in this clinical group. However, no associations were 
found between PM abilities and adaptive behaviour in daily life in either children with ASD 




8.2 Contributions of the Study Findings to the ASD Literature 
Children with ASD have well-established deficits on a range of cognitive abilities 
including theory of mind, executive functioning, episodic memory and relational memory, 
and these deficits have been argued to contribute to the functional difficulties associated 
with ASD (Bowler et al., 2011; Brent, Rios, Happé, & Charman, 2004; Craig et al., 2016; 
Kenny et al., 2019; Kring, Johnson, Davison, & Neale, 2014). By contrast, cognitive 
abilities of children with ASD in relation to prospection have attracted much less empirical 
attention. By focusing on this area, specifically on the key aspects of episodic future 
thinking (including episodic foresight) and PM, the current thesis extends the ASD 
literature by providing a more fine-grained profile of abilities in the area of prospection. 
More specifically, the current results indicate that different forms of prospection may be 
additional areas of cognitive impairment for children with the disorder. However, another 
key contribution of the current project was the positive finding that the capacity to initiate 
preparatory behaviours in the present in anticipation of future events, a core aspect of 
episodic foresight, appeared intact in children with ASD. This is an important finding as it 
may have important implications for the development of treatment approaches that aim to 
improve episodic foresight.  
8.3 Implications for Interventions in Children with ASD 
Children with ASD are often reported to struggle coping with the demands of 
everyday living, leading to poor functioning in the classroom and at home (Jordan, 2011; 
Mckeithan & Sabornie, 2019; Thomeer et al., 2019). Consequently, a range of classroom 
and home strategies have been developed and used by parents and teachers to support the 




Mckeithan & Sabornie, 2019; Stokes et al., 2017). In addition, in clinical practice, 
interventions have been tailored for high-functioning children with ASD to remediate well-
established cognitive deficits experienced such as executive dysfunction (McCrimmon et 
al., 2016). However, given the limited research on episodic future thinking and episodic 
foresight in children with ASD, no studies have yet reported the development of 
appropriate interventions for the remediation deficits in these abilities in this group. The 
findings of the current thesis are thus valuable in expanding current knowledge about this 
aspect of cognitive functioning in children with ASD and can help inform and guide the 
development of strategies to support it.  
One possible avenue could be to adapt current interventions targeting other aspects 
of cognitive impairment in ASD such as episodic memory deficits, to address specific 
impairments in episodic future thinking, including episodic foresight, in this clinical group. 
For example, this could include adapting story-based interventions that have been proposed 
to be a useful approach in targeting impairments in recalling details of specific past events 
in children with ASD (Hutchins & Prelock, 2018). In this intervention, children are asked 
to reconstruct past scenarios in a story-based format with the support of an adult. Visual 
cues are used, as appropriate, to prompt children to draw a series of pictures of those past 
scenarios detailing what they saw, smelled, heard, thought and felt as a way of enhancing 
their re-experiencing of the past. The children are also asked to reflect on how their past 
experiences could guide their future behaviours (Hutchins & Prelock, 2018). It may be 
feasible then that this type of story-based intervention could be extended to target the 




Story-based interventions could also be extended to incorporate scenarios that 
require the application of episodic foresight, such as presenting situations in which children 
are required to acquire and use items to solve problems in anticipation of imagined future 
scenarios. Given the findings of Study 2 showed an intact capacity to acquire items but an 
impaired capacity to subsequently use the acquired items, however, it may be that 
specifically targeting impairments in the latter capacity might be most beneficial in 
increasing successful application of episodic foresight. For instance, using the story-based 
intervention, children may first be encouraged to independently initiate preparatory 
behaviours for an anticipated future and then taught to generate rich details of a range of 
scenarios in which their previously secured benefits may be adaptively applied at future 
time points. This may in turn increase the likelihood that they will recognise the appropriate 
context in which actions should be taken to achieve the most desirable outcomes. Such a 
direct training approach to improve cognitive functioning has been shown to be effective in 
past studies (Rose et al., 2015; Schaffer & Geva, 2016; Zhao, Fu, & Maes, 2019), and thus 
may be a potential treatment option for the remediation of deficits in episodic future 
thinking and episodic foresight, in children with ASD.  
In relation to PM, there is currently limited understanding of strategies that may be 
useful in remediating deficits in this capacity in children with ASD. Research with other 
clinical populations may, however, inform the development of potential approaches to 
target PM impairments in this group. For example, compensatory strategies such as the use 
of external aids have been implemented to support successful PM performance in daily life 
for individuals with acquired brain injury (Mahan, Rous, & Adlam, 2017; Raskin, 




These external aids may be an audio-visual message alert on a smartphone or an alarm tone 
to remind an individual to carry out required PM tasks at the appropriate future points 
(Dewar, Kapur, & Kopelman, 2018; Evald, 2015; Mahan et al., 2017). These types of 
external devices may reduce demands on cognitive resources such as executive functions 
that may be involved in monitoring appropriate cues for task performance (Mahan et al., 
2017; Talbot, Müller, & Kerns, 2018), and thus support the successful execution of PM 
tasks. Given the findings in Study 3 showed that children with ASD have significant 
difficulties carrying out PM tasks, the use of such external devices may therefore be helpful 
for this group. However, it should be noted that the findings in Study 3 also revealed that 
failures of the ASD group to complete PM tasks were related to a reduced capacity to 
remember specific PM task content. As such, strategies that primarily aid the execution of 
PM tasks at appropriate future points (e.g., an alarm tone) may not be sufficient to support 
successful task completion in children with ASD. Additional strategies may therefore be 
required to compensate for their difficulties with encoding and retention of PM task 
information (i.e., what action is required and when it is to be performed). One option could 
be that the use of electronic devices such as smartphones be extended to also save details of 
specific PM task content, as well as prompt the execution of PM tasks (Evald, 2015).  
While electronic devices such as smartphones have the capacity to provide valuable 
support for both the retrospective and prospective aspects of a PM task, they may not, 
however, be easily accessible in classroom settings for children to use. In that context then, 
it is suggested that other devices appropriate for children could be used to cue task 
execution, such as MotivAider which silently vibrates at specific set times (Moore, 




strategies that help alleviate difficulties in retrospective memory for PM task content, such 
as visual schedules. Visual schedules are commonly adopted in classrooms and at home to 
manage executive dysfunction and alleviate anxiety associated with unpredictability in 
children with ASD (Kellems, Gabrielsen, & Williams, 2016; McCrimmon et al., 2016), and 
could potentially be adapted to support PM performance (Altgassen et al., 2010; Altgassen, 
Williams, et al., 2009; Kretschmer, Altgassen, et al., 2014). More specifically, written 
instructions for the completion of PM tasks (i.e., what is to be performed and when to 
perform the tasks) may be incorporated into visual schedules to compensate for 
retrospective memory difficulties. Such an integrated approach to help manage difficulties 
regarding retention and execution of PM tasks in children with ASD may reduce their 
dependence on adults to provide prompts for task completion and in turn can facilitate 
independence in the classroom and at home. 
Another approach to improving PM performance in children with ASD could be via 
training this group to implement strategies that enhance encoding of PM task content. This 
may involve making explicit plans about when, where, and how a PM task will be 
performed at a specific point in the future (e.g., When I walk into the classroom in the 
morning, I will hand the signed school note to the teacher; Foster, McDaniel, & Rendell, 
2017; Mioni, Rendell, Terrett, & Stablum, 2015). It has been argued that this strategy, 
which often referred to as implementation intentions, is effective in facilitating PM task 
performance through strengthening associations between PM cue (i.e., walking into the 
classroom) and PM action (i.e., handing the school note to the teacher). Stronger encoding 
of the link between PM cue and action may lead to increased likelihood of automatic 




PM task (Foster et al., 2017; Spiess et al., 2016). There have in fact been preliminary 
findings of the beneficial effects of this strategy on PM task completion in adults with ASD 
(Kretschmer, Altgassen, et al., 2014), and as such it could also be used with children with 
ASD.  
8.4 Future Research Directions 
As noted, episodic foresight is a largely overlooked area of study in the current 
literature on prospection. However, given the suggested impact of this capacity on 
successful daily functioning, it is perhaps not surprising that there has been a recent call for 
increased research on this topic (Miloyan, McFarlane, & Suddendorf, 2019). After all, it 
has been argued that the primary function of imagining the future is to modify behaviours 
accordingly in the present to achieve optimal future outcomes (Baumeister et al., 2016; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). The first avenue for future research would therefore be to 
conduct further investigations of episodic foresight ability in ASD, and perhaps in other 
vulnerable clinical populations, to more clearly establish the extent and nature of 
impairments in this ability in these groups. However, it appears that there is currently a 
limited number of appropriate measures of episodic foresight in the literature. Therefore, an 
additional area of future research would be the further development of measurement 
approaches for episodic foresight based on the criteria proposed by Suddendorf and 
Corballis (2010). It is also suggested that researchers should consider an increased use of 
the VW-Foresight measure in future studies to investigate episodic foresight. In VW-
Foresight, episodic foresight was operationalised as the capacity to acquire useful items in 




at appropriate future points to achieve the most desirable outcomes. This proved to be a 
valuable approach as it revealed an uneven profile of episodic foresight ability in children 
with ASD. The VW-Foresight measure as well as the development of other measures 
reflecting the principles outlined by Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) may therefore help 
identify specific areas of impairment in episodic foresight in clinical groups, which will in 
turn guide the development of tailored interventions targeting these impairments. 
Additional research would also be valuable to further deconstruct mechanisms that 
underlie episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and PM in children with ASD. For 
example, it is suggested that the capacity to pre-experience the self in mentally simulated 
future scenarios may be a critical foundation for episodic foresight and PM. It may 
therefore be proposed that episodic future thinking, episodic foresight and PM are closely 
related forms of prospection. However, current understanding of the links between these 
future-oriented cognitive abilities remains limited in the literature as most past studies have 
investigated episodic future thinking and PM in isolation, and very few studies have 
explored episodic foresight. Although there is emerging evidence of an association between 
episodic future thinking and PM (Altgassen, Kretschmer, & Schnitzspahn, 2017; Altgassen 
et al., 2015; Kretschmer-Trendowicz et al., 2019; Nigro, Brandimonte, Cicogna, & 
Cosenza, 2014; Terrett et al., 2019; Terrett, Rose, et al., 2016), there are no studies to date 
that have examined episodic future thinking in relation to episodic foresight. Increased 
research will be needed to delineate processes that link the different forms of prospection to 
develop a better understanding of how deficits in common underlying abilities may 




establishing a finer-grained profile of prospection abilities will enhance understanding of 
the disorder and determine specific areas of support needed for this clinical population. 
8.5 Limitations and Strengths of the Overall Research Project 
While the current research project has provided novel insights into prospection in 
children with ASD, there are some limitations that should be acknowledged. Firstly, it 
should be noted that the confirmation of ASD diagnoses was obtained via clinical reports 
from relevant professionals (i.e., paediatricians and psychologists) and supported by the 
results of the SCQ. However, information regarding the presence of other possible common 
comorbid developmental disorders or psychiatric conditions such as attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder and anxiety disorder was 
provided by parents of the children with ASD. Hence, it may be that some children with 
ASD recruited for the current project may also have had other conditions not yet formally 
diagnosed by clinicians. The potential inclusion of children with ASD who have comorbid 
conditions may impede an accurate understanding of prospection associated with ASD.  
Secondly, the List Memory Delayed task used to index retrospective memory in 
Studies 2 and 3 appears to primarily assess the ability to recall a list of meaningless, 
unrelated words, which may not be relevant for the application of episodic foresight and 
PM in everyday life. Future studies should therefore consider using a different measure of 
memory, such as a more specific episodic memory measure, to allow further understanding 
of the role of specific types of memory in prospection in children with ASD. In addition, 
the ABAS-II Self-Direction subscale (Harrison & Oakland, 2003) used in the current 




related to episodic foresight and PM. For example, while some items relevant to 
prospection are included within the Self-Direction subscale (e.g., “Plans ahead to allow 
enough time to complete big projects”), other items appear to be less relevant (e.g., “Works 
hard on assigned tasks or chores that are not liked”). A combination of these different types 
of items may cause this subscale to be less sensitive to prospection difficulties. This may 
have partially contributed to the non-significant relationships between aspects of 
prospection and adaptive functioning in Studies 2 and 3. Furthermore, the Self-Direction 
subscale only taps a relatively restricted domain of adaptive functioning. Future research 
should therefore consider assessing a wider range of adaptive skills and using a measure of 
daily functioning that reflects more closely the adaptive functions of prospection. This will 
in turn enable a better understanding of whether poor episodic foresight and PM might 
contribute to the poor functional outcomes observed in children with ASD.  
Thirdly, it is noted that the precise executive processes that may be involved in 
episodic future thinking and episodic foresight cannot yet be fully determined in the current 
thesis. This is because there remains a paucity in research on the relationship between 
executive functioning and episodic future thinking or episodic foresight. In addition, most 
past studies in the broader literature have used different tasks to examine executive 
functioning, leading to the current lack of specificity in identifying which executive 
functions might be most implicated in episodic future thinking and episodic foresight. 
Increased research studies with the aim of systematically examining specific types of 
executive functions will therefore be useful in providing a clearer picture of which specific 




Despite the limitations in the current research project, there are a number of 
strengths that should be highlighted. The first is the inclusion of a large battery of cognitive 
measures in our testing protocol which allowed investigation of the relationships between a 
wide range of cognitive functions and prospection. Thus, our findings across the three 
studies have provided a comprehensive understanding of key aspects of prospection and 
their underlying mechanisms in children with ASD. Moreover, the empirical studies in the 
current thesis included relatively large samples of children with ASD (n > 30) in 
comparison to past studies of prospection which mostly comprised small samples of 
participants with ASD (n ≤ 20). Larger samples of participants included in the current 
project thus provided greater power for the statistical analyses performed, in turn increased 
reliability of the obtained findings. Although larger sample sizes would have been desirable 
for the correlational and regression analyses in Studies 2 and 3 (as discussed in Chapter 4), 
findings in these studies have nevertheless provided preliminary understanding of the 
possible cognitive abilities that might be related to episodic foresight and PM. Future 
studies should aim to replicate these two studies with larger samples for increased 
confidence in the obtained findings.   
Another strength of this research project was the use of a novel behavioural measure 
of episodic foresight that was developed strictly according to the proposed criteria in the 
literature (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010). As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the use of a measure based on these criteria leads to increased confidence that 
the future-directed behaviours observed in participants were the result of the application of 
episodic foresight rather than other factors (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005). Although the 




nevertheless be viewed as a valuable tool in assessing episodic foresight given its 
successful use in past adult studies (e.g., Lyons et al., 2019; Terrett, Lyons, et al., 2016). It 
is also acknowledged that further investigation of the validity of VW-Foresight two-day 
version in children will be required to increase confidence of its use in future studies. 
Considering the potential value of this measure in studies with various paediatric 
populations to investigate episodic foresight, it will therefore be beneficial for future 
research to invest in the refinement of the children’s version of VW-Foresight.  
Lastly, Study 3 in the thesis is one of the few studies in the current ASD literature 
that has employed a reliable behavioural measure of PM. As noted in Chapter 7, the 
reliability estimates for PM tasks on VW-PM in the current samples were found to be 
relatively high for both children with ASD and typically developing children. Furthermore, 
rather than repetitively pressing keys on a keyboard in response to target PM cues as in the 
typical laboratory-based measures of PM, the use of VW-PM allowed the assessment of 
PM abilities in a simulated everyday life context. Thus, results obtained on VW-PM reflect 
PM abilities that arguably have more direct relevance to real life functioning. As such, the 
current findings are suggested to be valuable in informing the development of effective 
strategies that are more applicable to the daily situations encountered by children with 
ASD. However, it is noted that increased research will be needed to investigate the validity 
of the measure in paediatric clinical populations. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Relative to the wealth of knowledge on various cognitive deficits such as theory of 




thinking, episodic foresight and PM has been somewhat neglected in the ASD literature. 
Whilst there is growing evidence of impairments in these abilities, much more remains to 
be understood regarding these cognitive abilities and how they might be compromised in 
this clinical group. This thesis extends our current knowledge of the cognitive deficits 
associated with ASD by shedding light on the specific areas that are intact and 
compromised in key aspects of prospection, as well as delineating the nature of these 
deficits. The unique pattern of results shown in this thesis may be an important stepping 
stone for future research to further explore different forms of prospection in children with 
ASD. A greater understanding in this area could in turn guide implementation of 
appropriate strategies to help alleviate difficulties in daily living for these children. The 
provision of a better support system for children with ASD could maximise their learning 
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Appendix A. Screenshots of the Children’s Version VW-Foresight Game 






























Appendix B. Screenshots of the Children’s Version VW-PM Game 
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